Opinion
Civil Action No: 03-1080 Section: "A" (1).
December 6, 2004
HEARING ON MOTION
Submitted on briefs
DEFENDANTS' RULE 56(c) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Rec. doc. 58)
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART
Before the undersigned is the motion of all of the defendants for summary judgment. For the reasons described below the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Reggie U. Guilbeau ("Guilbeau"), alleges that he was incarcerated in the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex for driving while intoxicated. While so confined and beginning about November 5, 2002, he alleges he began to experience difficulty breathing and progressive numbness in his hands and feet. Notwithstanding his alleged complaints and the helplessness of his condition, he contends he was not diagnosed with Guillian-Barre syndrome until November 22, 2002. Rec. doc. 1. On April 16, 2003, he filed a complaint against Terrebonne Parish and others. Id. He alleges three causes of action: (1) the defendants' conduct amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the defendants' actions violated his civil rights and his right to be free from unlawful detainment under the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) the defendants' actions constituted negligence under Louisiana law. Id.
On November 12, 2003, Guilbeau filed an amended and supplemental complaint in which he named the State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DOC"), as an additional defendant. On December 22, 2003, the State filed a motion to dismiss which was granted. Rec. doc. 45. The pretrial conference is set for December 16, 2004 and the trial is set for January 24, 2005. Rec. doc. 41. The defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on October 29, 2004 after the parties conducted discovery. Rec. doc. 58. During the pendency of the motion Guilbeau reached a settlement with the following defendants: (1) Jerry J. Larpenter, individually, and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Parish of Terrebonne; (2) Marcel Null, individually and in his official capacity as the Warden of Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex ("TPCJC"); (3) Lt. Dennis LeCompte, an employee of the Sheriff's office at TPCJC; and (4) Lt. Saul Tanner, an employee of the Sheriff's office at TPCJC.
The parties consented to the trial of this action before a Magistrate Judge. Rec. docs. 16 and 39.
DEFENDANTS
Guilbeau seeks relief against the remaining defendants:
a. Robert Bergeron, individually and in his official capacity as the President of the Parish of Terrebonne. The Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government owns TPCJC and operates the Medical Department within TPCJC;
b. Ed Byerly, the medical administrator for TPCJC;
c. Marge Whitney, R.N., the nurse supervisor in the medical department at TPCJC;
d. Nina Helene E. Eschete, LPN, a nurse in the medical department at TPCJC; and
e. the Parish of Terrebonne.
SUMMARY OF GUILBEAU'S ALLEGATIONS
On November 5, 2002, while confined in the general population dorm at TPCJC, Guilbeau suffered an acute onset of difficulty in breathing. Previously, he reported to TPCJC's medical staff complaints of increasing numbness in his hands and feet. After more than one attempt at securing attention, he was escorted to the nurse's station. The medical staff reported that they did not believe his complaints. After further efforts to convince the staff of the veracity of his complaints and a day's delay, he was seen by a physician at TPCJC on November 6, 2002. The physician attributed the symptoms to anxiety related to his confinement. On that same day Guilbeau fell down steps because of the increasing numbness in his legs. He believed that he injured his back and neck in the fall. Nurse Whitney was called to the scene. After listening to Guilbeau's explanation, she accused him of malingering. Later that day he was taken to the emergency room at Chabert Medical Center in Houma. Guilbeau did not demonstrate reflexes upon examination. X-rays of the cervical and thoracic spine were negative. The emergency room ("ER") physician said he needed to be examined by a neurologist and reported this to Nurse Whitney, who insisted that Guilbeau was malingering. He was returned to TPCJC. Guilbeau made further complaints that evening about his condition. Nurse Eschete refused to let him see a doctor.
Guilbeau describes his complaint as verified, but it does not contain a verification. Rec. doc. 1.
