" The Defendant: Yeah, yeah." In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 130; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a factual basis is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the jury could reasonably draw an inculpatory inference from the admitted facts. We believe that defendant's admission that, "I made like I had a gun in a paper bag", along with his statement that his victim subsequently complied with his demand, supports drawing the inference that the victim reasonably believed defendant had a weapon.
Each of the defendant's three claims of error has been carefully considered by the Court, but two of them do not require extended discussion. First, there can be no doubt that the policy enunciated in the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), is intended to apply in all cases raising issues concerning GCR 1963, 785.7 that were pending on appeal on November 7, 1975. Second, since the defendant acknowledged on the record that he was not on probation or parole, GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(c) was not violated.
Under this doctrine, literal or “talismanic” compliance with the court rules is not required. See id. at 280, 631 N.W.2d 320; in rE guiltY pleA cases, 395 mich. 96, 124, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975). instead, reviewing courts consider the record to determine whether “the judge informed the defendant of the constitutional and other rights delineated in the rule in such manner as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that the defendant understood what a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was knowingly giving up his right to a trial and the rights and incidents of a trial.”
However, earlier in the day defendant was present while the same judge instructed the jury that convened for defendant's trial — on the charge to which he subsequently pleaded guilty — that the defendant was presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), the question is whether there was substantial, not strict, compliance with the requirements of MCR 6.302. Despite the trial court's omission of the presumption of innocence during the plea hearing, we hold that defendant "was informed of such constitutional rights and incidents of a trial as reasonable to warrant the conclusion that he understood what a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was knowingly and voluntarily giving up his right to a trial and such rights and incidents."
To decide which is the appropriate practice we will consider, first, the reasons said to justify the difference in the two, and second, how those reasons apply in the context of the instant case. In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 133; 235 N.W.2d 132, 147 (1975), the Supreme Court stated its "preference for interrogation of the defendant by the judge and for reliance on his responses to establish a factual basis". In an accompanying footnote, the Court quoted with approval the following, in apparent explanation of this preference:
Where there is error but it is not one of complete omission of the court rule and Anderson requirements, reversal is not necessarily required. Cf. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 122-124; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975). Whether a particular departure justifies reversal "will depend on the nature of the noncompliance."
In the present case, the plea-taking form was substituted wholesale for the judge's direct advice on the record required by GCR 1963, 785.7. In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 114; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), the Court stated: "While it would be better for the judge to cover all the points himself, as long as he assumes the principal burden of imparting the required information, * * * the purpose of requiring him personally to address the defendant and in so doing observe his demeanor and responses is achieved."
While it is clear that each of these guilty pleas involved "sentence bargaining" during which the judge agreed to limit the range of his sentencing discretion, that fact does not alter the responsibility of the judge under Rule 785.7(1), subds (b) and (d).Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975).People v Beaty, 400 Mich. 813 (1977).
In State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763, 765 (1971) the Nebraska Supreme Court said that the defendant need not be given an item-by-item review of his constitutional rights nor need the court obtain a separate expressed verbal waiver as each of them before it can find an intelligent and voluntary waiver by defendant. Apparently besieged by numerous guilty plea cases, much as we are, the Supreme Court of Michigan felt it necessary to consider the problem in a special case entitled In re Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132, 138-139 (1975). There the court said:
It was the circuit judge's responsibility to determine whether the plea was induced by a promise of leniency which went unfulfilled. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 127; 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975). In lieu of leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant's conviction and sentence.