Gulley v. Roach

Full title: STEVEN GULLEY, 91-B-1924, Plaintiff, v. JOHN ROACH, et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, W.D. New York

Date published: Jun 7, 2004

02-CV-0908S(Sr) (W.D.N.Y. Jun. 7, 2004)

Opinion

02-CV-0908S(Sr).

June 7, 2004

DECISION AND ORDER

KEN SCHROEDER, Magistrate Judge

This case was referred to the undersigned by the Hon. William M. Skretny, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), for all pretrial matters, including hearing and disposition of all non-dispositive motions. Dkt. #6.

Currently before the Court is the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery. Dkt. #25. For the following reasons, the plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants deprived him of his constitutional right to due process during the course of a tier III disciplinary hearing. Dkt. #1. As a result of the disciplinary hearing, the defendant was sentenced to twenty four months in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"), as well as a loss of good time credit. Dkt. #1. This penalty was reduced and ultimately reversed following an article 78 proceeding in New York State Supreme Court, but not until the plaintiff had already spent seven months in "full restraints"¹ in SHU. Dkt. #1.

1 The SHU Restraint Order Renewals indicate that plaintiff was to be "cuff[ed] from behind" whenever he was outside of his cell. Dkt. #28, Exh. C.

On August 19, 2003, the plaintiff served a request for discovery upon the defendants. Dkt. #20. The defendants responded to this demand on or about October 6, 2003. Dkt. #22. The plaintiff filed a motion to compel on October 29, 2003. Dkt. #25. The defendants responded to the motion and produced additional documents on or about December 3, 2003. Dkt. #28.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A review of the defendants' responses to plaintiff's document demands indicates that the defendants replied to demands numbered 1, 2, 11, and 14 without reservation. Dkt. #22. The defendants produced redacted copies of DOCS Directive #4933, entitled "Special Housing Units," and DOCS Directive #4910, entitled "Control of and Search for Contraband," in response to document demands numbered 4 and 5. Dkt. #22, ¶¶ 4, 5 Exh. C, D. In their response to plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants produced documents in response to demands numbered 3 and 15, without reservation, and redacted copies of log book entries in response to document demand #13. Dkt. #28, ¶¶ 3, 13, 15 Exh. E. Thus, the document demands which remain at issue are numbers 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17 and 18.

Document Demand #6 seeks a "copy of Attica cell inspection form — showing cell search inspection before I moved in cell #BE-9 on date May 25^th." Dkt. #20, ¶ 6. The defendants objected this request as "irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant material." Dkt. #22, ¶ 6. In response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants state that the "search and inspection of empty SHU cells prior to an inmate moving into it was standard procedure but was not documented in 2000, the year relevant to this lawsuit." Dkt. #28, ¶ 6. However, the defendants did disclose a "SHU Cell Equipment and Property Inventory Form for Cell BE-9, dated 5/24/00." Dkt. #28, ¶ 6. The defendants also state that there are no other documents responsive to this demand Dkt. #28, ¶ 6. In light of this representation, this aspect of the plaintiff's motion to compel is denied.

Document demand number 7 seeks a "copy of all memorandums and directives on the use of mechanical restraints." Dkt. #20, ¶ 7. The defendants objected to this demand as "irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant material," but noted that mechanical restraints were discussed in DOCS Directive #4910, entitled "Control of and Search for Contraband," which has been produced. Dkt. #22, ¶ 7. In response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants state that this document "is the only document governing the use of such restraints in SHU." Dkt. #28, ¶ 7.

The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground that seven months of SHU confinement does not implicate a liberty interest sufficient to require due process. Dkt. #35, pp. 7-9. "A prisoner's liberty interest is implicated by prison discipline, such as SHU confinement, only if the discipline `imposes [an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004), quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In assessing whether the discipline imposed rises to this level, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has directed the district courts to consider both the conditions of confinement and their duration, "since especially harsh conditions endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh conditions endured for a prolonged interval might both be atypical." Id., quoting Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 1999).

Where the length of confinement is within an intermediate duration of 101 and 305 days, the district court is required to develop a detailed record of the conditions of confinement relative to ordinary prison conditions. Id. at 64-65. Even shorter periods of SHU confinement may "constitute atypical and significant hardships if the conditions were more severe than the normal² SHU conditions. . . ." Id. at 65. Thus, in the Palmer case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that plaintiff's confinement of 77 days in SHU with, inter alia, application of mechanical restraints whenever he was being escorted, sufficient to raise a genuine question of material fact "as to the conditions under which Palmer was confined and how those conditions compared to the conditions imposed on the general prison population." Id. at 66.

2 The Palmer Court references the following description of "norm al" SHU conditions:

An inmate is confined to his cell 23 hours per day, can take no more than three showers per week, has limited library privileges and no telephone privileges. There was no quiet bell in the SHU, so it was noisy most of the time. On occasion, inmates threw feces at other inmates.

Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 1999).

In the instant case, plaintiff complains that he spent seven months in SHU with, inter alia, application of "full restraints." Dkt. #1. Whether or not the use of mechanical restraints during such an intermediate term of SHU confinement is sufficient to implicate a liberty interest will potentially be influenced by the prevalence of the application of mechanical restraints within both the SHU and general population. Accordingly, the defendants shall produce any "memorandums and directives on the use of mechanical restraints" within the entire population at Attica or indicate that such restraints are only employed within the SHU.