On November 7, 2002, he fell while walking to the toilet. The medic reported to him that Nurse Whitney had told the medical staff that he was a malingering and he should not be helped. Lt. LeCompte, who was with the medic, yelled at the other inmates that Guilbeau was a malingerer and threatened them with a loss of privileges if they helped Guilbeau. Guilbeau submitted a further request for treatment but was ignored. Nurse Eschete entered the dorm late in the evening and ordered that Guilbeau be strapped down on a stretcher or gurney that was used to immobilize persons when there was concern of a spinal injury. Despite Guilbeau's protests, he was kept on the stretcher until the morning as punishment for his complaints. Guilbeau could not walk without assistance. On November 8, 2002 Guilbeau was examined by a physician at TPCJC, who found no reflexes. The diagnosis, however, was unchanged from that of paralysis due to the anxiety of imprisonment. Over the next several days Guilbeau continued to experience numbness and paralysis, but his complaints were not heeded by the medical staff at TPCJC.
On November 13, 2004, Ed Byerly ("Byerly") notified Lt. Saul Tanner that Guilbeau should be sent to DOC facility so that he could be seen by a neurologist. Lt. Tanner ignored Byerly's order and Byerly knew it was ignored. After several days of continued complaints by Guilbeau, he was placed in an isolation cell. He objected because there was no one from the general prison population available to help him. During his confinement in the isolation cell he was often left lying on the floor unable to move because of his condition. After several days he was placed in a medical dorm. In the medical dorm Guilbeau depended on other inmates to carry him. He contacted his family by phone to request their assistance in obtaining medical treatment. On November 21, 2002, he was seen by an orthopedic surgeon. This appointment was arranged by his parents. The doctor had an MRI done on Guilbeau, but it was normal. Guilbeau was returned to TPCJC. On November 22, 2002, Guilbeau lost consciousness. He was transported to Chabert, where, after a number of tests and examinations, he was diagnosed with Guillian-Barre syndrome.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 provides in pertinent part that summary judgment will be granted when ". . . the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990). To that end, the court must "view the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood, 297 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2002). Where the record taken as whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986);Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, the party moving for summary judgment must "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case.Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187. If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. If the movant does, however, meet this burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54. A dispute over a material fact is genuine, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Kee v. City of Rowlett Texas, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2001).
This burden is not satisfied with "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, by "conclusory allegations," Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3180, by "unsubstantiated assertions," Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994), or by only a "scintilla" of evidence, Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 1994). The court resolves factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. The court does not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. See Lujan, 110 S.Ct. at 3188. Summary judgment is appropriate in any case "where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant." Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1993). If the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden, the motion for summary judgment must be granted. See Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 588-89 (5th Cir. 2000).
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. Guilbeau was in the custody of TPCJC from August 15, 2002 through November 26, 2002.
Rec. doc. 58, exhibit 9, TPSO Booking Data Inquiry.
2. On November 7, 2002, Dr. Haydel at TPCJC's Medical Department diagnosed Guilbeau with paresthesia of unknown etiology.
Paresthesia is defined as an abnormal sensation, such as of burning, pricking, tickling, or tingling. Stedman's Medical Dictionary (26th Ed. 1995), p. 1300.
Rec. doc. 58, exhibit 2, TPCJC's Medical Department note of November 7, 2002.
3. On November 7, 2002, Guilbeau was taken to the Chabert emergency room where a physician diagnosed him with paresthesia of unknown etiology. He indicated that Guilbeau was a malingerer.
Id., exhibit 3, Chabert emergency room record of November 7, 2002.
4. The Chabert physician reported the diagnosis, including malingering, to TPCJC's Medical Department and recommended that it should follow Dr. Haydel's recommendations.
Id., exhibit 2, TPCJC Medical Department's November 7, 2002 request for treatment with physicians notes of November 7, 2002.
4. On November 12, 2002, Guilbeau was seen by Dr. Haydel who reported that the etiology of his symptoms was unknown and that he should be seen by a neurologist.
Id., exhibit 2, TPCJC Medical Department note of November 12, 2002.
5. On November 13, 2002, Byerly suggested to Lt. Saul Tanner that, since Guilbeau was a DOC inmate, he be sent to a state facility where a neurologist was available.
Id., exhibit 9, memo of November 13, 2002 from Byerly to Tanner.
