Fiedler v. Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39 (Minn.App. 1991) pet. for rev. denied (Minn. April 29, 1991); Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.App. 1994). With respect to the first element, it is not disputed that there existed an attorney-client relationship between Fletcher and Zellmer at the time of the alleged negligent acts. With respect to the second and third elements Plaintiffs still must make a sufficient showing to survive the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Eighth Circuit has held that Fiedler did not alter the "but for" element of a case of legal malpractice in Minnesota, but was an application of it to a different fact situation. See Yusefzadeh v. Ross, 932 F.2d 1262, 1264 & n. 4 (8th Cir.1991); Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) (same). In order to survive summary judgment, Appellant must create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether but for Appellees' negligence, Rampy would have recovered more from BIC and its principals than she received in settlement payments.
The next element of proof was establishing that Dorsey acted negligently when it gave advice or furnished an opinion. SeeDay v. Dorsey Whitney, Civil No. 98-1425, Slip op. at 11 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2001) (Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.Ct.App. 1994); Fiedler v. Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991) ( citingTogstad, 291 N.W.2d at 693, n. 4). "Attorneys have a 'duty to exercise that degree of care and skill that is reasonable under the circumstances, considering the nature of the undertaking.'" Jerry's Enters., 711 N.W.2d at 817 ( quotingPrawer v. Essling, 282 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn.
Causation is a fact issue that is left for the jury in all but unusual cases where the issue may be decided as a matter of law because reasonable minds can arrive at only one conclusion. Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. App. 1994) (citation omitted). Appellant argues that Bright Wood's conduct is not dispositive of whether a reasonable jury could find that JJJ Specialty also caused or contributed to Scherer Brothers' damages.
Causation is a fact issue that is usually left for the jury, but may be decided as a matter of law when reasonable minds can arrive at only one conclusion. Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.App. 1994) (citations omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Lau was negligent in not seeing Mengedoht, but that Mengedoht's negligence in entering the intersection without stopping, after Lau had already begun moving to make a right turn, was the direct cause of the accident.
Causation is usually a fact issue for the jury, but may be decided as a matter of law when reasonable minds can arrive at only one conclusion. Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.App. 1994). Here, the record shows that Baker testified about the meeting with Ploetz.
Gustafsonv. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.App. 1994) (citation omitted). The district court dismissed Moeller's express- and implied-warranty claims, concluding that the contract was predominantly a sale of services and, consequently, outside the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
A directed verdict is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is directed, the trial court would be obliged to "set aside a contrary verdict as manifestly contrary to the evidence or to the law." Gustafson v.Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.App. 1994). The reviewing court applies the same standard, making an independent assessment of the trial court's ruling.
However, when an attorney's negligence harms a plaintiff by some means other than destruction of or damage to a cause of action, the fourth Togstad element is inapplicable. Fiedler v. Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Minn.App. 1991) (noting Togstad's "case-within-a-case" element essentially describes proximate cause for legal malpractice that damages claim), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1991); see Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.App. 1994) (recognizing Fiedler simply applied traditional rule of "but for" causation to different fact situation); see, e.g., Blue Water Corp. v. O'Toole, 336 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn. 1983) (omitting analysis of "case-within-a-case" element).
Rouse v. Dunkley Bennett, P.A., 520 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn. 1994); See Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.App. 1994) (listing the elements of a malpractice claim not involving the loss of a claim). Although the element of causation is usually a jury issue, "proximate cause can be decided as a matter of law where reasonable minds can arrive at only one conclusion."