Gulentz v. Fosdick

14 Citing cases

  1. Gehling v. St. George's School of Medicine, Ltd.

    773 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1985)   Cited 308 times
    In Gehling, the Third Circuit cited approvingly Galentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1983).

    For the same reason, the fact that St. George's may be said to derive some percentage of its revenues from Pennsylvania residents in return for services provided in Grenada does not subject it to in personam jurisdiction. Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (1983), upon which appellants rely, is distinguishable. In that case a trucking company was found amenable to personal jurisdiction for a non-forum related cause of action even though only a small percentage of its total income was derived from Pennsylvania activities. The record indicated that the company had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of using Pennsylvania highways, and that it had done so extensively. Thus the fact that only a small percentage of the company's total income was attributable to Pennsylvania activities was irrelevant; that small percentage represented continuous and substantial business within the state.

  2. Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson & Quin, Inc.

    844 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1994)   Cited 42 times
    Finding no general jurisdiction over corporation that sold over $230,000 of its products to approximately twenty-nine customers in the forum and who had sales representatives who included the forum in their territories

    Courts have interpreted § 5301's "continuous and systemic" standard to be the equivalent of the "continuous and substantial" language used in the case law which delineates general personal jurisdiction. See Derman v. Wilair Servs., Inc., 590 A.2d 317, 323 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 1991); Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049, 1054 (1983). III. DISCUSSION

  3. Provident Nat. v. Cal. Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n

    819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987)   Cited 1,063 times
    Holding general jurisdiction proper where the defendant had no property in Pennsylvania and conducted no advertising and only a small percentage of its business in the state, but "the nature of [defendant's] contacts with Pennsylvania . . . was central to the conduct of its business."

    The district court in the present case, however, noted that in Gehling, this court stated that "the fact that only a small percentage of the [defendant's] total income was attributable to Pennsylvania activities was irrelevant." 773 F.2d at 543 (citing Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (1983)). Thus, concluded the district court, "[t]he absolute amount of [California Federal's] Pennsylvania-related deposits, loans, and depositors may be large enough to show that [California Federal] has conducted substantial business activity in Pennsylvania, although the percentage is minute."

  4. Amos ex rel. Amos v. Pendry

    810 F. Supp. 146 (M.D. Pa. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that "[i]f personal jurisdiction could be established by the mere act of traversing another state's highways, the underlying concerns of due process would be defeated. . . ."

    Upon a thorough review of those cases, however, the court finds them distinguishable. The plaintiff has cited Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (1983), as "on all fours" with the present case. There, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found jurisdiction over the defendant trucking company who was found to have "continuous and substantial" contacts with the Commonwealth as part of its "general business."

  5. Gaidar v. Tippecanoe Distribution Service, Inc.

    299 Ill. App. 3d 1034 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 39 times
    Finding that an Indiana trucking corporation was doing business in Illinois even though it did not maintain offices or directly advertise Illinois, reasoning: "[Defendant's] contacts with Illinois may not have been numerous, but its contacts were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated. The relatively small percentage of trips made to Illinois is not determinative; it is whether the business in Illinois was fairly regular. [Defendant's] business in Illinois was sufficiently regular to satisfy section 2-209(b)"

    The relatively small percentage of trips made to Illinois is not determinative; it is whether business in Illinois was fairly regular. See Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 49, 466 A.2d 1049, 1055 (1983) (fact that gross receipts from transportation activities in one state were only 3.7% of total gross receipts and that business in state was only a small fraction of total business did not deprive court of jurisdiction where activities were systematic and continuous). Tippecanoe's business in Illinois was sufficiently regular to satisfy section 2-209(b)(4).