Document demand #8 seeks "copies of all deprivation orders dated 6-2-00 to 6-2-01." Dkt. #20, ¶ 8. The defendants objected to this demand as "irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant material." Dkt. #22, ¶ 8. In response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants state that "[o]rders pertaining to inmates other than plaintiff have nothing to do with the instant lawsuit." Dkt. #22, ¶ 8. The defendants also state that "[a] check of plaintiff's security file disclosed no such orders." Dkt. #28, ¶ 8. In light of the defendants' representation that plaintiff was not subjected to a deprivation order, the Court agrees that any such orders with respect to other inmates are irrelevant. Accordingly, this aspect of the plaintiff's motion is denied.

Document demand #9 seeks "copies of all use restraint orders dated 6-2-00 to 6-2-01." Dkt. #20, ¶ 9. The defendants objected to this demand as "irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant material." Dkt. #22, ¶ 9. Without waiving that objection, in their response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, defendants produced the "SHU Restraint Order Renewals for plaintiff from June 2, 2000 to December 26, 2000," plaintiff's last day at Attica. Dkt. #28, ¶ 9. The defendants also stated that they had requested and would supplement their response with the Southport Correctional Facility's SHU Restraint Order Renewals for plaintiff from December 26, 2000 to June 2, 2001. Dkt. #28, ¶ 9.

In the instant case, plaintiff complains that he spent seven months in SHU with, inter alia, application of "full restraints." Dkt. #1. Whether or not the use of mechanical restraints during such an intermediate term of SHU confinement is sufficient to implicate a liberty interest will potentially be influenced by the prevalence of the application of mechanical restraints within the facility. See discussion supra document demand #7. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to discovery with respect to this issue. However, plaintiff's request for "copies of all use restraint orders dated 6-2-00 to 6-2-01" is overbroad. Dkt. #20, ¶ 9. Instead, the defendants shall produce documentation indicating the number of inmates at Attica who were subject to a restraint order during the period June, 2000 through June, 2001, and if such information is available, the duration of such restraint orders and whether they were imposed upon inmates within the general population or just SHU, or state that no such document exists.

Document demand #10 seeks a "copy of the job description (manual) of the Director of Special Housing." Dkt. #20, ¶ 10. The defendants objected to this demand as "irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant material." Dkt. #22, ¶ 10. In response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants continue that objection, but refer plaintiff to Part 254.8 of the previously disclosed DOCS Directive governing the conduct of tier III hearings, which discusses the Special Housing Director's responsibilities with respect to review of inmate appeals. Dkt. #28, ¶ 10. The defendants also state that they have requested "any documents which describe or dictate the procedures by which such review is to be made; such documents, if they exist, will be disclosed when available." Dkt. #28, ¶ 10. In light of defendants' representation that they have or will disclose any documents pertaining the review of inmate appeals by the Director of Special Housing, which is the only aspect of the Director of Special Housing's duties at issue in this action, this aspect of the plaintiff's motion is denied.

Document demand #12 seeks "any photos." Dkt. #20, ¶ 12. The defendants objected to this demand as "vague and overbroad." Dkt. #22, ¶ 12. In response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants state that there are no photographs in plaintiff's security file and no photographs of the weapons pertinent to this lawsuit. Dkt. #28, ¶ 12. However, the defendants produced a redacted copy of the Unusual Incident Report pertaining to the search of plaintiff's cell, which "contains photocopies of the weapons." Dkt. #28, ¶ 12. The defendants state that no other documents responsive to this request exist, but do not attempt any explanation as to why the original photographs cannot be produced. Dkt. #28, ¶ 12. The defendants shall conduct a diligent search for these photographs and explain their efforts and the results of their search to the Court.

Document demand #16 seeks "witnesses BE-1 cell thru BE-12." Dkt. #20, ¶ 16. The defendants objected to this demand as "vague, irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant material." Dkt. #22, ¶ 16. In response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants state that the disclosure of the names and DINs of other inmates would place the security of the facility and other inmates at risk. Dkt. #28, ¶ 16. The Court agrees that the identity of inmates housed in nearby cells is irrelevant to the question of whether plaintiff was afforded due process at his disciplinary hearing. Accordingly, this aspect of plaintiff's motion is denied.

Document demand #17 seeks the "hearing officer's record of how many tier III hearing[s] he conducted 90 days prior to my hearing from February 12 . . . to May 12^th." Dkt. #20, ¶ 17. The defendants objected to this request as "irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant material." Dkt. #22, ¶ 17. The defendants also objected on the ground that this request required "the creation of a record." Dkt. #22, ¶ 17. In response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants continue their objection, stating, "the number of hearings has absolutely nothing to do with whether plaintiff's civil rights were violated at one particular hearing." Dkt. #28, ¶ 17. The Court agrees that the process due plaintiff at his disciplinary hearing does not depend upon the experience of the hearing officer. Accordingly, this aspect of plaintiff's motion to compel is denied.

Document demand #18 asks how many times during the period from February 12^th thru May 12^th that the hearing officer found an inmate not guilty of all the charges. Dkt. #20, ¶ 18. The defendants objected to this request as "irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant material." Dkt. #22, ¶ 18. The defendants also objected on the ground that this request required "the creation of a record." Dkt. #22, ¶ 18. In response to the plaintiff's motion to compel, the defendants continue their objection, stating, the "outcome of other inmates' hearings has nothing to do with whether plaintiff's rights were violated at one particular hearing." Dkt. #28, ¶ 19. The Court agrees that the outcome of other disciplinary hearings is irrelevant to the issue of whether plaintiff received due process at his disciplinary hearing. Accordingly, this aspect of plaintiff's motion to compel is denied.

Although the plaintiff appears to have made additional document demands in his motion to compel, which is procedurally improper, the Court has reviewed the defendants responses to these additional demands and is satisfied that the defendants have responded to these demands to the extent that a response is warranted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to compel (Dkt. #25), is granted in part and denied in part as set forth above.

SO ORDERED.