Guzell v. Civil Service Com

9 Citing cases

  1. Shea v. Civil Service Comm'n

    586 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 1 times

    • 4 In support of its contention that John's discharge was reasonable, the Department cites case law which supports its authority to determine in the first instance the sanction to be imposed for employee misconduct. (See Holliday v. Civil Service Comm'n (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 763, 460 N.E.2d 358 (in which a Department of Revenue employee's discharge for conflict of interest was affirmed on appeal); see also Guzell v. Civil Service Comm'n (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351 (in which a Department of Revenue employee was discharged for accepting $3 from a taxpayer to change a tax return. This discharge was also upheld on appeal).)

  2. Kinter v. Bd. of Fire Police Comm'rs

    550 N.E.2d 1126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 14 times
    Stating that police officer's refusal to abide by order given by superior that he submit to drug test constituted insubordination that warranted dismissal

    We do not agree. • 1, 2 The complaint in an administrative hearing need not be as precisely drawn as those before a trial court ( Guzell v. Civil Service Comm'n (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 272, 308 N.E.2d 351, 356), although it must be sufficient to allow the defendant to prepare an adequate defense. ( Martich v. Ellis (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 1098, 1101, 427 N.E.2d 876, 878.)

  3. Holliday v. Civil Service Com

    460 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 11 times
    In Holliday v. Civil Service Comm'n (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 763, 460 N.E.2d 358, the appellate court refused to consider an appellant's arguments which were not supported by authority.

    • 7 The penultimate issue raised by Holliday is whether the fact that Holliday was shown to have no business interest in LSI refutes as a matter of law the claim that there was a conflict of interest. Offering the behavior found in the case of Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351, as the type of behavior which may result in discharge, Holliday urges that since he had no technical business interest in LSI, the Civil Service Commission incorrectly found that cause was established for which he might be discharged. Holliday's interpretation of Guzell is that there must be some type of remuneration to establish a conflict of interest. In this case, Holliday claims that all he did was give money to the corporation, not receive it.

  4. Giampa v. Civil Service Com

    89 Ill. App. 3d 606 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 23 times
    Holding there is nothing inherently repugnant to due process in requiring a party to choose between giving testimony at a disciplinary hearing and keeping silent, even though giving testimony at the hearing may damage his criminal case and keeping silent will most likely lead to loss of his employment

    The charges or a complaint in an administrative proceeding need not be drawn with the same precision as required of pleadings in a judicial proceeding. ( Strickland v. Department of Registration Education (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 1, 376 N.E.2d 255; Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351.) The charge in an administrative proceeding is required to advise adequately the respondent as to the charges so that he will be able intelligently to prepare his defense.

  5. Rasky v. Dept. of Registration Education

    410 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that charges in an administrative hearing do not have to be drawn with the same precision as judicial pleadings, but "need only be drawn sufficiently so that the alleged wrongdoer is reasonably apprised of the case against him to intelligently prepare his defense"

    Plaintiff next posits that the complaint did not state a cause of action because (1) he was not reasonably apprised of the charges against him since the Municipal Code violations were not specifically set forth; and (2) there was no allegation that he had notice of the violations. Concerning the first reason, we note that charges filed before an administrative agency need not be drawn with the precision required of pleadings in judicial actions. ( Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351.) They need only be drawn sufficiently so that the alleged wrong-doer is reasonably apprised of the case against him to intelligently prepare his defense.

  6. Talman v. Dept. of Registration Education

    397 N.E.2d 151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 13 times
    In Talman v. Department of Registration Education, 78 Ill. App.3d 450, 456, 397 N.E.2d 151, 155 (1979), a complaint that a physician improperly dispensed medication was sufficient, even though it merely stated the physician dispensed certain amounts of one drug within an eight-month period and another drug within a one-year period.

    Furthermore, had the plaintiff desired a more extensive detailing of the charges, he should have requested a bill of particulars. Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351. • 6 The plaintiff next argues the revocation of his license based upon a violation of the "good faith" provision of the Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1102(w)) is void because the provision is vague and uncertain and unlawfully delegates legislative powers to the Board of Pharmacy, thereby denying him due process.

  7. Hall v. Lyons

    71 Ill. App. 3d 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 8 times

    In order to guarantee him ample opportunity to prepare his defense, the hearing was ordered continued until February 4, when evidence pertinent to this cause began to be adduced. The written charges filed in an administrative proceeding must simply apprise the accused of the charges against him with reasonable certainty ( Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351) so as to enable him to intelligently prepare his defense. ( Wierenga v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 270, 352 N.E.2d 322.)

  8. Wells v. Health Hospitals Gov. Com

    367 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 3 times
    In Wells the commission failed to comply with a rule requiring that it give written notice to an employee of circumstances giving rise to any disciplinary action against him.

    ( Tarr, at 42. See also Kelly v. Police Board of Chicago (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 559, 323 N.E.2d 624; Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351.)

  9. Opinion No. 1991-232

    Opinion No. 1991-232 (Ops.Ark.Atty.Gen. Sep. 3, 1991)

    Outside employment limitations or prohibitions that are aimed at avoiding conflicts or incompatibility between private interests and public duties have, in various employment settings, withstood challenges based on assertions that they violate due process of law. 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law (1985). See, e.g., Mackey v. Graham, 99 Wash.2d 572, 663 P.2d 490 (1983); Guzell v. Civil Service Commission, 17 Ill. App. 3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351 (1974). And because there appears to be no "suspect class" involved, so as to trigger "strict scrutiny," the limitation on the registered sanitarians' private employment need only have a rational basis, and be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, in order to withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.