Gussio v. State

11 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. Denver

    125 N.M. 308 (N.M. 1998)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that voting "based on a majority of those using the ditch for the distribution of water" is acceptable

    Although this Court has addressed the meaning of Section 73-3-3 on several occasions, we disagree with the Wilsons' interpretation of those cases. {21} The Wilsons primarily rely on a statement by this Court inState ex rel. Community Ditches v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 370, 143 P. 207, 213 (1914), that the "interest in the ditch depends upon the amount of land for which [a person] has acquired a water right, and this right, so acquired . . ., is only to the use of a sufficient amount of water to properly irrigate [the] land and for domestic purposes." The Wilsons contend that this statement in Tularosa interprets Section 73-3-3 as requiring a single election procedure based on water rights.

  2. Cartwright v. Public Service Company of New Mexico

    66 N.M. 64 (N.M. 1959)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that "[n]o water right becomes vested until it has been applied to beneficial use to the full extent of its right"

    The parties agree that the question has not been determined in the State of New Mexico, although both parties seek to gain some comfort from two New Mexico cases which mention the doctrine. They are the cases of State ex rel. Community Ditches v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 143 P. 207, and the case of New Mexico Products v. New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634. In neither case was any position taken by the Court on the doctrine.

  3. State ex Rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas

    135 N.M. 375 (N.M. 2004)   Cited 82 times
    Holding that the pueblo water rights doctrine is inconsistent with prior appropriation

    "As it is only by the application of the water to a beneficial use that the perfected right to the use is acquired, it is evident that an appropriator can only acquire a perfected right to so much water as he [or she] applies to a beneficial use." State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 371, 143 P. 207, 213 (1914); accord Snow, 18 N.M. at 694, 140 P. at 1048 ("[I]t is the application of the water, or the intent to apply, followed with due diligence toward application and ultimate application, which gives the appropriator the continued and continuous right to take the water."). The principle of beneficial use is based on "imperative necessity," Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. McMurry, 16 N.M. 172, 181, 113 P. 823, 825 (1911), and "aims fundamentally at definiteness and certainty."

  4. U.S. v. State

    01cv072-BB/WDS, Subfile No. ZRB-3-0090 (D.N.M. May. 4, 2009)

    Actual, beneficial use defines the extent of a water right. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 89 P.3d 47, 58-9 (2004), quoting State ex rel. State Eng'r. v. Crider, 431 P.2d 45, 48 (1967). Only by applying water to beneficial use can an appropriator acquire a perfected right to that water.State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 143 P. 207 (1914), Hanson v. Turney, 94 P.3d 1 (Ct.App. 2004). The purpose of a stream system adjudication is to determine the amount of water which each water right claimant is entitled to in order to facilitate the distribution of unappropriated water. ยงยง 72-4-15 through 72-4-19, NMSA 1978; Snow v. Abalos, 140 P. 1044 (1914).

  5. U.S. v. State

    01cv072-BB/WDS (D.N.M. Apr. 13, 2009)

    Only by applying water to beneficial use can an appropriator acquire a perfected right to that water. State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 143 P. 207 (1914), Hanson v. Turney, 94 P.3d 1 (Ct.App. 2004). Further, the purpose of a stream system adjudication is to determine the amount of water which each water right claimant is entitled to in order to facilitate the distribution of unappropriated water.

  6. State v. Red River Valley Co.

    51 N.M. 207 (N.M. 1947)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that "this constitutional provision is only `declaratory of prior existing law,' always the rule and practice under Spanish and Mexican dominion"

    It accords with justice and common sense to say that when the United States in 1869 confirmed title to the lands of the grant in question, and when in 1873 it issued its patent thereto, it was not intended that it should, nor did the patent purport to, destroy, or in any manner limit, the right of the general public to enjoy the uses of public waters. Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. McMurray, supra; State v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 376, 143 P. 207; Diversion Lake Club case, supra. "The doctrine of the Common Law as to the private ownership of the water of public streams no longer exists in this Territory or the mountain states * * * and no longer can there be such a thing as private ownership of the water of public streams in this Territory."

