In support of its decision, the trial court cited A.R.S. § 25-516 (2000), which provides for a lien by operation of law on property owned or acquired by an obligor, and A.R.S. § 25-521 (2000), which establishes a right of ADES to issue a levy and collect the amount of child support arrearages owed by an obligor if the amount equals twelve months of support. Finally, citing Guthmiller v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Servs., 421 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 1988), the trial court concluded that the relevant federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 664 (2003), enabled the State to intercept tax refunds for past due support. ¶ 9 In appealing the trial court's order, Father argues that A.R.S. § 25-503(I) is dispositive.
We recognize that courts in some jurisdictions have not applied analogous statutes of limitations to administrative proceedings when such statutes refer to a "civil action" or an "action," as do ours, because the common meaning ascribed to those terms refers to judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Oakland v. Public Employees' Retirement System , 95 Cal. App. 4th 29, 48, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 (2002) ; In re Wage & Hour Violations of Holly Inn, Inc. , 386 N.W.2d 305, 307–308 (Minn. App. 1986) ; Guthmiller v. North Dakota Dept. of Human Services , 421 N.W.2d 469, 471 (N.D. 1988) ; Morgan v. Dept. of Commerce, Division of Securities ,414 P.3d 501, 503, 2017 WL 6154336, *3 (Utah App. 2017). We agree with those courts that do not consider that term dispositive.
¶ 18 The opinion below also cites case law from other jurisdictions in support of its conclusion that the time limits imposed by A.R.S. § 25-503 cut off only judicial — not administrative — remedies to collect support arrearages. See, e.g., Bednarek v. Bednarek, 430 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn.App. 1988) ("We hold the ten-year statute of limitations barring court actions on judgments does not apply to bar the administrative remedy of intercepting an obligor's tax refund to satisfy [child support] arrearages previously validly established."); Guthmiller v. N.D. Dep't of Human Servs., 421 N.W.2d 469, 471 (N.D. 1988) ("Attempted collection of child support arrearages through the tax intercept procedures is not an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, but rather is in the form of an administrative proceeding conducted before the agency. Therefore, the statute of limitations . . . does not apply to the tax intercept procedure.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reynolds, 458 N.W.2d at 105; K.B., 490 N.W.2d at 717; R.T.L., 780 P.2d at 514. In K.B., this Court held that section 14-17-05(1)(b), N.D.C.C., is a statute of limitations and, as such, acts only to bar the bringing of the specified action and does not extinguish the claim or affect remedies other than the one to which it applies. 490 N.W.2d at 717 (citing Guthmiller v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 421 N.W.2d 469, 471, 473 (N.D. 1988); Larson v. Quanrud, Brink Reibold, 47 N.W.2d 743, 750 (N.D. 1950)). [¶ 16] In reexamining K.B., this Court contemplated whetherK.B. might set up a situation in which no other legal father could be established because of the statute of limitations for an action to determine a father-child relationship.
" N.D.C.C. § 32-01-02. See also Guthmiller v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Services, 421 N.W.2d 469, 471 (N.D. 1988); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 235 (N.D. 1980); Greenleaf v. Minneapolis St. Paul Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 30 N.D. 112, 119, 151 N.W. 879, 881 (1915). An action "in its usual legal sense means a lawsuit brought in a court."
The reason for the principle that a renewal note does not extinguish the antecedent debt is that a note merely evidences the debt, and it is not the debt itself. C.A. Finch Lumber Co., 215 N.W. at 156; Anderson v. Kain, 40 N.D. 632, 169 N.W. 501, 503 (1918); Guthmiller v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Services, 421 N.W.2d 469, 473 (N.D. 1988) ("Application of a statute of limitations . . . operates only to bar the remedy and does not extinguish the debt or affect remedies other than the one to which it applies."); Larson v. Quanrud, Brink Reibold, 78 N.D. 70, 47 N.W.2d 743, 750 (1950) ("In this state the statute of limitations operates to bar the remedy and does not destroy the debt or affect remedies other than the one to which it applies."); Tracy v. Wheeler, 15 N.D. 248, 107 N.W. 68 (1906) ("The fact that he may not be coerced to discharge them by legal means affects only the legal character of his obligation. It does not alter the primary fact that he owes an obligation which in equity and good conscience he should pay."). Thus, the renewal note here has not extinguished the original debt, but clearly evidences the continuing obligation. It unequivocally acknowledged the "ORIGINAL NOTE DATED 10/5/84" as a continuing contract, and is not a novation.
NDCC 14-09-09.21 (part; for the complete text, see n. 5). The Unit urges that the closing sentence of NDCC 14-09-09.21 confines the trial court's power to those enumerated mistakes of fact: "Issuance of an income withholding order does not confer jurisdiction on the courts of this state for any purpose other than issuance and enforcement of income withholding orders." A trial court has no generalized power to change the amount of withholding or to forestall withholding to enforce another state's order for child support unless there is one of the enumerated mistakes of fact. Compare Guthmiller v. Dep't of Human Services, 421 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 1988) (Enforcing agency is not required to obtain a separate judicial determination of amount of child support arrearages before intercepting either state or federal tax refunds). We agree that the trial court went beyond the scope of the hearing authorized to begin income withholding for support of a child.
A statute of limitations acts only to bar the bringing of the specified action, and does not extinguish the claim or affect remedies other than the one to which it applies. Guthmiller v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 421 N.W.2d 469, 471, 473 (N.D. 1988); Larson v. Quanrud, Brink Reibold, 78 N.D. 70, 47 N.W.2d 743, 750 (1950). Under similar circumstances, the Colorado Court of Appeals has held that its codification of U.P.A. § 6(a)(2) [Colo.Rev.Stat. § 19-4-107(1)(b)] does not prevent a presumed father from challenging the presumption of paternity in a child support collection action brought more than five years after the child's birth.
Although we have addressed the merits of Bladow's attack on the 1984 foreclosure, this decision should not be viewed as a departure from our previous decisions preventing unlawful collateral attacks on prior judgments. See, e.g., Guthmiller v. North Dakota Dept. of Human Services, 421 N.W.2d 469, 473 (N.D. 1988). Nor should this opinion be viewed as a departure from the requirement that a claim of homestead be supported by some estate in the land. See, e.g., Myrick v. Bill, 3 Dak. 284, 17 N.W. 268 (1883).
Thus, they cannot control the outcome of this appeal. See Har Mar, 300 Minn. at 149, 218 N.W.2d at 751 (arbitration proceedings); Matter of Wage and Hour Violations of HollyInn, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 305 (Minn.App. 1986) (administrative proceeding for minimum wage violations); Bednarek v. Bednarek, 430 N.W.2d 9 (Minn.App. 1988) (administrative action to intercept tax refund for child support arrearages); Guthmiller v. Department of Human Service, 421 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 1988) (administrative action to intercept tax refund for child support arrearages); Latrielle v. Michigan State Bd. of ChiropracticExaminers, 98 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1959) (administrative proceeding to revoke chiropractor's license). While we recognize, as did the court in Johnson, that justice may not have been served, the holding in Johnson must control our decision here.