Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd

9 Citing cases

  1. McCollum v. P/S Investments, Ltd.

    764 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App. 1988)   Cited 11 times
    Granting summary judgment to defendant appraiser because plaintiff real estate broker failed to establish a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether the appraiser had knowledge superior to that of the real estate broker, and record reflected that the plaintiff suffered from "studied ignorance"

    "Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, 120 S.W.2d 914, 917-918 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1938, no writ). See Fossier v. Morgan, 474 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, no writ); Frankfurt v. Wilson, 353 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1961, no writ); Mann v. Rugel, 228 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1950, no writ).

  2. Abilene National Bank v. Fina Supply, Inc.

    706 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    It is a well established principle that a misrepresentation as to a matter of law or the legal effect of a document is, generally, not a misrepresentation sufficient to support an action for fraud; rather, the representation is to be regarded as a mere expression of an opinion. See Bifano v. Econo Builders, Inc., 401 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dial Temp Air Conditioning Company v. Faulhaber, 340 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. v. Marker, 298 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mann v. Rugel, 228 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1950, no writ); Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, 120 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1938, no writ); Panhandle Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Neal, 119 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1938, writ ref'd); Phipps v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 116 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1938, writ dism'd); Duncan v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 105 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1937, writ dism'd); Mitchell v. Small, 45 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1931, no writ); see also Safety Casualty Co. v. McGee, 133 Tex. 233, 127 S.W.2d 176 (1939). In 96 A.L.R. 1001 (1935) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio St. 283 (1877)) the following declaration, applicable to this case, appears:

  3. Bykowicz v. Pulte Home Corp.

    950 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1992)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that reliance requirement in deceptive trade practices statute prohibiting fraud in real estate transactions was requirement of "justifiable reliance"

    Statements which frequently come within this rule are those concerning value."Id. (emphasis in McCollum) (quoting Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, 120 S.W.2d 914, 917-18 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1938, no writ)). The fact that the McCollum plaintiff was a real estate broker does not distinguish McCollum from this case.

  4. Ford v. Murdock Accept. Corp.

    112 So. 2d 544 (Miss. 1959)   Cited 1 times

    A. Alliance Trust Co. v. Armstrong, 185 Miss. 148, 186 So. 633; Associates Discount v. Ruddock, 224 Miss. 533, 81 So.2d 249; Beck v. Tucker, 147 Miss. 401, 113 So. 209; Bell v. Tindall, 215 Miss. 243, 60 So.2d 801; Continental Jewelry Co. v. Joseph, 140 Miss. 582, 195 So. 639; Doyle v. L. Herzog Bros., 115 Miss. 154, 75 So. 760; Friedman v. Wisconsin Acceptance Corp. (Wis.) 210 N.W. 831; General Contract Corp. v. Bailey, 218 Miss. 484, 67 So.2d 485; Great Southern Land Co. v. Valley Securities Co., 162 Miss. 120, 137 So. 510; Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd (Tex.), 120 S.W.2d 914; Gunter v. Henderson Molpus Co., 149 Miss. 603, 115 So. 720; Heaberlin v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. (W. Va.), 171 S.E. 419; J.B. Colt Co. v. Harris, 177 Miss. 536, 171 So. 695; Jourdan v. Albritton, 146 Miss. 651, 111 So. 591; McCubbins v. Morgan, 199 Miss. 153, 23 So.2d 926; Martorano v. Finance Corp. (N.Y.), 43 N.E.2d 705; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gill, 182 Miss. 815, 182 So. 109; Niles v. Kavanagh (Cal.), 175 P. 462; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Wade, 153 Miss. 874, 121 So. 844; Ranson v. Snyder, 222 Miss. 248, 75 So.2d 738; Rodiguez v. Youngberg Finance (Tex.), 241 S.W.2d 815; Scottish Union Etc. v. Warren Gee Lumber Co., 118 Miss. 740, 80 So. 9; Sledd v. Pilot Life Ins. Co. (Ga.), 183 S.E. 199; 91 C.J.S., Usury, p. 645. II. Assuming for the sake of argument that a fee under Sec. 5579 was not authorized by statute and that the interest charged appellants by appellee here was in excess of the legal rate, resulting in a forfetiture of all interest, by no calculation can such int

