Opinion
Case No. C.C.A. No. 02C01-9712-CC-00478.
DATE: October 23, 1998
Appeal from Madison County, Honorable Franklin Murchison, Judge.
AFFIRMEDFOR THE APPELLANT:
C. Michael Robbins, Attorney at Law Reporter George Morton Googe, District Public Defender General Vanessa D. King, Assistant Public Defender General
(at trial)
FOR THE APPELLEE:
John Knox Walkup, Attorney General Georgia Blythe Felner, Counsel for the State James G. (Jerry) Woodall, District Attorney Al Earls and Don Allen, Assistant District Attorneys
The petitioner pled guilty to four counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and four counts of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. He received an effective thirty-year sentence for these crimes pursuant to his plea bargain. The petitioner took no direct appeal from his convictions or sentences but filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. After hearing the petitioner's testimony, the hearing court below granted the state's motion to dismiss and denied relief. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the court's judgment.
In post-conviction relief proceedings the petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations in his petition by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-210(f) (1997). Furthermore, the factual findings of the trial court in hearings "are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against the judgment." State v. Buford, 666 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1983).
In reviewing the petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, this Court must determine whether the advice given or services rendered by the attorney are within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To prevail on a claim of ineffective counsel, a petitioner "must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that this performance prejudiced the defense. There must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error the result of the proceeding would have been different.Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692, 694 (1984);Best v. State, 708 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1985). To satisfy the requirement of prejudice in this case, the petitioner would have had to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Bankston v. State, 815 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1991).
The court below found the petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance "just vague, indefinite, uncertain." We agree. The petitioner testified that his trial counsel "could have give[n] [me] a better job" but admitted that he had confessed his crimes to the police and that he received the exact sentence to which he agreed. The petitioner's allegations are without merit. The petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proving that his lawyer was ineffective.
____________________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
_____________________________ JOE G. RILEY, Judge