Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-000527-MR
02-10-2017
VERNECE GUNTER AND HUGH GUNTER, HUSBAND AND WIFE; AND LARRY GREGORY APPELLANTS v. THOMAS R. PEEPLES, II AND INA PEEPLES, HUSBAND AND WIFE APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Ralph W. Hoskins Corbin, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Kendall L. Duerson Berea, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 13-CI-00026 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: JONES, MAZE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: Vernece Gunter, Hugh Gunter, and Larry Gregory appeal from an order of the Rockcastle Circuit Court which held that an enforceable right of way existed over their property to the benefit of the adjoining property belonging to Appellees, Thomas R. Peeples II and Ina Hale (formerly Peeples). We conclude that substantial evidence existed to support the trial court's findings of fact, and we conclude that the trial court properly applied the law. Therefore, we affirm.
Background
Thomas R. Peeples and Ina Hale (hereinafter collectively "the Peepleses"), and Appellants, Vernece Gunter and Hugh Gunter ("the Gunters"), own contiguous tracts of land west of Mount Vernon in Rockcastle County, Kentucky. The tract owned by the Peepleses (hereinafter "the Peeples property") covers approximately sixty-five acres. The Peepleses acquired the land from Jerrel Keith Brackett by a recorded deed of conveyance dated September 13, 2007. This deed contained the following additional provision: "There is also conveyed herein a 30 ft right of way from the county road to the above described property." This right of way crosses the Gunters' tract, and the Peepleses use it to access their property. The deed conveying the Peeples property from the Martins to Brackett in 2003 also contained the aforementioned description of the right of way easement.
The Gunters acquired their property (hereinafter "the Gunter property") from Dorothy Martin by recorded deed on December 4, 2009. While this deed made no mention of the right of way easement granted to Brackett, and later to the Peepleses, prior to purchase, the Gunters viewed a sale map which showed that an "unnamed road" traversed the Gunter property. Though the Peeples property and the Gunter property have the same predecessors in title, Guy and Dorothy Martin, the two tracts of land come from separate chains of title, as the Martins owned the tracts concurrently by two separate 1995 deeds.
In 2011, Appellant Gregory, who lived on the Gunters property with his wife, erected a gate across the "unnamed road" at the property line between the Gunter property and the Peeples property. He provided the Peeples with the combination to open this gate. However, the Peepleses sued in 2013, claiming that Gregory had since blocked their ability to pass through the gate, impeding the right of way over the Gunter property granted in their 2007 deed. The Peepleses sought a permanent injunction against the Gunters and Gregory on this basis.
On October 31, 2014, following a bench trial, the trial court ruled that the Peepleses had an enforceable thirty-foot right of way easement across the Gunters property. The trial court further concluded that the Gunters did not qualify as bona fide subsequent purchasers of the land because they had actual, constructive, and inquiry notice of the easement. Lastly, the trial court found that the Gunters' installation of a gate at the entrance to the easement constituted an impermissible restriction on the Peepleses' access to their property, and the court granted the Peepleses' request for injunctive relief.
On November 12, 2014, the Gunters filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment pursuant to CR 59.05, alleging that the judgment lacked support in the law, that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were erroneous, and that the judgment failed to provide for the joint maintenance of the easement. Three weeks later, the Gunters filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to CR 60.02, raising similar issues. The trial court overruled both of the Gunters' and Gregory's motions. This appeal follows.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. --------
Standard of Review
On appeal, the Gunters and Gregory contend that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the enforceability of the easement and their notice of it were erroneous. Because the trial court heard these issues without a jury, pursuant to CR 52.01, any "[f]indings of fact, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." See also Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1995). Findings of fact will be upheld and are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). Substantial evidence is defined as "evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Id. Furthermore, we review the trial court's conclusions of law and its application of the law to the facts under a de novo standard. See Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky. App. 2001).
Analysis
A subsequent purchaser of land who buys the land "with actual, constructive, or implied notice that it is burdened with an easement in favor of other land ordinarily takes the estate subject to the easement." Dukes v. Link, 315 S.W.3d 712 (Ky. App. 2010), citing 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 93 (2004). To satisfy the actual notice requirement, verbal or written information must indicate the existence of an easement. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 81 (2016). Constructive notice can be achieved simply through the proper recordation of a deed or other written document used to grant an easement. Dukes, 315 S.W.3d at 716. Implied or inquiry notice is typically satisfied when "the easement is of such a character that a purchaser acting with ordinary diligence would know or learn of its existence." 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 81 (2016). A party will only be deemed a bona fide purchaser, and relieved of the burden of an easement, if she did not have notice of the easement. Dukes, 315 S.W.3d at 716.
