Opinion
No. 01 CV 4721 (SJ).
June 25, 2004
KENNETH RICHARDSON, ESQ., New York, New York, Attorney for Plaintiff.
ORRICK, HERRINGTON SUTCLIFFE LLP, New York, New York, Ira G. Rosenstein, Esq. Nicole Clifton Pierre, Esq., Attorney for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this instant action against Defendants Delta Air Lines ("Delta") and Jerry Hightower ("Hightower") (collectively, "Defendants") alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of her national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Currently before this Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2001, Delta hired Plaintiff, a Latina woman, as a customer service agent ("CSA") in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 1); (Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs.' Mt. to Dismiss, Ex. B, at 1.) In September 1999, Plaintiff requested and was granted a transfer to LaGuardia Airport in Queens, New York. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 2.) "As a CSA, Plaintiff was responsible for opening and closing flights, including collecting tickets, helping with the boarding process, meeting arriving flights, greeting arriving passengers and making sure all passengers had departed the aircraft." (Id. at ¶ 3.)On May 7, 2000, Susan Hallahan ("Hallahan"), a supervisor, reported to a fellow supervisor, Frank Cordomone ("Cardomone"), that she had witnessed Plaintiff carrying a grey bag containing Delta property. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Cardomone reported this information to his direct supervisor, John Boer ("Boer"), who along with Kevin McHugh, a colleague of Boer's, confronted Plaintiff at her locker regarding this incident. (Id. at ¶ 7.) According to Plaintiff, Boer asked if he could view the contents in the grey bag. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Defendants maintain that the bag contained two bottles of wine and twelve bottles of water, all Delta property. (Id.) Plaintiff conceded that the bag contained two bottles of wine. (Id.) Delta immediately suspended Plaintiff, but told her to report to Hightower, the station manager, the next day. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
The following day, Plaintiff told Hightower that she had received the two bottles of wine from Romeo Sandoval ("Sandoval"), a food supplier and caterer, in return for assisting his family with flight arrangements. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff further told Hightower that a pilot assigned to the jump seat of the flight witnessed Sandoval giving her the wine. (Id. at ¶ 12.) At Hightower's request, Plaintiff drafted her version of the events. (Id. at ¶ 13.) After receiving Plaintiff's written statement, Delta conducted an investigation and found that Plaintiff illegitimately possessed Delta property. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-19.) As a result, Theresa Thomas and Mark Baxter, employees in Delta's Equal Opportunity Department in Atlanta, terminated Plaintiff's employment. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Hightower informed Plaintiff of her termination. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff did not appeal her termination. (Id. at ¶ 22.) On July 17, 2001, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint alleging that she was terminated against on the basis of her national origin.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The burden is on the movant to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995).
Once the movant has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present "significantly probative" supporting evidence showing that there is a material factual issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Summary judgment should be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322;see also Sim v. New York Mailers' Union No. 6, 166 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1999).
II. Title VII claims
In evaluating a Title VII intentional discrimination claim, the three-step burden-shifting framework as articulated in the Supreme Court case, McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, must be employed. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Specifically, the plaintiff-employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, thus creating the presumption that the defendant-employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing satisfactorily; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, then the burden of production shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employee's adverse personnel action. Id. at 253. Upon an employer's successful demonstration of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse personnel action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the "legitimate non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the employer were false, and that more likely than not the employee's [gender, religion, or national origin] was the reason for the [adverse action.]" Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1996).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she cannot prove the second or fourth elements. The Court will focus its analysis on whether Plaintiff has demonstrated that her adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to prove that her supervisors had discriminatory animus toward Latinas. Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists because she was terminated while Denise Staffa, a white, female CSA was not terminated even though she was accused of theft by a co-worker. The Court rejects Plaintiff's argument.
First, Plaintiff's "assertions [regarding the Staffa incident] are based on rumor and hearsay and may not be considered in opposition to defendants' well documented motion for summary judgment." Brown v. Soc'y for Seaman's Children, 194 F. Supp.2d 182, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). Second, "[P]laintiff did not show that the alleged instance of unfair employment practice involved the same supervisors who were involved in [her] termination." Id. Lastly, as pointed out by Defendants, the property purportedly stolen by Staffa did not belong to Delta.See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2000) ("a plaintiff must show [she] was `similarly situated in all material respects' to the individuals with whom [she] seeks to compare herself . . . [T]o satisfy [the] `all material respects' standard for being similarly situated, a plaintiff must show that [her] co-employees were subject to the same performance evaluation and discipline standards . . . [and] that similarly situated employees who went undisciplined engaged in comparable conduct."). Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Defendants have put forth a legitimate reason for terminating her employment — her possession of Delta property in violation of Delta's policy. Plaintiff failed to put forth evidence showing that Delta's reason for terminating her employment was pretextual.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint alleging a violation of Title VII is dismissed.SO ORDERED.