6. The TPCJC Medical Department's notes reflect that on November 13, 2002 an appointment with a neurologist was obtained for July 1, 2003.
Id., exhibit 2, TPCJC Medical Department note of November 13, 2002.
7. On November 21, 2002, Guilbeau was seen by Michael A. LaSalle, M.D., a physician at the Houma Orthopedic Clinic, who examined Guilbeau and obtained a MRI. There was no evidence of a herniated disc. He recommended a neurological evaluation for his numbness and pain syndrome.
Id., exhibit 4, Dr. LaSalle's note of November 21, 2002.
8. On November 22, 2002, Guilbeau arrived at Chabert in a police vehicle with a report that he fell out of bed at TPCJC and was unresponsive. The emergency room diagnosis was extremity weakness/parathesia.
Id., exhibit 3, Chabert emergency room record of November 22, 2002.
9. On November 23, 2002, a Chabert physician recognized a possible diagnosis of Guillan-Barre syndrome.
Id., exhibit 3, Chabert Physician's Progress Notes (Addendum) for November 23, 2002.
10. The TPCJC Medical Department's notes reflect that on November 25, 2002 it received a call from Mary L. Eschete, M.D., a physician at Chabert, who reported that Guilbeau was stable, he was not responding well, he could be moved if needed and he probably would require steroid therapy.
Id., 58, exhibit 2, TPCJC Medical Department note for November 25, 2002.
11. On November 26, 2002, Dr. Eschete reported that Guilbeau had Guillian-Barre syndrome, he required continued hospitalization, he was stable and he was able to be transferred.
Id., exhibit 9, Dr. Eschete's letter of November 26, 2002 to TPCJC.
12. Guilbeau remained at Chabert from November 22, 2002 until he was transported to Charity in New Orleans.
Id., exhibit 2, TPCJC Medical Department note of November 27, 2002.
CLAIMS AGAINST BERGERON
In his first cause of action Guilbeau alleges that all of the defendants "either participated directly or knew of the commissions and omissions described above and amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's health and safety . . ." The act and omissions of all of the defendants are alleged to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. For a second cause of action Guilbeau alleges that the acts and omissions of the defendants led to his illegal confinement in violation of his civil rights.1. Analysis of Individual Capacity Section 1983 Claims Against Bergeron.
In Turner v. Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Bd., 229 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit held that, "[t]he performance of official duties creates two potential liabilities, individual-capacity liability for the person and official-capacity liability for the municipality." Id. at 484. Where the defendant is sued in both his individual and official capacities, Turner demonstrates the necessity of considering such claims separately.
Although Bergeron is sued in his individual capacity, there are no allegations against him in that capacity. After being named in his official and individual capacity, he is not identified in any manner throughout Guilbeau's lengthy description of his confinement from November 5 through November 22, 2003 at TPCJC. Rec. doc. 1 at pp. 5-40. Guilbeau's opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment is silent concerning this defendant. The Section 1982 claims in counts one and two of the complaint against Bergeron in his individual capacity must be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Analysis of Official Capacity Section 1983 Claims Against Bergeron.
In Turner the Fifth Circuit said:
Official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. Accordingly, a § 1983 suit naming defendants only in their official capacity does not involve personal liability to the individual defendant.229 F.3d at 483 (Citations and quotation marks omitted). While a municipality may be held liable under section 1983, Monell v. New York City Dept. Of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978), it cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Id. at 2036. Rather, a plaintiff must identify a municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused his or her injury. Id. at 2037-38. In Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997), the test set out in Monell was significantly narrowed when the Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.Brown, 117 S.Ct. at 1388. In Foust v. McNeill, 310 F.3d 849, the Fifth Circuit stated:
To establish liability for a policy or practice, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the local government or official promulgated a policy; (2) the decision displayed deliberate indifference and proved the government's culpability; and (3) the policy decision lead to the particular injury. A formal policy is a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority. An informal but still official policy is a persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Finally, a final decisionmaker's adoption of a course of action tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations may, in some circumstances, give rise to municipal liability under § 1983.
