Gulf. C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Meadows

8 Citing cases

  1. City Com'rs of Port Arthur v. Fant

    193 S.W. 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)   Cited 9 times
    In City Commissioners of Port Arthur v. Fant, 193 S.W. 334 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1916, no writ), where the City, in order to provide proper drainage, planned to construct a ditch down a certain street and suit was brought by a landowner, who owned land which adjoined the street, to enjoin its construction on the grounds that the same constituted the 'taking' of his property under the Constitution, it was held that adjoining property owners to the street did not have the right to injunction because the city was not 'taking' the land.

    The constitutional provision was undoubtedly enacted to meet this construction. Railroad Co. v. Eddins, 60 Tex. 656; Railway Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 32, 11 S.W. 145, 3 L.R.A. 565. It follows from the constitutional provision that, if the use of the streets by appellee for the purpose of transporting freight from one point to another in the city of San Antonio imposes an additional servitude on the streets — that is, puts them to a use not contemplated in their dedication and construction — appellant is entitled to compensation for any damages that he may have sustained by such use of the streets; and if there was a `taking' of his property, as contemplated by the Constitution, appellee should, in the absence of condemnation proceedings and compensation paid or secured, be restrained from such use of the streets.

  2. Rische v. Transportation Co.

    27 Tex. Civ. App. 33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901)   Cited 24 times
    In Rische v. Texas Transportation Co., 27 Texas Civ. App. 33[ 27 Tex. Civ. App. 33], such an opinion is expressed, but at the same time it is stated that the pleading did not properly show that the plaintiff owned the fee.

    The constitutional provision was undoubtedly enacted to meet this construction. Railway v. Eddins, 60 Tex. 656; Railway v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467; Railway v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 32. It follows from the constitutional provision that if the use of the streets by appellee for the purpose of transporting freight from one point to another in the city of San Antonio imposes an additional servitude on the streets, that is, puts them to a use not contemplated in their dedication and construction, appellant is entitled to compensation for any damages that he may have sustained by such use of the streets, and if there was a "taking" of his property, as contemplated by the Constitution, appellee should, in the absence of condemnation proceedings and compensation paid or secured, be restrained from such use of the streets.

  3. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Callaway

    382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974)   Cited 26 times
    Granting a preliminary injunction and requiring congressional approval

    It can be ascertained by determining whether the proposed structure represents a material change in the character and capacity of the existing structure. In the case of Gulf, C. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Meadows, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 131, 120 S.W. 521, 524 (1909) a Texas court stated: Appellant in its pleadings and brief claims that it was repairing an old bridge, but the truth of the matter is that it tore down an old wooden bridge, and placed in its stead a new steel structure.

  4. State ex Rel. Ray County v. Hackmann

    295 Mo. 417 (Mo. 1922)   Cited 14 times

    (8) Construction of the proposed bridge across the Missouri River, unauthorized by a special act of Congress, and without the consent of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Engineers, is a clear violation of law, and this court will not lend its assistance thereto. Sec. 9971, U.S. Compiled Statutes 1916; Gulf Ry. Co. v. Meadows, 120 S.W. 521. (9) The bonds issued by Ray County state on their face (see application of relators) that they are issued "for the purpose of grading, constructing, paving and maintaining paved, gravelled, macadamized or rock roads and necessary bridges and culverts therein, and pursuant to and in full compliance with the Constitution and laws of Missouri, including among others, Article V, Chapter 98, Revised Statutes 1919." The notice of special election recites the same purpose, "as authorized by Article V, Chapter 98, Revised Statutes 1919" (see relators' application), and the order for the election says "as authorized by Article V, Chapter 98, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919" (see relators' application).

  5. G.C. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes

    94 Tex. 155 (Tex. 1900)   Cited 65 times
    Holding that railroad company was not liable for creating a negligent nuisance when it planted Bermuda grass that spread to neighboring property and facts failed to show that this was not a legitimate use of its property

    The necessity or importance of using it may vary with the purposes to be accomplished thereby, and the limited extent to which such companies can use the land may influence the inquiry, whether or not, under all the circumstances, such a use is reasonable, but in this respect only is there a difference, affecting this question, between the rights of such companies and other landowners. They would not be liable for an act which is a reasonable use of the right of way for proper purposes further than natural persons would be. Railway v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 35. In the case of Brock v. Connecticut, etc., Railroad Company, 35 Vermont, 373, a company authorized to acquire a right of way and to operate and maintain a railway and required by law to fence its track, planted willow trees along the line separating its right of way from the adjoining lands, in low, marshy ground, intending that the trees should grow and furnish posts for its fence, and at the same time prevent the washing away of its embankment.

  6. Irvin v. Bevil

    16 S.W. 21 (Tex. 1891)   Cited 15 times
    In Irvin v. Bevil, 80 Tex. 332, are found expressions which apparently support appellant's contention, but if the proposition is sound it does not apply to this case, for if, as appellant contends, the description as set out in the grant is void, the reference to the field notes and map would clearly authorize their consideration and render the grant operative to convey the land included in the original field notes.

    The court erred in its charge to the jury, in this: It wholly failed to submit the issues of the locality of the land and of the cutting to the jury, and to instruct them that unless the land was at the place on the ground which plaintiffs (appellees) alleged it to be located, and further that unless the timber was cut from such place where they alleged the land to be, they must find for defendant (appellant), the appellant having asked a special charge presenting those issues. Shipman v. Fullcrod, 42 Tex. 249; Gammage v. Alexander, 14 Tex. 418 [ 14 Tex. 418]; Pasch. Dig., art. 1846; 2 Greenl. on Ev., 11, 15, 160; 1 Greenl. on Ev., 58; Parker v. Beaver, 19 Tex. 410; Sayles' Civ. Stats., art. 1317, and note; Cannon v. Cannon, 66 Tex. 682 [ 66 Tex. 682]; Railway v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 32; Railway v. Schofield, 72 Tex. 496; Ponton v. Ballard, 24 Tex. 621; Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 22; Spence v. Onstott, 3 Tex. 147. 9.

  7. City of Glenn Heights v. Sheffield Development Co.

    61 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. 2001)   Cited 8 times
    Recognizing regulatory taking when zoning ordinance imposed temporary moratorium on development applications

    * * * The insertion of the words 'damaged or destroyed' in the section [of the constitution] quoted was doubtless intended to obviate this question, and to afford protection to the owner of property by allowing him compensation when, by the construction of a public work, his property was directly damaged or destroyed, although no part of it was actually appropriated.' Railway Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34, 11 S.W. Rep. 145. Ft. Worth R. G. Ry. Co. v. Jennings, 76 Tex. 373, 13 S.W. 270, 270-271 (1890). Of course, the Texas Constitution may provide greater protections than those provided by the United States Constitution.

  8. Heilbron v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co.

    52 Tex. Civ. App. 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908)   Cited 24 times
    In Heilbron v. St. L. S.W. Ry. Co., 52 Tex. Civ. App. 575, 113 S.W. 610, 979, it is said: "Owners of property abutting upon a public highway have a vested right in the easement created by the existence of the highway, and, when this highway is obstructed or destroyed and the obstruction or destruction causes a special injury to the property owner beyond that which results to the public generally, such owner has a cause of action against the aggressor."

    On the contrary it was rightfully made and gives no cause of action to appellants, whose land was not touched. Railway Co. v. Shaw, 92 S.W. 30; Railway Co. v. Longino, 25 S.W. 1020; Railway Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 32; 15 Am. Eng. Enc. Law, 500. HODGES, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE. —