Opinion
November 20, 1906.
Albert S. Barnes and Hiram Mintz, for the appellants.
C.H. Hitchcock, for the respondents.
Primarily an application for a warrant of attachment should be based on legal evidence. Hearsay evidence is substituted therefor only in cases of necessity, and the courts have been strict where such necessity exists that the source of the evidence be given as well as the reason why primary evidence is not furnished.
"Where a party alleges upon information and belief, and states that the sources of his information are certain writings, the court is entitled to know what the writings are, in order to see whether the affiant is justified in his belief or not." ( Landenburg v. Commercial Bank, 87 Hun, 269, 275; affd., 146 N.Y. 406; Barrell v. Todd, 65 App. Div. 22, 26.)
It appears from the affidavit on which this attachment was based that the sources of the affiant's information and the grounds of his belief are, among other things, a telephone conversation between him and Conlon, one of the plaintiffs, in which the facts alleged in the affidavit on information and belief were related in detail by said Conlon, and that on the day following such telephone conversation the affiant received a letter from said Conlon repeating the substance of the matters alleged on information and belief. If this affidavit were based solely on the telephone communication it is possible that the facts are sufficient to identify the plaintiff Conlon as the person giving the information, but, according to the affidavit, the information was derived also from a letter which was received from Conlon and which was in the possession of the affiant, and which repeated in substance the information related to the affiant over the telephone. It admits of little doubt that this letter is better evidence than the telephone communication, and the failure to produce the letter is a failure to present the best information to the court. Within the principle above cited this letter should have been presented in order that the judge might determine whether the affiant's belief in the facts stated by him in his affidavit as the grounds of the attachment was well founded.
The order must be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion granted, with ten dollars costs.
PARKER, P.J., and SMITH, J., concurred; CHESTER, J., dissented in an opinion in which KELLOGG, J., concurred.
The claim is that the affidavit on which the attachment was granted is insufficient in two respects: First, because the letters referred to are not annexed, and, second, because it is not stated that the affiant knew with whom he had the conversation over the telephone. He states positively that the conversation was with the plaintiff William J. Conlon in the city of Philadelphia without, it is true, stating in so many words that he knew him, but it is said that the plaintiff Conlon is one of the correspondents in the city of Philadelphia of deponent's firm, which before such conversation had received a letter from Conlon which was answered by the deponent and that thereafter such conversation was had in the course of which all the facts stated on information and belief were related to deponent in detail by Conlon. It is also stated that the next day after such conversation deponent received a further letter from Conlon repeating in writing the substance of the matter set forth on information and belief. These facts, I think, furnish a sufficient identification of the plaintiff Conlon as the man with whom the affiant had the conversation over the telephone and distinguish the case from Murphy v. Jack ( 142 N.Y. 215), where it was held that an affidavit on information and belief was insufficient to support an attachment where the only information was a talk over a telephone with a person with whom the affiant did not state he was acquainted, nor that he recognized his voice, and it did not appear that he in any other way knew who it was talking with him.
If the sources of the deponent's information and the grounds of his belief had been alone the letters referred to in the affidavit they would have been insufficient upon which to procure an attachment without affixing the letters to the affidavit. ( Barrell v. Todd, 65 App. Div. 22; Ladenburg v. Commercial Bank, 87 Hun, 269.) But here the letters were essential only as a means of identifying the person with whom the talk over the telephone was had, and that conversation, which covered in detail the plaintiff's claim and all the facts stated on information and belief, was the important thing to be considered by the court in determining whether such information and belief were well founded. I think, therefore, that under such circumstances we should not hold that the absence from the affidavit of the letters was a fatal defect.
The order should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and printing disbursements.
KELLOGG, J., concurred.
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted, with ten dollars costs.