1 S.W.2d 380; Simms v. Southern Pipe Line Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 195 S.W. 283; Fritsche v. Niechoy (Tex.Civ.App.) 158 S.W. 791; Gulf, etc., Ry. v. Shields, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 7, 120 S.W. 222; Frazier v. Coleman (Tex.Civ.App.) 111 S.W. 662; Givens v. Delprat, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 67 S.W. 424; Geers v. Scott (Tex.Civ.App.) 33 S.W. 587. See, also, 32 C.J. p. 57, §§ 37, 38. Also note 34 thereunder, with special discussion of the status of the authorities in Tex as on the point here under consideration.

Our courts have held that an answer filed in the justice court gives said court jurisdiction over the defendant and authorizes a judgment to be rendered against him. Chance v. Pace (Tex.Civ.App.) 151 S.W. 843; Gulf, C. S. 1. Ry. Co. v. Shelds, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 7, 120 S.W. 222 (writ refused). Appellee having entered his appearance in the justice court, and having perfected an appeal to the county court from an adverse judgment rendered against him in the justice court, thereby conferred jurisdiction on the county court.

Appellant makes yet another objection to the court's order, which is perhaps of more force than that which we have just discussed. In the case of G., C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Shields, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 7, 120 S .W. 222, by the Austin Court of Civil Appeals, writ of error refused, it was said, quoting from the headnote: "It is always necessary to exhaust all legal remedies before an injunction will be granted." In Frazier v. Coleman, 111 S.W. 662, it was said by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, quoting from the headnote that: "An injunction will not be granted where the law provides a full, complete, and adequate remedy."

Articles 2374-2377, Revised Civil Statutes; Sherman Steam Laundry v. Carter, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 533, 60 S.W. 328. He must show, not only that he was not in default in permitting the case to go to judgment in his absence, but also that he has a meritorious defense to the cause of action alleged against him. Holliday v. Holliday, 72 Tex. 581, 10 S.W. 690; Drummond v. Lewis, 157 S.W. 266; Railway Co. v. Shield, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 7, 120 S.W. 222. As controverting the proposition asserted by us, appellee has cited Railway Co. v. King, 80 Tex. 683, 16 S.W. 641; Medlin v. Commonwealth, etc., Co., 180 S.W. 899; Insurance Co. v. Arant, 40 S.W. 853.

Appellee is therefore not entitled to relief from any such defect as could have been corrected. Williams v. Watt, 171 S.W. 266; Railway v. Shields, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 7, 120 S.W. 222. The objection that the minor to whom it is alleged the mule in question belonged was not a party to the suit is of no force, in view of the fact that it is evident from the judgment and allegations of the petition that the suit was instituted by the father as next friend of the minor.

Aside from the filing of the plea of privilege and answer to the merits, it may be that the defendant submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by its appearance and taking exception to the action of the court in overruling the suggestions made by the amici curiæ. Mueller v. Heidemeyer, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 109 S.W. 447 (writ of error refused); Railway Co. v. Shields, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 7, 120 S.W. 222 (writ of error refused); Railway Co. v. Scoggin, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 349, 123 S.W. 229; Degetau v. Mayer, 145 S.W. 1054: Railway Co. v. McCarty, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 616, 69 S.W. 229; Railway Co. v. Kiser, 136 S.W. 853 (writ of error refused). But as to this, no ruling is made, as we deem it clear that submission was made for the reason first indicated.

We are of the opinion that the plaintiffs entered their appearance in this cause for all purposes after the filing of the cross-action, and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court with reference to the cross-action; and that therefore no citation was necessary to be served upon them. Smithers v. Smith, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 508, 80 S.W. 646; Harris v. Schlinke, 95 Tex. 88, 65 S.W. 172; Mueller v. Heidemeyer, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 109 S.W. 447; Gulf Co. v. Shields, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 7, 120 S.W. 222. The cross-action is affirmative in its character, and is to be distinguished from those cases in which the pleadings are strictly defensive and have only an affirmative prayer for relief. It points out specifically the title it seeks to annul, and, by reference to the petition, makes the description thereof certain, even to the giving of the book and page where the deed of trust is recorded.