The record discloses no satisfactory explanation for the belated attempt at amendment of the bill of particulars. Further, substantial prejudice to the defendants is apparent in the amendment which seeks to add a new theory of recovery which was not readily discernible from the allegations in the original complaint and bill of particulars (see, Gutierrez v Enright, 91 A.D.2d 972). In addition, the affidavit of the physician in support of the plaintiff's motion is insufficient to establish either a departure from accepted practice or connection to the alleged injury.
Initially, it should be noted that the plaintiffs made no effort to explain the delay in seeking to amend their bill of particulars on the eve of trial some 6 1/2 years after the date of the accident, 3 1/2 years after the original bill of particulars was served and 2 1/2 years after the completion of examinations before trial (see, Perricone v City of New York, 96 A.D.2d 531). Moreover, the proposed amendment sought to add a new theory of recovery which was not readily discernible from the allegations in the original complaint and bill of particulars (see, Gutierrez v Enright, 91 A.D.2d 972).
Moreover, we believe that it was a clear abuse of discretion to permit amendment in the circumstances presented. The belated injection of a new claim of malpractice, completely foreign to those previously disclosed and litigated, over eight years after the original bill of particulars was served, is unfair and highly prejudicial to defendants. (See Gutierrez v Enright, 91 A.D.2d 972. ) Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Asch, Silverman, Bloom and Alexander, JJ.