• 4 In support of its contention that John's discharge was reasonable, the Department cites case law which supports its authority to determine in the first instance the sanction to be imposed for employee misconduct. (See Holliday v. Civil Service Comm'n (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 763, 460 N.E.2d 358 (in which a Department of Revenue employee's discharge for conflict of interest was affirmed on appeal); see also Guzell v. Civil Service Comm'n (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351 (in which a Department of Revenue employee was discharged for accepting $3 from a taxpayer to change a tax return. This discharge was also upheld on appeal).)
We do not agree. • 1, 2 The complaint in an administrative hearing need not be as precisely drawn as those before a trial court ( Guzell v. Civil Service Comm'n (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 272, 308 N.E.2d 351, 356), although it must be sufficient to allow the defendant to prepare an adequate defense. ( Martich v. Ellis (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 1098, 1101, 427 N.E.2d 876, 878.)
• 7 The penultimate issue raised by Holliday is whether the fact that Holliday was shown to have no business interest in LSI refutes as a matter of law the claim that there was a conflict of interest. Offering the behavior found in the case of Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351, as the type of behavior which may result in discharge, Holliday urges that since he had no technical business interest in LSI, the Civil Service Commission incorrectly found that cause was established for which he might be discharged. Holliday's interpretation of Guzell is that there must be some type of remuneration to establish a conflict of interest. In this case, Holliday claims that all he did was give money to the corporation, not receive it.
The charges or a complaint in an administrative proceeding need not be drawn with the same precision as required of pleadings in a judicial proceeding. ( Strickland v. Department of Registration Education (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 1, 376 N.E.2d 255; Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351.) The charge in an administrative proceeding is required to advise adequately the respondent as to the charges so that he will be able intelligently to prepare his defense.
Plaintiff next posits that the complaint did not state a cause of action because (1) he was not reasonably apprised of the charges against him since the Municipal Code violations were not specifically set forth; and (2) there was no allegation that he had notice of the violations. Concerning the first reason, we note that charges filed before an administrative agency need not be drawn with the precision required of pleadings in judicial actions. ( Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351.) They need only be drawn sufficiently so that the alleged wrong-doer is reasonably apprised of the case against him to intelligently prepare his defense.
Furthermore, had the plaintiff desired a more extensive detailing of the charges, he should have requested a bill of particulars. Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351. • 6 The plaintiff next argues the revocation of his license based upon a violation of the "good faith" provision of the Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1102(w)) is void because the provision is vague and uncertain and unlawfully delegates legislative powers to the Board of Pharmacy, thereby denying him due process.
In order to guarantee him ample opportunity to prepare his defense, the hearing was ordered continued until February 4, when evidence pertinent to this cause began to be adduced. The written charges filed in an administrative proceeding must simply apprise the accused of the charges against him with reasonable certainty ( Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351) so as to enable him to intelligently prepare his defense. ( Wierenga v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 270, 352 N.E.2d 322.)
( Tarr, at 42. See also Kelly v. Police Board of Chicago (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 559, 323 N.E.2d 624; Guzell v. Civil Service Com. (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351.)
Outside employment limitations or prohibitions that are aimed at avoiding conflicts or incompatibility between private interests and public duties have, in various employment settings, withstood challenges based on assertions that they violate due process of law. 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law (1985). See, e.g., Mackey v. Graham, 99 Wash.2d 572, 663 P.2d 490 (1983); Guzell v. Civil Service Commission, 17 Ill. App. 3d 266, 308 N.E.2d 351 (1974). And because there appears to be no "suspect class" involved, so as to trigger "strict scrutiny," the limitation on the registered sanitarians' private employment need only have a rational basis, and be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, in order to withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.