  5. Kwik Indus., Inc. v. Rock Prairie Holdings, Ltd.

    No. 05-13-00054-CV (Tex. App. Mar. 30, 2015)   Cited 2 times

    Statements which frequently come within this rule are those concerning value." Id. at 255 (quoting Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, 120 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1938, no writ)). Both of the Loftons testified they had no previous experience in the lube and tune industry, and no knowledge of how to operate a lube and tune facility.

  6. CMS Energy Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Quicksilver

    No. 02-07-260-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 25, 2009)

    On the whole, we consider the statement of facts reflects quite a volume of immaterial personal opinion and trade-talk between these parties, each one sparring for an advantage, and considering the matter from his own standpoint; but on the whole we think it conclusively appears that the general tenor and statement of these negotiations do not rise, or rather descend, to the level of actionable fraud, warranting the cancellation sought.Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, 120 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1938, no writ); see also 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 75 (2001) (explaining the general rule that trade talk will not be construed as importing a representation upon which a charge of fraud may be based at least where the parties deal at arm's length). Quicksilver relies on Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434-35 (Tex. 1986), for the proposition that a promise to do an act in the future with the intention, design, and purpose of deceiving and with no intention of performing the act may constitute actionable fraud.

  7. Bifano v. Econo Builders Inc.

    401 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)   Cited 17 times
    In Bifano, appellants claimed that although their current lease of a building in a shopping center did not explicitly contain a description of the portion of land not covered by the building, it was nevertheless by implication a part of the demised premises or should be considered so, because inter alia the use thereof by the appellants was reasonably necessary to their beneficial use of the building itself.

    Since both parties had equal means of knowing what property the 1960 lease covered, and no artifice or fraud was employed to prevent Bifano from making his own examination and arriving at his own conclusion, Hill's statement must be regarded as a mere expression of opinion, and not a misrepresentation of a material fact upon which Bifano was legally entitled to rely. Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 914, 918, no wr. hist.; Whitsel v. Hoover, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 930, wr. dism. The appellants also argue that the 1960 lease was ambiguous and should be construed by the court to include all of Tract C, and that the court erred in refusing to do so.

  8. Fenn v. Boxwell

    312 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)   Cited 10 times

    Concerning the question of the deed being void it is said in 14-B Tex.Jur., Section 194, paragraph 1, page 655, 'If the grantor, without court compulsion, executes a second deed containing a sufficient description, the correcting deed is effective beween the parties as of the date of the earlier deed under the doctrine of relation back.' In guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 914, 919, the Court of Civil Appeals of Eastland, in a case where the conveyance called for the lots as being in Block 34 when they were in fact in Block 134 said: '* * * we are of the opinion that any reasonable interpretation of the testimony setting forth the circumstances surrounding and including the execution of the correction deed of May, 1937, conclusively establishes, when viewed from the standpoint of the appellees, that said deed of correction amounted to a complete ratification of the deed of January 16, 1937, the deed reciting the $125 consideration and containing the wrong block number.' In Marshall Field Co. v. Pearson, 5 Cir., 48 F.2d 485, 487, the Fifth Circuit Court, speaking through Judge Hutcheson, said, 'That an instrument, though changed after filing and before recordation, will stand as recorded when the change is made with the consent of the grantor is settled law

  9. Mann v. Rugel

    228 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)   Cited 8 times

    In Mitchell v. Small, Tex.Civ.App., 45 s.W.2d 403, a lessor made certain statements as to her interest under a deed and her authority to make a lease of certain minerals, she not being a lawyer, the court held that such was an opinion on a question of law which could not be the basis of a fraud action. In Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 914, the court held that any statement that it would be impossible to obtain a permit to drill on certain property constitutes an opinion on a question of law not amounting to legal fraud. At the conclusion of the evidence the defendant moved for peremptory instruction; and, again, motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.