For the same reason, the fact that St. George's may be said to derive some percentage of its revenues from Pennsylvania residents in return for services provided in Grenada does not subject it to in personam jurisdiction. Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (1983), upon which appellants rely, is distinguishable. In that case a trucking company was found amenable to personal jurisdiction for a non-forum related cause of action even though only a small percentage of its total income was derived from Pennsylvania activities. The record indicated that the company had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of using Pennsylvania highways, and that it had done so extensively. Thus the fact that only a small percentage of the company's total income was attributable to Pennsylvania activities was irrelevant; that small percentage represented continuous and substantial business within the state.
Courts have interpreted § 5301's "continuous and systemic" standard to be the equivalent of the "continuous and substantial" language used in the case law which delineates general personal jurisdiction. See Derman v. Wilair Servs., Inc., 590 A.2d 317, 323 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 1991); Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049, 1054 (1983). III. DISCUSSION
The district court in the present case, however, noted that in Gehling, this court stated that "the fact that only a small percentage of the [defendant's] total income was attributable to Pennsylvania activities was irrelevant." 773 F.2d at 543 (citing Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (1983)). Thus, concluded the district court, "[t]he absolute amount of [California Federal's] Pennsylvania-related deposits, loans, and depositors may be large enough to show that [California Federal] has conducted substantial business activity in Pennsylvania, although the percentage is minute."
Upon a thorough review of those cases, however, the court finds them distinguishable. The plaintiff has cited Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (1983), as "on all fours" with the present case. There, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found jurisdiction over the defendant trucking company who was found to have "continuous and substantial" contacts with the Commonwealth as part of its "general business."
The relatively small percentage of trips made to Illinois is not determinative; it is whether business in Illinois was fairly regular. See Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 49, 466 A.2d 1049, 1055 (1983) (fact that gross receipts from transportation activities in one state were only 3.7% of total gross receipts and that business in state was only a small fraction of total business did not deprive court of jurisdiction where activities were systematic and continuous). Tippecanoe's business in Illinois was sufficiently regular to satisfy section 2-209(b)(4).
HoltHauling and Warehousing v. Aronow Roofing, 309 Pa. Super. 158, 161, 454 A.2d 1131, 1133 (1983); Delaware Valley Underwritingv. William and Sapp, 359 Pa. Super. 368, 373, 518 A.2d 1280, 1283 (1986); Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 41 n. 1, 466 A.2d 1049, 1051 n. 1 (1983); Liggitt v. Liggitt, 253 Pa. Super. 126, 131, 384 A.2d 1261, 1263-1264 (1978). Once the plaintiff has produced some evidence to support jurisdiction, the defendant must come forward with some evidence of his own to dispel or rebut the plaintiff's evidence.
Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Watson, Ess, Marshall Enggas, 675 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). These connections should reflect the defendant's "purposeful and extensive availment," Provident Nat'l Bank, 819 F.2d at 437 (citing Gulentz v. Fosdick, 466 A.2d 1049 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)), such that the defendant could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court," World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301(a)(2)(iii). In assessing whether a defendant's business in Pennsylvania is "continuous and systematic," this court must examine the defendant's contacts "over a reasonable period of time," Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson Quin, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1994), and may consider factors such as: whether the defendant conducts "daily business" with Pennsylvania companies, see Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436-38 (3d Cir. 1987); what percentage of defendant's total business was generated in Pennsylvania, see Derman, 590 A.2d at 324; whether defendant maintained offices or paid taxes in Pennsylvania, see id.; whether defendant availed itself of Pennsylvania resources in an extensive manner as a way of furthering its business, see Gulentz v. Fosdick, 466 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Pa.Super. 1983); and whether defendant made significant direct sales in Pennsylvania, solicited business regularly in Pennsylvania, and advertised in a manner specifically targeted to reach the Pennsylvania market. See Strick, Corp. v. A.J.F. Warehouse Distribs., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 951, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
The court believes, also, following the Third Circuit's guidance in Gehling, supra, that defendant's proposed statistics of minute percentages of its deposits, loans, and depositors is an irrelevant statistic. In Gehling, the Third Circuit cited approvingly Galentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1983). In Galentz, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had found it irrelevant that only a small percentage of defendant trucking company's income was derived from its Pennsylvania activities and had affirmed the exercise of general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
Slota v. Moorings, supra (no "continuous and substantial" business contact with Pennsylvania where defendant employed no agents in Pennsylvania, had no mailing address, bank account or telephone listing in Pennsylvania, did no advertising or solicitation in Pennsylvania, defendant's only advertising appeared in national publications, and defendant was neither assessed nor paid tax in Pennsylvania); RenoldPower Transmission v. Cunningham Bearing, 640 F. Supp. 24 (M.D.Pa. 1985) (no "continuous and systematic" contact with Pennsylvania where defendant did not earn significant part of its revenues from dealings in Pennsylvania, defendant did not advertise extensively in Pennsylvania and defendant did not regularly solicit business in Pennsylvania). Although the "continuous and substantial" language of Bork and its progeny deviates slightly from the "continuous and systematic" language of the statute, there is no conflict between the cases and the statute, which express the same concept. Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 48, 466 A.2d 1049, 1054 (1983). With the above-mentioned standards in mind, we turn to an evaluation of appellants' claims.