  7. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. v. Chavez

    101 P.2d 190 (N.M. 1940)   Cited 2 times

    It is not deemed necessary for the purposes of this case to do more than briefly refer to the history of irrigation and conservancy legislation in New Mexico. Our reports are replete with cases interpreting legislation adjudicating water rights under both the territorial and state governments. Albuquerque Land Irrigation Co. v. Gutierrez, 10 N.M. 177, 61 P. 357; Leyba v. Armijo, 11 N.M. 437, 68 P. 939; Candelaria v. Vallejos, 13 N.M. 146, 81 P. 589; Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. McMurry, 16 N.M. 172, 179, 113 P. 823; Turley v. Furman, 16 N.M. 253, 262, 114 P. 278; Jaquez Ditch Co. v. Garcia, 17 N.M. 160, 124 P. 891; Pueblo of Isleta v. Tondre, 18 N.M. 388, 137 P. 86; State v. Tularosa Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 143 P. 207; In re Dexter-Greenfield Drainage Dist., 21 N.M. 286, 154 P. 382; State v. Aztec Ditch Co., 25 N.M. 590, 185 P. 549; Farmers' Development Co. v. Rayado Land Irrigation Co., 28 N.M. 357, 213 P. 202; State v. District Court, 31 N.M. 82, 239 P. 452; and numerous others, including the more recent cases arising under plaintiff Conservancy District legislation and hereinafter cited. We find our early territorial legislature of 1851-52 laying down simple principles of irrigation law, establishing rights in ditches or acequias and defining what are public ditches or acequias, see Chap. 151, N.M. Comp.St. 1929, supra.

  8. New Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico Power Co.

    42 N.M. 311 (N.M. 1938)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that the user could not be held to have intended to not use water when it did not reach its ditch because all of the water had been diverted upstream

    We find it convenient to consider only the last proposition. In State ex rel. Community Ditches v. Tularosa Com. Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 143 P. 207, 215, we said: "Nor can such exclusive right be sustained, under what was known under the Spanish and Mexican laws and customs as a `pueblo right,' the origin, nature, and character of which will be found fully discussed, by Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights (2d Ed.) ยง 581 et seq. The author says: `At first the plan for the establishment of these pueblos was for the King of Spain, in each case by special ordinance, to provide for the foundation of the pueblo, and to set apart for the use of the pueblo and its inhabitants a certain area of land, and to prescribe in the ordinance the rights of the pueblo and its inhabitants to the use of the waters flowing to those lands.'"

  9. Orchard v. Board of Com'rs of Sierra County

    42 N.M. 172 (N.M. 1938)   Cited 14 times

    We have held that the statutory remedy for contest of elections to public office has superseded quo warranto, and is an exclusive remedy for such purpose, State ex rel. Abercrombie v. District Court, 37 N.M. 407, 24 P.2d 265; but in other respects the remedy at common law and under the statute is in force. We have held that the statute of the 9th of Anne, c. 20 (1710), is in force, State ex rel. Community Ditches v. Tularosa Com. Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 143 P. 207; though by reason of its local application its adoption has been denied in some jurisdictions, Brooks v. State, 3 Boyce, Del., 1, 79 A. 790, 51 L.R.A., N.S., 1126, Ann.Cas. 1915A, 1133; but affirmed in others, State v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 185 Ala. 388, 64 So. 23, Ann.Cas. 1916B, 166. In any event, the common-law remedy is as broad as the statute, Brooks v. State, supra, and is in full force in this jurisdiction except as to contests for public offices, as the New Mexico statute continues "the remedies heretofore obtainable by writ of quo warranto," section 115-101, N.M.Sts.Ann. 1929; and specifically provides that such action may be brought "(a) When any person shall usurp, intrude into or unlawfully hold or exercise any public office, civil or military, or any franchise within this state, or any office or offices in a corporation created by authority of this state."

  10. City of Las Vegas v. Oman

    110 N.M. 425 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 19 times
    Noting the particular force of stare decisis in cases which seek to overturn decisions affecting property rights

    Cartwright I is the only New Mexico case to recognize the right in a particular city. Santa Fe and Tularosa have both attempted to assert the right, but have failed because they were not founded on a grant of land for purposes of colonization under Spanish-Mexican law. See New Mexico Prods. Co. v. New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634 (1937); Stateex rel. Community Ditches v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 143 P. 207 (1914). The City of Albuquerque has also raised the issue of a pueblo water right, but it was rejected as being raised in the wrong proceeding.