Gustin v. Gustin

11 Citing cases

  1. Bower v. Bournay-Bower

    469 Mass. 690 (Mass. 2014)   Cited 25 times
    Concluding that "the appointment in this case exceeded the bounds of that authority by granting the parent coordinator binding decision-making authority without the consent of a party"

    See, e.g., Uniform Rule 2 (“ ‘Arbitration’ means a process in which a neutral renders a binding or non-binding decision after hearing arguments and reviewing evidence”). We held in Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 857–858, 652 N.E.2d 610 (1995), that a judge may not compel parties to submit to binding arbitration without their consent. Further, although our rules governing the implementation of court-connected dispute resolution services contemplate pilot programs for mandatory participation in alternative dispute resolution, such programs may extend only to nonbinding dispute resolution services.

  2. Gravlin v. Gravlin

    49 N.E.3d 677 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 4 times

    A judge may not, however, order parties to submit to binding arbitration absent their agreement, as such an order would be an improper delegation of the judge's authority under G.L. c. 208, § 34. See Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 857, 652 N.E.2d 610 (1995) (“a judge typically cannot order parties to a dispute to submit that dispute to binding arbitration unless the parties agree to do so”). Indeed, this court and the Supreme Judicial Court have repeatedly held that a judge may not compel an unwilling party to submit to a nonjudicial third-party decision-making authority.

  3. Ventrice v. Ventrice

    87 Mass. App. Ct. 190 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 16 times
    Vacating a provision requiring divorced parties to engage in mediation prior to filing any subsequent court action

    See Bower, supra at 702–703, 15 N.E.3d 745. See also Boddie, supra at 380–382, 91 S.Ct. 780 (cost requirement may deprive certain litigants of procedural due process); Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 857, 652 N.E.2d 610 (1995) (Gustin ) (“a judge typically cannot order parties to a dispute to submit that dispute to binding arbitration unless the parties agree to do so”) Graizzaro, supra at 912, 627 N.E.2d 951 (“A court may appropriately urge settlement on the parties but may not refuse them access to a judicial forum to resolve their justiciable disputes”). Accordingly, the amended judgment must be vacated and the case remanded to the Probate and Family Court, for further proceedings.

  4. Bearbones, Inc. v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co.

    Civil Action No. 3:15-30017-KAR (D. Mass. Oct. 11, 2016)   Cited 2 times

    Ventrice, 26 N.E.3d at 1131-32. See also Gustin v. Gustin, 652 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Mass. 1995) (holding that that a judge may not compel a party to submit to binding arbitration without a party's consent). The Bower court went on to state in dicta that any preconditions that require the use of costly services like parent coordinators prior to filing a court action may implicate the free access provision of art. 11 of the Declaration of Rights.

  5. Imbrie v. Imbrie

    No. 21-P-770 (Mass. App. Ct. May. 2, 2023)

    Accordingly, to the extent that the judge gave substantial deference to the adjudicator's rulings, rather than employing the less deferential review prescribed by Rule 53, this was error. See Gustinv.Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 857-858 (1995) ("Absent an agreement of the parties, by stipulation or otherwise, the role of the intermediary . .

  6. Imbrie v. Imbrie

    102 Mass. App. Ct. 557 (Mass. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 5 times

    Accordingly, to the extent that the judge gave substantial deference to the adjudicator's rulings, rather than employing the less deferential review prescribed by Rule 53, this was error. See Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 857-858, 652 N.E.2d 610 (1995) ("Absent an agreement of the parties, by stipulation or otherwise, the role of the intermediary ... should be limited to hearing the matter and making a recommendation to the Probate Court judge.

  7. Webster Ventures, LLC v. Dumore

    No. 19-P-599 (Mass. App. Ct. May. 22, 2020)

    This request did not state the grounds on which attorney's fees were sought, and we therefore need not entertain it. See Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 858 (1995) (where request for appellate fees and costs fails to identify legal grounds on which award allegedly would be justified, that request does not rise to level of adequate appellate argument contemplated by Mass. R. A. P. 16 [a] [4], now Mass. R. A. P. 16 [a] [9], as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 [2019]). Judgment affirmed.

  8. People's United Bank v. B&B Fire Prot., Inc.

    94 Mass. App. Ct. 626 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    However, the case law long has established that where, as here, a request for appellate fees and costs fails to identify the legal grounds on which the award allegedly would be justified, that request does not rise to the level of adequate appellate argument contemplated by Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975), and therefore need not be entertained. Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 858, 652 N.E.2d 610 (1995). Nor are valid grounds for an award of appellate fees otherwise apparent on the record before us.

  9. P.W. v. M.S

    67 Mass. App. Ct. 779 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 1 times

    We caution, however, that it is ultimately the judge, and not a special master or GAL, who must make the determination as to which records are protected by the patient-psychotherapist privilege, and which are not. Cf. Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 857-858 (1995) (judge cannot delegate duty to make "fair and equitable division of property" pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 34). However, before the judge undertakes such an endeavor, the father has an obligation to assert the privilege.

  10. Litchfield v. Litchfield

    770 N.E.2d 554 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 9 times

    In the absence of any claim under G.L.c. 209A, § 3( f), we do not consider whether that section may be applicable to these proceedings. See Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854, 858 (1995).