The Gunters allege that the trial court was wrong to conclude that they possessed actual, constructive, and inquiry notice of the easement. Rather, the Gunters argue that they could not be burdened by the easement because their deed did not reference the easement and the Martins-Brackett and Brackett-Peeples deeds lacked a source of title to the easement. Therefore, the Gunters argue that they were bona fide subsequent purchasers of land without notice of the easement. We ultimately disagree.
On appeal, the Gunters focus almost exclusively on the trial court's conclusion that they had constructive notice of the easement because the Martins-Brackett deed was properly recorded. The Gunters argue that they did not have constructive notice because neither the Martins-Brackett deed nor the Brackett-Peeples deed specifically mentioned the Gunter property as the property burdened by the easement. The Gunters contend that, in addition to depriving them of constructive notice, this also violated KRS 382.110(4). However, that statute states that, to be recorded, a deed must refer to the prior deed and its location. Although it is true that neither the Martin-Brackett deed nor the Brackett-Peeples deed specifically name the Gunter property, they both contain the requisite reference to their preceding deeds. Therefore, a violation of KRS 382.110 is not a means by which the easement, or the Gunters' notice of it, may be invalidated. Furthermore, other factual and legal grounds existed to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the Gunters and Gregory were on notice of the easement.
At trial, testimony established that, prior to purchasing the property from Martin, the Gunters reviewed a sales map which depicted an "unnamed road" crossing their property and terminating at the property line with the Peeples property. Even when countered by testimony that an agent instructed the Gunters to disregard this road, the testimony regarding the sales map constituted substantial evidence upon which the trial court could properly rely in concluding that the Gunters and Gregory possessed actual notice of the easement across their property. Indeed, this evidence established that the Gunters reviewed "written information [indicating] the existence of an easement."
The trial court also found that the Gunters were on inquiry notice of the easement because they could have inspected the property and discovered the easement prior to purchase, but did not. Testimony at trial established that neither the Gunters nor Gregory walked the property prior to purchase; and they did not investigate the site of the "unnamed road" listed on the sales map. We agree that, had the Gunters performed a full, rather than a partial, inspection of the property prior to purchasing it, they undoubtedly would have learned of the gate and the road over their property, just as they did upon their first inspection of the property after they purchased it. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that the Gunters and Gregory were, at the very least, on "inquiry notice" of the easement. Had they been "acting with ordinary diligence[,]" the Gunters and Gregory would have learned of the easement's existence. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 81 (2016).
Having concluded that the Gunters and Gregory were on notice of the easement across their property, we now turn to the enforceability of that easement against them. For this, we turn to our prior opinion in Dukes v. Link, supra. The Gunters argue that reliance on Dukes is misplaced because its facts are distinguishable from our own. However, the legal principles restated in Dukes are well-established and general in nature. Hence, they apply to the present facts.
It bears repeating that Kentucky law states that a party who purchases property with actual, constructive, or implied notice that it is burdened with an easement in favor of other land ordinarily takes the estate subject to the easement." Dukes at 716 (citation omitted). Factual differences notwithstanding, in Dukes, we restated what is already the law in Kentucky:
that where the owner of an entire tract of land, or of two or more adjoining parcels, employs a part thereof so that one derives from the other a benefit or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one in favor of which such ... easement exists, such easement, being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, will pass to the grantee by implication.315 S.W.3d at 716, quoting Swinney v. Haynes, 236 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Ky. 1951) (emphasis added). This is precisely what occurred in this case. The Martins created an easement which benefited the Peeples property, and later conveyed that dominant estate to the Peeples. That they held the Peeples property and the Gunter property, the servient estate, by separate deeds has no impact upon the enforceability of the easement under Kentucky law.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that the Gunters were on actual and inquiry notice of the Peepleses' easement. Therefore, the Gunters are not bona fide purchasers without notice, and they cannot escape the burden of the easement over their property. The easement granted to the Peepleses is enforceable. It follows that any restriction upon the Peepleses' use of this right of way, including Gregory's alleged use of a locked gate, was wrongful, and the trial court properly granted the Peepleses a permanent injunction against such action.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Rockcastle Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Ralph W. Hoskins
Corbin, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Kendall L. Duerson
Berea, Kentucky