Opinion
20-56053
12-27-2021
GUILLERMINA R., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted November 16, 2021 Pasadena, California
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Alexander F. MacKinnon, Magistrate Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 5:19-cv-02315-AFM
Before: BERZON and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON, [**] District Judge.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Claimant Guillermina R. appeals the district court's order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Our review of the district court's decision is de novo, and "[w]e will 'set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.'" Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009)). We affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge's (ALJ) formulation of Claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). The RFC is consistent with Claimant's contention that she is limited to standing and walking for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. Although the RFC does not specify a 6-hour limitation in so many words, the RFC explains that Claimant can "perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §] 404.1567(b)," with certain noted limitations.
Because the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review, the decision of the ALJ became the agency's final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).
"Light work" has a well-established meaning in disability law. Cf. Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing "medium work," which is similarly defined). The regulation cited by the ALJ describes "light work" as "requir[ing] a good deal of walking or standing." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). A Social Security ruling further explains: "[T]he full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Sitting may occur intermittently during the remaining time." SSR 83- 10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (Jan. 1, 1983). Claimant acknowledges and urges that she is limited to 6 hours of standing and walking during an 8-hour workday, and to the extent she asserts that "light work" necessarily requires more than 6 hours of standing and walking, her position is inconsistent with longstanding precedent regarding Social Security Ruling 83-10. See, e.g., Terry, 998 F.3d at 1014 n.1 ("[T]his court has cited [Social Security Ruling 83-10]'s definitions with approval on multiple occasions.").
2. The ALJ properly relied on the vocational expert's response to a hypothetical question even though that question did not expressly include a walking and standing limitation. The ALJ asked the expert to assume a capability to "perform light work" along with the limitations that the ALJ ultimately specified in the RFC. Again, "light work" has a well-established meaning, and "the expert here would have understood the ALJ's question to imply" a 6-hour standing and walking limitation, Terry, 998 F.3d at 1014. Thus, "the ALJ's reference to the term in h[er] questioning of the expert sufficiently conveyed" the limitation. Id. at 1013.
Although 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) alternatively describes "light work" as "involv[ing] sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls," during oral argument Claimant disclaimed reliance on the presence of this alternative in urging reversal.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.