Indeed the exclusion of lawyers when acting for benevolent purposes and charitable societies, as distinguished from business corporations, from the restrictions imposed by the canons of Professional Ethics has long been recognized in the approval given by the courts to services voluntarily offered by members of the bar to persons in need, even when the attorneys have been selected by corporations organized to serve a cause in a controversial field. See the historic incidents listed in the opinion In re Ades, D.C.Md., 6 F. Supp. 467, 475; and see also Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602, 132 A.L.R. 1165, where the Supreme Court of Georgia refused an injunction to restrain the bar association and its members from offering their services to borrowers of money as usurious rates in defense of suits that might be brought against them. The Court said in 191 Ga. at page 382, 12 S.E.2d at page 610:

Payday loans are the current version of "salary buying" or "wage buying." See Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Assoc., 191 Ga. 366, 381(3) ( 12 S.E.2d 602) (1940); Hinton v. Mack Publishing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823, 826 ( 155 S.E. 78) (1930). The fees, charges, and interest on a payday loan are between 15% and 30% of the principal for a two-week loan, constituting a pretext for usury. Cashback CatalogSales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp.2d 1375, 1380 (S.D.Ga. 2000); see also Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 594 ( 499 S.E.2d 266) (1998); White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1999). Since the Georgia Industrial Loan Act was enacted to "define and prevent usury" and to provide a source of regulated funds "for those who had been borrowing at usurious rates from loan sharks, street shylocks and wagebuyers[,]" then such financial transactions come within the jurisdiction of the Act.

26 monthly payments, he is a volunteer making very small payments to justify very great usury. When from a consideration of the transaction it becomes apparent that there was a corrupt intent to violate the usury laws, the courts will permit no scheme or device, by whatever name, to hide it; any contrivance to evade the usury laws and enable the lender to get more than legal interest will render the transaction usurious, and the courts will look to the actual nature of the transaction and not to the form the parties have given it. Young v. First Nat. Bank of Covington, 22 Ga. App. 58, 65-66 ( 95 S.E. 381); see Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Assn., 191 Ga. 366, 381 ( 12 S.E.2d 602). The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Powell on the issue of usury under OCGA § 7-4-18 as to the June 1990 loan. Moreover, six months after Williams actually borrowed and had use of $6,255.

In American Oil Co. v. Towler, 56 Ga. App. 866 ( 194 S.E. 223), it was held that where one maliciously and wrongfully, with intent to injure another person's business, prevented others from dealing with him by blacklisting him, and his business was thereby injured, a right of action accrued. See to the same effect Rivers v. Dixie Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga. App. 131 ( 76 S.E.2d 229); Gunnels v. Atlantic Bar Assn., 191 Ga. 366 ( 12 S.E.2d 602, 132 ALR 1165); Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga. App. 819 ( 135 S.E.2d 60). In such a case it is not necessary to show that the wrongdoer has procured the breach of any specific contract, but only that he has purposely interfered with the plaintiff's reasonable expectancies of trade with third persons.

McGehee v. Petree, 165 Ga. 492 (1) ( 141 S.E. 206). "No scheme or device has yet been invented, the substantial effect of which is to violate the usury laws of this State, that the courts have not condemned as such." Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Association, 191 Ga. 366, 381 ( 12 S.E.2d 602). As tersely stated by Bleckley, J., in Pope v. Marshall, 78 Ga. 635, 640: "No disguise of language can avail for covering up usury, or glossing over an usurious contract. The theory that a contract will be usurious or not according to the kind of paperbag it is put up in, or according to the more or less ingenious phrases made use of in negotiating it, is altogether erroneous.

" McGehee v. Petree, 165 Ga. 492 ( 141 S.E. 206); Public Finance Cor. v. State, 67 Ga. App. 635 ( 21 S.E.2d 476); Portwood v. Bennett Trading Co., supra; Crowe v. State, supra; Knight v. State, 64 Ga. App. 693 ( 14 S.E.2d 225); Pope v. Marshall, 78 Ga. 635 ( 4 S.E. 116). "No scheme or device has yet been invented, the substantial effect of which is to violate the usury laws of this State, that the courts have not condemned as such. While a bona fide purchase of earned wages is not a loan and is not governed by the laws relating to interest, it has many times been held that what may appear to be an assignment of wages may in substance and in fact be a loan at usurious rates of interest." Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Asso., 191 Ga. 366, 381 ( 12 S.E.2d 602, 132 A.L.R. 1165). The jury were authorized to find that the scheme, as testified to by Peek and several other witnesses, was a contrivance to charge usury rather than the purchase of salary accounts.

2. "No scheme or device has yet been invented, the substantial effect of which is to violate the usury laws of this State, that the courts have not condemned as such." Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Asso., 191 Ga. 366, 381 ( 12 S.E.2d 602). 3. The evidence authorized the conviction of the defendants of having charged interest on a loan at a rate greater than five per cent. per month.

We must make a distinction between those contractual or business relationships unenforceable because of the statute of frauds, formal defects, lack of consideration or uncertainty, and those which are invalid because they are illegal or against public policy. (See Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Association (1940) 191 Ga. 366 (12 S.E.2d 602, 132 A.L.R. 1165) (illegal contract); Paramount Pad Co. v. Baumrind (1958) 4 N.Y.2d 393 (175 N.Y.S.2d 809, 151 N.E.2d 609) (unreasonable contract against public policy).) We now add that a fraudulently procured contract cannot be the subject of the tort of interference with a business or contractual relationship.

Button makes clear that "regulations which reflect hostility to stirring up litigation have been aimed chiefly at those who urge recourse to the courts for private gain, serving no public interest," 371 U.S., at 440, and that "[o]bjection to the intervention of a lay intermediary . . . also derives from the element of pecuniary gain," id., at 441. In recognition of the overarching obligation of the lawyer to serve the community, see Canon 2 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, the ethical rules of the legal profession traditionally have recognized an exception from any general ban on solicitation for offers of representation, without charge, extended to individuals who may be unable to obtain legal assistance on their own. See, e. g., In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467, 475-476 (Md. 1934); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Assn., 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940); American Bar Association, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion 148, pp. 416-419 (1967). At bottom, the case against appellant rests on the proposition that a State may regulate in a prophylactic fashion all solicitation activities of lawyers because there may be some potential for overreaching, conflict of interest, or other substantive evils whenever a lawyer gives unsolicited advice and communicates an offer of representation to a layman.

But truly non-pecuniary arrangements involving the solicitation of legal business have been frequently upheld. See In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D.C.D. Md. 1934) (lawyer's volunteering his services to a litigant, without being asked, held not unprofessional where "important issues" were at stake); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Assn., 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940) (arrangement whereby a local bar association publicly offered to represent, free of charge, persons victimized by usurers, upheld). Of particular pertinence to the instant case is Opinion 148, supra, note 13. In the 1930's, a National Lawyers Committee was formed under the auspices of the Liberty League.