Gustafson v. Svenson

12 Citing cases

  1. Flannery v. McNamara

    432 Mass. 665 (Mass. 2000)   Cited 18 times
    Declining to follow Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers 12.1 allowing reformation of unambiguous will

    Putnam v. Putnam, supra. See Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 275 (1977) (extrinsic evidence of testatrices' alleged intent inadmissible where will, in particular the phrase "his heirs per stirpes," unambiguous). Thus, extrinsic evidence of the decedent's alleged intent is only admissible if his will is ambiguous.

  2. Groden v. Kelley

    415 N.E.2d 850 (Mass. 1981)   Cited 16 times

    The requirement to construe the instrument to give effect to the intention of the donor is essentially identical in the case of both trusts and wills. Compare Dana v. Gring, 374 Mass. 109, 117 (1977) (trusts), and cases cited, with Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 275 (1977) (wills), and cases cited. See Second Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Wasserman, 337 Mass. 195, 200 (1958), and cases cited.

  3. Hershman-Tcherepnin v. Tcherepnin

    452 Mass. 77 (Mass. 2008)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that contractual language "create[d] an ambiguity because it [was] susceptible to two meanings"

    The following cases illustrate the difference between clear and ambiguous provisions in a will. Compare Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 275 (1977) (no ambiguity in phrase "his heirs per stirpes" where "heirs," by force of statute, included surviving spouse; extrinsic evidence of statements made by testatrices to attorney that they wished residuary estate to pass to brother but not his wife inadmissible); Watson v. Goldthwaite, 345 Mass. 29, 33 (1962) (no ambiguity in word "issue," which has technical legal meaning referring to all lineal descendants; extrinsic evidence of testimony pertaining to testatrix's written instructions inadmissible); McMillen v. McMillen, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 569-576 (2003) (no ambiguity in meaning of "paintings, furniture and furnishings" in will where court looked to dictionary definitions and precedent from other jurisdictions to determine meaning of those terms), with Putnam v. Putnam, 366 Mass. 261, 269-271 (1974) (where conflict in language of will created ambiguity regarding testator's intent with respect to estate tax marital deduction, extrinsic evidence concerning statements of testator's at

  4. John v. Ryan

    447 Mass. 1003 (Mass. 2006)   Cited 5 times
    Affirming trust reformation under Massachusetts law when the term "heirs" did not conform to the settlorsโ€™ intent because "heirs" included a surviving spouse under state law and the settlors did not intend to include any surviving spouse

    The term "heirs" includes a surviving spouse. Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 275-276 (1977), and cases cited. In their affidavits, the settlors have sworn that they did not intend to include any surviving spouse, but only each predeceasing child's descendants.

  5. Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Wilbur

    431 Mass. 429 (Mass. 2000)   Cited 10 times
    Deriving intent of testator from use of certain language in one part of will and omission of such language in another

    Thus his use of the phrase "by right of representation" defines the manner by which the beneficiaries should take. See Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273 (1977). Boston Safe contends that at the time the will and its codicils were executed the terms "heirs at law" and "statutory distributees" had similar meanings.

  6. Wright v. Brandon

    863 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    While we are in agreement with the viability of the preceding dictum, we fail to find the intent of testator, Claude Brandon, to be either ambiguous or obscure. As our sister court in Massachusetts succinctly stated in Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 366 N.E.2d 761, 762 (1977): The phrase "his heirs per stirpes" is not ambiguous. The word "heirs" includes, by force of statute, a surviving spouse.

  7. Clymer v. Mayo

    393 Mass. 754 (Mass. 1985)   Cited 31 times
    Resolving ambiguity regarding identity of donees based on agreed statement of uncontested facts

    Fitts v. Powell, 307 Mass. 449, 454 (1940). Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 275 (1977). Where "a reading of the whole will produces a conviction that the testator must necessarily have intended an interest to be given which is not bequeathed or devised by express or formal words, the court must supply the defect by implication and so mould the language of the testator as to carry into effect as far as possible the intention which it is of opinion that he has sufficiently declared."

  8. Dorfman v. Allen

    386 Mass. 136 (Mass. 1982)   Cited 10 times
    Discharging report that did not comply with G. L. c. 215, ยง 13

    However, where the testator has created a gift over, the bequest passes according to the terms of that gift. See Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273 (1977); Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272 Mass. 1 (1930).

  9. In re McLoughlin

    No. 23-P-770 (Mass. App. Ct. Sep. 30, 2024)

    d.. at 785. Construing the term "contest" narrowly and applying traditional rules of interpretation, see Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 275 (1977) (where will unambiguous, language interpreted according to legal meaning, even where testator not likely to have understood legal meaning); Watson v. Goldthwaite, 345 Mass. 29, 33-34 (1962) (construing word "issue" according to its technical legal meaning where no evidence of testatrix's intentions to contrary), "contest" is a judicial proceeding to determine the validity of a will. Accordingly, Sean did not "contest the probate or validity of" his father's will.

  10. Adams v. Peterson

    625 N.E.2d 575 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    " Where a will is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to aid in interpretation of its provisions is inadmissible even though language involved has a legal meaning which is not likely to have been understood by the testator or which does not correspond to an oral statement of his intention. Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273 (1977). In this case, there was no question as to what property the testatrix was referring to when she devised the property to the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively.