Opinion
No. ED76741
May 2, 2000
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Honorable Kenneth M. Romines, Judge.
Rick Barry, Gregory Kloeppel, 8000 Maryland Ave., Ste. 620, St. Louis, MO 63105, for appellant.
John M. Hessel, David B. Helms, J. Kenneth Graham, III, 500 N. Broadway, Suite 2000, St. Louis, MO 63102, for respondents.
Lawrence G. Crahan, J., and Charles B. Blackmar, Sr. J., dissenting.
Steven Guyer ("officer") appeals the trial court's judgment denying his petition for a declaratory judgment in which he sought the disclosure of an internal police investigation report. The trial court held that the report related to the hiring, firing, or disciplining of an employee within section 610.021(3) RSMo (Cum. Supp. 1999), and also that it was an identifiable personnel record within section 610.021(13). As such, the report was a closed record exempt from disclosure. We find no error and affirm.
All further statutory references are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 1999) unless otherwise indicated.
Officer is employed as a commissioned police officer by the City of Kirkwood ("City"). In December 1997, City received a citizen's complaint that officer had engaged in criminal conduct. City, in order to determine whether officer was acting in a manner consistent with his duties as a police officer, decided to look into the complaint and asked the assistance of the Bureau of Internal Affairs of St. Louis County Police Department ("Bureau"). After an investigation, the Bureau concluded the complaint was unfounded. Relying upon this assessment, City determined that discipline of officer was unwarranted.
Officer requested a copy of the Bureau's report. Based upon its interpretation of the Missouri Sunshine Law, section 610.010 et seq., City denied the request. Officer later made a second request for a copy of the report, but City again denied his request.
Thereafter, officer filed suit against City, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Bureau's report was subject to disclosure under the Sunshine Law. The trial court entered judgment in favor of City, holding that the report was exempt from disclosure as it related to the hiring, firing, or disciplining of an employee under section 610.021(3), and also that the report constituted an individually identifiable personnel record under section 610.021(13). This appeal followed.
Our standard of review is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.banc 1976). We will affirm the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. at 32.
In his two points on appeal, officer argues the trial court erred in classifying the Bureau's report under sections 610.021(3) and 610.021(13). Officer contends section 610.100 applies to the report in issue. That section provides in pertinent part:
We strongly urge appellant to examine Rule 84.04(d) regarding the drafting of Points Relied On.
2. Each law enforcement agency of this state, of any county, and of any municipality, shall maintain records of all incidents reported to the agency, investigations and arrests made by such law enforcement agency. All incident reports and arrest reports shall be open records. Notwithstanding any other provision of law other than the provisions of subsections 4, 5 and 6 of this section or section 320.083, RSMo, investigative reports of all law enforcement agencies are closed records until the investigation becomes inactive. If any person is arrested and not charged with an offense against the law within thirty days of the person's arrest, the arrest report shall thereafter be a closed record except that the disposition portion of the record may be accessed and except as provided in section 610.120.
Section 610.100.1(5) defines "investigative report" as "a record, other than an arrest or incident report, prepared by personnel of a law enforcement agency, inquiring into a crime or suspected crime, either in response to an incident report or in response to evidence developed by law enforcement officers in the course of their duties."
Section 610.100.1(3) defines "inactive" as
an investigation in which no further action will be taken by a law enforcement agency or officer for any of the following reasons:
(a) A decision by the law enforcement agency not to pursue the case;
(b) Expiration of the time to file criminal charges pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations, or ten years after the commission of the offense; whichever date earliest occurs;
(c) Finality of the convictions of all persons convicted on the basis of the information contained in the investigative report, by exhaustion of or expiration of all rights of appeal of such persons;
In construing a statute, the legislative intent is to be determined from the language used in the statute, and words are to be considered in their plain and ordinary meaning. Long v. Seely, 975 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo.App. 1998). Standard rules of statutory construction require that a statute be given a reasonable interpretation in light of the legislative objective. State ex rel. Rowland Group v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Mo.banc 1992).
A court looks to the circumstances and usages of the time, and seeks to promote the purposes and objects of the statute and to avoid any strained or absurd meaning. State v. Moriarty, 914 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Mo.App. 1996). This is not to say a court may capriciously ignore the plain language of a statute. Id. But in determining what the language really means, a court may consider the entire purpose and policy of the statute and the language in the totality of the enactment, construing it in light of what is below the surface of the words and yet fairly part of them. Id.
Officer points out that the report he seeks was written and recorded by the Bureau, a law enforcement agency, in response to specific information accusing him of a crime. These facts, officer maintains, clearly fall within the definition of "investigative report" as provided in section 610.100.1(5). Officer further argues that the report became "inactive," as defined in section 610.100.1(3), when City decided to take no further action against him. Therefore, officer concludes, the report is subject to disclosure under section 610.100.2. As a result, the trial court erred in failing to enter a declaratory judgment in his favor. We disagree.
The trial court found that section 610.021(3) and (13) applied to the report as it related to the hiring, firing, and disciplining of an employee. Further, the report was an identifiable personnel record.
Section 610.021 provides in pertinent part:
Except to the extent disclosure is otherwise required by law, a public governmental body is authorized to close meetings, records and votes, to the extent they relate to the following:
. . .
(3) Hiring, firing, disciplining or promoting of particular employees by a public governmental body when personal information about the employee is discussed or recorded . . . As used in this subdivision, the term "personal information" means information relating to the performance or merit of individual employees;
. . .
(13) Individually identifiable personnel records, performance ratings or records pertaining to employees or applicants for employment . . .
The report at issue concerned an investigation of officer conducted by the Bureau of Internal Affairs. Therefore, no one could credibly deny that what officer sought disclosure of was an internal investigation report. Our court, as well as the Western District, has previously held that police department internal investigation reports are exempt from disclosure under section 610.021. See Wolfskill v. Henderson, 823 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Mo.App. 1991); Wilson v. McNeal, 575 S.W.2d 802, 806-07 (Mo.App. 1978). As a result, judicial precedent does not support officer's position.
Officer erroneously asserts that the amendments to section 610.100 in 1995 overturned the decisions in cases such asWolfskill and Wilson. There is no indication the legislature intended to limit or alter the application of section 610.021. We find that cases interpreting that provision, such as Wolfskill andWilson, are still good law.
In addition, officer's interpretation of section 610.100 would lead to an absurd and unreasonable result. Internal investigation reports of police officers for acts characterized as crimes would be subject to disclosure if the department chose to take no action, while investigation reports of officers concerning acts not characterized as crimes would never be subject to disclosure. In addition, under officer's interpretation, law enforcement agency personnel who were internally investigated for crimes would be treated differently than personnel of all other agencies who were also internally investigated for acts characterized as crimes.
The policy established by the legislature is reasonable, and we are bound to follow it.
For these reasons, we find the trial court did not err in classifying the report under section 610.021, rather than section 610.100, and denying officer's petition for a declaratory judgment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Lawrence G. Crahan, J., and Charles B. Blackmar, Sr.J., concur.