Opinion
No. 05-09-00899-CR
Opinion issued April 15, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F08-61842-T.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG-MIERS, and FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State charged appellant Timothy Gerard Gunter with family violence assault, alleging that he caused bodily injury to his girlfriend by striking her with his fist and with the strap from their child's car seat. Gunter waived a jury. The trial court found him guilty and assessed his punishment at ten years' confinement. On appeal, Gunter challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, and he contends the trial court erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into Gunter's competency. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the dispositive issues are clearly settled in law. On the evening of October 14, 2008, Gunter and his girlfriend, Erica Moreno, spent several hours driving around the Dallas area. During most of that time, the two argued about Gunter using Moreno's car and about Gunter's involvement with other women. Moreno testified that Gunter began striking her face with his fist as he drove. Eventually, he stopped the car at a service station. Moreno testified he hit her again with his fist and hurt her arm when he swung a strap from the car seat at her. An employee at the station-and at least one customer-observed Gunter's conduct and told him to leave the premises. When he did not leave, the employee called the police. Officer Jodean Jones took a statement from Moreno and photographed her injuries. Gunter was arrested. At trial, Gunter testified that Moreno had inflicted her injuries upon herself. In his first issue, Gunter contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard a reviewing court is to apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). We determine whether, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the fact finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 899. We defer to the fact finder's determinations of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony because the fact finder is the sole judge of those matters. See id. Gunter argues specifically that Moreno's testimony is "not worthy of belief." He identifies contradictions in her report to the police and her testimony at trial. But Moreno consistently contended that Gunter hit her repeatedly with his fist and, while they were outside the service station, injured her with the strap from the car seat. It was for the trial court to determine the issue of her credibility. See id. Moreover, even without Moreno's testimony, a fact finder could rationally have found Gunter guilty of the assault. Officer Jones testified that police were called to the station by an employee after she observed Gunter's conduct, asked Gunter to leave the premises, and he refused. Jones took Moreno's statement and photographed her injuries. The injuries included cuts and bleeding on her face, especially around her mouth, and redness on her arm; the injuries were consistent with Moreno's allegations. Indeed, the only evidence contrary to Moreno's allegations was Gunter's testimony that Moreno had inflicted her own injuries by banging her head against the dashboard, seat, and window of the car. Our review of the photographs of Moreno's injuries are not consistent with Gunter's allegations. We conclude the trial court, acting as fact finder, was rationally justified in finding Gunter guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. We decide Gunter's first issue against him. In his remaining two issues, Gunter contends the trial court should have, sua sponte, inquired into Gunter's competency to stand trial, and the court's failure to do so violated both Gunter's due process rights and the statutory mandate of the code of criminal procedure. A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.002(b) (West 2006). He is incompetent to stand trial only if he does not have either sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. art. 46B.003(a). If evidence suggesting incompetency comes to the attention of the trial court, the court must suggest-on its own motion-that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial and then conduct an informal inquiry into the issue. Id. art. 46B.004(b), (c); see also McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (to protect criminal defendant's constitutional rights, trial court must inquire into accused's mental competency once issue is sufficiently raised). But the trial court is required to make such an inquiry only if it has a bona fide doubt about the defendant's competency. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). "A bona fide doubt may exist if the defendant exhibits truly bizarre behavior or has a recent history of severe mental illness or at least moderate mental retardation." Id. We review the trial court's decision not to conduct a competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 426. Our review of the record found no evidence that Gunter was incompetent to stand trial. The record contains no evidence Gunter suffered from any mental illness or retardation. Gunter points to his punishment-phase testimony, which consisted largely of a long and rambling letter he wrote to give his thoughts on sentencing. The letter describes Gunter's time in prison, the conclusions he came to during that time concerning his life, and his plan to turn his life around if he could avoid prison. Gunter maintained his innocence in the statement, and he called on God to help him with his plan. The statement may be inarticulate in places, but it is not bizarre. Throughout trial, Gunter communicated clearly with his attorney and the trial judge, whether he was explaining his jury waiver, or testifying on his own behalf in both phases of the trial. In closing arguments, Gunter's attorney stated that Gunter is an "intelligent individual" and argued he could follow all the requirements of probation. There was no suggestion by Gunter's attorney, the State, or the trial court that Gunter appeared unable to understand the proceedings. Those who observed his behavior at trial were in the best position to determine if Gunter was competent at that time. See id. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision not to conduct an inquiry into Gunter's competency. We decide Gunter's second and third issues against him as well. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.