  6. Schmitt v. Seaspray-Sharkline, Inc.

    366 Pa. Super. 528 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)   Cited 15 times
    Stating law requires more than mere objection to personal jurisdiction

    HoltHauling and Warehousing v. Aronow Roofing, 309 Pa. Super. 158, 161, 454 A.2d 1131, 1133 (1983); Delaware Valley Underwritingv. William and Sapp, 359 Pa. Super. 368, 373, 518 A.2d 1280, 1283 (1986); Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 41 n. 1, 466 A.2d 1049, 1051 n. 1 (1983); Liggitt v. Liggitt, 253 Pa. Super. 126, 131, 384 A.2d 1261, 1263-1264 (1978). Once the plaintiff has produced some evidence to support jurisdiction, the defendant must come forward with some evidence of his own to dispel or rebut the plaintiff's evidence.

  7. Ciolli v. Iravani

    651 F. Supp. 2d 356 (E.D. Pa. 2009)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that limited exchange of emails and phone calls between nonresident defendant and a Pennsylvania resident insufficient to show purposeful availment of forum

    Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Watson, Ess, Marshall Enggas, 675 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). These connections should reflect the defendant's "purposeful and extensive availment," Provident Nat'l Bank, 819 F.2d at 437 (citing Gulentz v. Fosdick, 466 A.2d 1049 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)), such that the defendant could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court," World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

  8. Corporate Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Multiservice Corp.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-3020 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2003)   Cited 5 times
    Listing factors

    42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301(a)(2)(iii). In assessing whether a defendant's business in Pennsylvania is "continuous and systematic," this court must examine the defendant's contacts "over a reasonable period of time," Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson Quin, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1994), and may consider factors such as: whether the defendant conducts "daily business" with Pennsylvania companies, see Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436-38 (3d Cir. 1987); what percentage of defendant's total business was generated in Pennsylvania, see Derman, 590 A.2d at 324; whether defendant maintained offices or paid taxes in Pennsylvania, see id.; whether defendant availed itself of Pennsylvania resources in an extensive manner as a way of furthering its business, see Gulentz v. Fosdick, 466 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Pa.Super. 1983); and whether defendant made significant direct sales in Pennsylvania, solicited business regularly in Pennsylvania, and advertised in a manner specifically targeted to reach the Pennsylvania market. See Strick, Corp. v. A.J.F. Warehouse Distribs., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 951, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

  9. Provident Nat. Bk. v. Cal. Fed. Sav. Loan

    624 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Pa. 1985)   Cited 9 times

    The court believes, also, following the Third Circuit's guidance in Gehling, supra, that defendant's proposed statistics of minute percentages of its deposits, loans, and depositors is an irrelevant statistic. In Gehling, the Third Circuit cited approvingly Galentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1983). In Galentz, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had found it irrelevant that only a small percentage of defendant trucking company's income was derived from its Pennsylvania activities and had affirmed the exercise of general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

  10. Derman v. Wilair Services, Inc.

    404 Pa. Super. 136 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)   Cited 23 times
    Finding no general jurisdiction over corporate defendant who advertised in national publications that circulated in Pennsylvania, received 1.5% of its business from Pennsylvania, and bought .3% of its products from Pennsylvania

    Slota v. Moorings, supra (no "continuous and substantial" business contact with Pennsylvania where defendant employed no agents in Pennsylvania, had no mailing address, bank account or telephone listing in Pennsylvania, did no advertising or solicitation in Pennsylvania, defendant's only advertising appeared in national publications, and defendant was neither assessed nor paid tax in Pennsylvania); RenoldPower Transmission v. Cunningham Bearing, 640 F. Supp. 24 (M.D.Pa. 1985) (no "continuous and systematic" contact with Pennsylvania where defendant did not earn significant part of its revenues from dealings in Pennsylvania, defendant did not advertise extensively in Pennsylvania and defendant did not regularly solicit business in Pennsylvania). Although the "continuous and substantial" language of Bork and its progeny deviates slightly from the "continuous and systematic" language of the statute, there is no conflict between the cases and the statute, which express the same concept. Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 48, 466 A.2d 1049, 1054 (1983). With the above-mentioned standards in mind, we turn to an evaluation of appellants' claims.