The culpability element requires proof that the defendants adopted the policy with deliberate indifference. This is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. The causation element requires that the policy be the moving force behind the plaintiff's injury. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.Id. at 861-62 (citations, quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Guilbeau has not presented any evidence of a policy or practice attributable to Bergeron in his capacity as President of Terrebonne Parish. There has been no attempt by Guilbeau to demonstrate that Bergeron adopted a policy or practice with deliberate indifference. He has not demonstrated that there was any failure to provide proper training. There is no evidence that TPCJC faced a history of problems similar to the problem alleged by Guilbeau. Foust, 310 F.2d at 862. The Section 1983 claims in counts one and two of the complaint against Bergeron in his official capacity must be dismissed with prejudice.
3. State law claims against Bergeron.
In his third cause of action Guilbeau alleges that the acts and omissions of Bergeron constituted negligence and the intentional infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana law. As described above, however, Guilbeau does not make any allegations against Bergeron. The state law claims against him for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed with prejudice.
4. Guilbeau's fourth cause of action.
Guilbeau's original complaint alleged only the presence of three causes of action. He filed one amended complaint alleging a fourth cause of action. Rec. doc. 26. The only party referred to in the amended complaint was the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Corrections, who has been dismissed from this proceeding. Rec. doc. 45. Inasmuch no other defendant is named in the fourth cause of action, there is no need to consider it.
CLAIMS AGAINST ED BYERLY
Byerly was the administrator of the Medical Department at TPCJC. The only allegation in the complaint against him is that:
On or before November 13th defendant Ed Byerly, the medical administrator of TPCJC, gave notice to defendant Lt. Saul Tanner that plaintiff should be sent to a state facility to have a neurologist to assess his paralysis problems. Defendant Tanner ignored defendant Byerly's order; defendant Byerly knew that his recommendation had been ignored, but did nothing to make certain his recommendation was acted upon, leaving plaintiff to continue suffering from progressing paralysis.
Rec. doc. 1 at p. 21. On November 13, 2002, Byerly sent the memo referred to in this allegation to Lt. Tanner. Rec. Doc. 58, exhibit 2. This is the only evidence in the record concerning the allegation. There is no evidence that Tanner ignored Byerly's request or that, if he did ignore it, Byerly knew that the request was being ignored. Guilbeau does not refer to Byerly in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Although Byerly has not submitted an affidavit exculpating himself, the record taken as whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for Guilbeau on his claims against Byerly. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue for trial as to them and the claims against Byerly must be dismissed with prejudice. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 1356.
CLAIMS AGAINST WHITNEY
The defendants contend that Guilbeau has not offered any evidence that Whitney individually or in her official capacity acted or failed to act in a way to deprive him of his civil rights. Guilbeau's claims against Whitney are: (1) a Section 1983 claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment concerning the adequacy of his medical care; (2) a Section 1983 claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment concerning his conditions of confinement; (3) a state law claim of intentional infliction of mental anguish or emotional distress; and (4) a state law claim of negligence.
1. Eighth Amendment — Inadequate Medical Care.
In his opposition memorandum, Guilbeau cites evidence from the depositions that he contends demonstrates that Whitney did not attend to him for Dr. Haydel's diagnosis of paresthesia; she did not review his medical chart; she did not review the full Chabert emergency room record regarding his diagnosis and recommended treatment; she told others that he was a malingerer; she failed to respond to his complaints of numbness even though she believed he suffered from a chronic condition; she did not monitor his condition; and she did not respond to an emergency call from him when she was in TPCJC. She is named as a defendant in her official and her individual capacity. Guilbeau has not presented any evidence of a policy or practice attributable to Whitney, and therefore the official capacity claim against her for inadequate medical care must be dismissed with prejudice. Guilbeau has presented sufficient evidence to raise a material issue of fact as to the individual capacity claim against her for inadequate medical care. The defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue must be denied.
2. Eighth Amendment — Conditions of Confinement.
Guilbeau's claim concerning the conditions of confinement relates to Nurse Eschete's decision to have Guilbeau strapped to a gurney for four to five hours late in the evening of November 10 and into the early morning hours of November 11, 2002. Whitney is not implicated in this incident by Guilbeau's allegations or the evidence submitted. Accordingly, Guilbeau's Section 1983 conditions of confinement claim against Whitney will be dismissed with prejudice.
3. State law claims.
The defendants argue that it is inconsistent for Guilbeau to assert claims based on negligence and intentional infliction of mental anguish or emotional distress. A party may state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency.See Banco Continental v. Curtiss Nat. Bank of Miami Springs, 406 F.2d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1969). Guilbeau's allegations and evidence are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact regarding Whitney's alleged negligent conduct.
The defendants contend that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e), Guilbeau must have a physical injury in order to recover mental or emotional damages. In Alexander v. Tippah County, 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003), the Fifth Circuit held:
Under § 1997e(e), no Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. The physical injury required by § 1997e(e) must be more than de minimus, but need not be significant.Id. at 631 (Quotation marks and brackets omitted). Inasmuch as Guilbeau has presented sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment on some claims against Whitney, a ruling will be reserved on whether Guilbeau has presented sufficient evidence of physical injury to make a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state law claims against Whitney will be denied.
CLAIMS AGAINST NURSE ESCHETE
1. Eighth Amendment — Inadequate medical care.
In his opposition memorandum Guilbeau cites evidence from the depositions that he contends demonstrates that Nurse Eschete was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. She is named in her official and individual capacities. Guilbeau has not presented any evidence of a policy or practice attributable to her and therefore the official capacity claim against her for inadequate medical care must be dismissed with prejudice. He has presented sufficient evidence to raise a material issue of fact as to the individual capacity claim against her for inadequate medical care. The defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim must be denied.
2. Eighth Amendment — Conditions of Confinement.
Guilbeau's claim concerning the conditions of confinement relates to Nurse Eschete's decision to have Guilbeau strapped to the gurney. Guilbeau has not presented any evidence of a policy or practice attributable to her, and therefore the official capacity claim against her for conditions of confinement must be dismissed with prejudice. The motion will be denied as to his claim against Eschete, in her individual capacity, concerning his conditions of confinement.
3. State law claims.
For the reasons described regarding Whitney, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state law claims against Nurse Eschete will be denied.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE PARISH OF TERREBONNE
As for the Parish of Terrebonne, Guilbeau alleges no particular act for which the Parish is included as a defendant. "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Monell, 98 S. Ct. at 2036. Without alleging a particular custom, usage or policy for which the Parish can be held constitutionally liable, Guilbeau fails to establish facts for which he is entitled to relief under § 1983.Monell; Wassum v. City of Bellaire, Texas, 861 F. 2d 453 (5th Cir. 1988); see also City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). In addition, a county, parish or city cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior merely because it employs a tortfeasor.Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 676 (5th Cir. 1997). UnderMonell, such entities may be liable pursuant to Section 1983 only "for harm caused by the execution of an official policy or custom that deprives individuals of their constitutional rights."Id. Accordingly, Guilbeau's Section 1983 claims against Terrebonne Parish must be dismissed with prejudice. Guilbeau's state law claims against the Parish based on its alleged responsibility for the acts and omissions of Whitney, Eschete and LeCompte remain for trial and the motion is denied as to those claims.
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. The defendants' motion for summary judgment (Rec. doc 58) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART.
2. All of Guilbeau's claims against Bergeron and Byerly are dismissed with prejudice.
3. All of the claims against Whitney are dismissed with prejudice except for (a) the Section 1983 claim against her in her individual capacity for inadequate medical care; and (b) the state law claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
4. All of the claims against Eschete are dismissed with prejudice except for: (a) the Section 1983 claim against her in her individual capacity for inadequate medical care; (b) the Section 1983 claim against her in her individual capacity for the conditions of confinement; and (c) the state law claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
5. All of the claims against the Parish of Terrebonne are dismissed with prejudice except for the state law claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.