No. 05-10-00681-CR
Opinion issued February 18, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F07-51594-LY.
Before Chief Justice WRIGHT and Justices BRIDGES and LAGARDE.
The Honorable Sue Lagarde, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
Opinion By Justice LAGARDE.
Appellant Joshua Lee Guyton appeals his conviction for robbery. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry into his competency, thus violating his right to due process. We affirm.
Background
Appellant was indicted for the offense of robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a) (West 2003). Appellant waived a jury, pleaded guilty to the robbery, and pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph charging a previous conviction for burglary of a habitation. The trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on community supervision for ten years. The State later filed motions to adjudicate on two separate occasions, but the trial court modified the conditions and continued appellant on community supervision. The State filed a third motion to adjudicate, alleging appellant violated the conditions of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded true to the allegations in a hearing on the motion. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty of robbery, and assessed punishment at fifteen years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Competency Inquiry
In his sole point of error, appellant specifically contends that due to his mental illness, he may not have been able to understand the proceedings conducted by the court or to consult with counsel about the State's motion to adjudicate with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. The State responds that appellant has not presented sufficient evidence from the record to show the trial court abused its discretion in not conducting a competency inquiry. Applicable Law
We review a trial court's decision not to conduct a competency inquiry under an abuse of discretion standard. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A trial court cannot accept a plea of guilty unless it appears the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (West Supp. 2010); McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (West 2006). If evidence suggesting a defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion must suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(b). Some evidence is "a quantity more than none or a scintilla that rationally may lead to a conclusion of incompetency." Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). An informal inquiry into a defendant's competency to stand trial is not required unless the evidence is sufficient to create a bona fide doubt in the mind of the trial court about whether the defendant is legally competent. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Although Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure concerns competency to stand trial, the court of criminal appeals has stated that due process is violated when someone is convicted while incompetent, and that chapter 46 also applied to revocation proceedings. See McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 709. The court of criminal appeals also determined that article 42.07(2) requires a person must be competent "at the time of sentencing" because important decisions concerning appeal must then be made, meaning that a defendant "must have a rational and factual understanding that the trial is concluded, that he is being sentenced, and that appeal considerations must be undertaken. See Casey v. State, 924 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.07(2) (West 2006). Discussion
Appellant contends that because he informed the trial court of his treatment for mental illness, and the necessity of taking his medication, Thorazine, the trial court should have inquired about his competence. Appellant explained to the trial court that without his medication, he would hear voices and have a "very hard time dealing with his reality." Appellant further argues the fact that he had been in jail for thirteen days without his medication should have caused the trial court to inquire into his incompetency before accepting his plea. Here, both parties agreed there would be no court reporter's record made of the proceedings in this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 13.1(a). In support of his argument, appellant points to two documents. First, he refers to statements contained in a letter he mailed to the trial court in November 2008, stating he was "having problems with hearing voices which was very hard to deal with." Appellant also asked the trial court to explore options that would allow him to continue taking Thorazine. Second, appellant relies on statements contained in a notice of appeal dated May 12, 2010. The November 2008 letter was nearly two years before the adjudication hearing and does not provide evidence of appellant's competency at the adjudication hearing. And, the statements in the notice of appeal filed three weeks after appellant was sentenced are not evidence that was before the court at the time of the adjudication hearing. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the trial court's actions were correct. See Thompson v. State, 641 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). And without a record, there is no contrary showing. Appellant has the burden to bring forward a record which demonstrates the error of which he complains. See Salazar v. State, 5 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.). When he fails to do so, nothing is presented for review. See Bundy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 425, 429 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref'd). Because the record before us does not show evidence of a bona fide doubt in the mind of the trial court about whether the defendant was legally competent at the time of the adjudication hearing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not sua sponte conducting an informal inquiry into appellant's competence during the punishment phase of trial. See Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425; Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 429. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt.