Opinion
NUMBER 2022 CA 0499.
11-04-2022
GULFSOUTH CREDIT, LLC v. Claudell CONWAY.
GUIDRY, J.
Plaintiff/appellant, Gulfsouth Credit, LLC (Gulfsouth), appeals from a trial court judgment failing to award it post-judgment interest in a suit to recover the unpaid debt on three promissory notes executed by defendant/appellee, Claudell Conway. For the reasons that follow, we remand this matter to the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 5, 2021, Gulfsouth filed a suit on three promissory notes against Claudell Conway. In its petition, Gulfsouth alleged that Conway executed the first promissory note on December 13, 2018, in favor of Gulfsouth in the amount of $6,162.23, together with interest at the rate of 29.3% per year, until the first year after the contract maturity date of January 1, 2021, and thereafter at the rate of 18% per year until satisfied, together with attorney's fees of 25% of principal and interest. Conway executed a second promissory note in favor of Gulfsouth on July 18, 2019, in the amount of $3,599.24, together with interest at the rate of 31.98% per year, until the first year after the contract maturity date of August 1, 2021, and thereafter at the rate of 18% per year until satisfied, together with attorney's fees of 25% of principal and interest. Conway executed the third promissory note in favor of Gulfsouth on December 1, 2020, in the amount of $1,916.67, together with interest at the rate of 30% per year, until the first year after the contract maturity date of December 10, 2022, and thereafter at the rate of 18% per year until satisfied, together with attorney's fees of 25% of principal and interest.
Gulfsouth alleged that despite demand, Conway has allowed payments on the promissory notes to fall behind, and therefore, under the terms of the notes, it was declaring the entire unpaid balance due and payable, together with interest, late charges, and attorney's fees. Accordingly, Gulfsouth sought judgment against Conway for $3,453.18, together with interest on $322.44 of that amount from the date of judicial demand at the rate of 29.3% per year until January 1, 2022, and thereafter at the rate of 18% per year until satisfied; together with interest on $1,292.81 of that amount from the date of judicial demand at the rate of 31.98% per year until August 1, 2022, and thereafter at the rate of 18% per year until satisfied; together with interest on the remaining amount of $1,837.93 from the date of judicial demand at the rate of 30% per year until December 10, 2023, and thereafter at the rate of 18% per year until satisfied. Gulfsouth also sought attorney's fees in the amount of 25% of the principal and interest and for all court costs, which includes but is not limited to any money paid to a private process server to serve documents in the suit.
Following a trial on February 24, 2022, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Gulfsouth and against Conway for the payoff amount as of the date of the trial for the sum of $5,283.14 together with an attorney's fee of 25% and for all costs, including but not limited to any money paid to a private process server to serve documents in the suit and court costs. The judgment denied any post-judgment interest.
Gulfsouth now appeals from the trial court's judgment, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to award it post-judgment interest.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
On May 13, 2022, this court issued a rule to show cause due to an apparent defect in the trial court's judgment, citing D'Luca v. Kirkland, 20-0713, 20-0714, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/21), 321 So.3d 411, 413-414 and U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for RFMSI 2005S7 v. Dumas, 21-0585, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 246, 249. Specifically, this court noted that the judgment at issue includes an award for "all costs," further specifying that the term "costs ... includes (but is not limited to) any money paid to a private process server to serve documents in this suit[,]" but that this language does not specify the amount of costs for the proceeding nor does it specify the costs of the private process server. Consequently, because the precise amounts of the "costs" awarded in the judgment cannot be determined from the judgment alone, this court ordered the parties to show cause why the appeal should or should not be dismissed or remanded.
A valid judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. Moreover, a final appealable judgment must contain decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Co., Inc., 17-1250, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So.3d 1044, 1046. These determinations should be evident from the language of the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Advanced Leveling, 17-1250 at p. 4, 268 So. 3d at 1046.
In the instant case, the judgment at issue provides:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of Gulfsouth Credit, LLC, and against defendant(s) Claudell Conway ... for the payoff amount as of the date of the trial (February 24, 2022) for the sum of $5,283.14 together with an attorney's fee of Twenty-Five Percent (25%) and for all costs. The term "costs" as used herein includes (but is not limited to) any money paid to a private process server to serve documents in this suit, and court cost[s].
In its response to the show cause order, Gulfsouth asserts that D'Luca and U.S. National Bank are distinguishable because those cases involved costs that are not court costs or costs that are to be determined at a later date or by reference to extrinsic evidence. Additionally, Gulfsouth asserts that the court costs awarded in the judgment are specifically defined and provided for by statute as service and court costs.
Costs shall be paid by the party cast and may be taxed by a rule to show cause. La. C.C.P. art. 1920. Costs that shall be taxed include "costs of the clerk, sheriff, witness' fees, costs of taking depositions and copies of acts used on the trial, and all other costs allowed by the court." La. R.S. 13:4533. We note that this court recognized in Edwards v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 13-0186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/13), 2013 WL 7122542, *5 (unpublished opinion) that while fees paid to the sheriff for service are specifically provided for by La. R.S. 13:4533, fees paid to a private process server are not taxable as court costs pursuant to that or any other statute. Therefore, because the judgment does not specify an amount for this award and otherwise leaves its determination for a later date, we find that the judgment is indefinite and is not a valid final judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of instructing the trial court to sign an amended final judgment that is precise, definite, and certain and contains proper decretal language. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1918(A), 1951, and 2088(A)(12) as amended by 2021 La. Acts 259, § 2 (eff. Aug. 1, 2021). It is further ordered that the record in this pending appeal shall be supplemented with such amended final judgment within 15 days of this opinion.
Comments—2021(a) to La. C.C.P. art. 1918 indicate that a lack of proper decretal language in a judgment that is otherwise a final judgment does not divest the appellate court of jurisdiction. Instead, the final judgment shall be corrected to include proper decretal language by an amendment in accordance with Article 1951.
Comments—2021 to La. C.C.P. art. 1951 indicate that the amendments to Article 1951 and Article 2088 allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction to correct, on its own motion or after remand from the appellate court, the lack of proper decretal language in a final judgment. This article does not allow the court to make substantive changes to a final judgment.
Comments—2021(c) to La. C.C.P. art. 2088 indicate that as of August 1, 2021, subparagraph (A)(12) of Article 2088 allows a trial court to retain jurisdiction after an order of appeal is granted to amend a final judgment to correct any deficiencies in the decretal language.