Guhl v. Pinkard

9 Citing cases

  1. DeKalb County v. Albritton Prop

    256 Ga. 103 (Ga. 1986)   Cited 11 times
    Finding that a comprehensive development plan was a "less effective planning tool" when the county violated its own plan to permit commercial development in residential areas and when the property in question abutted a "radically different land use approach" in a neighboring county

    That power may be abrogated by the judicial branch only on a clear showing that it has been unconstitutionally exercised, that is, a showing that the ordinance, as applied to the property at issue, is arbitrary and capricious so as to result in an unconstitutional taking without compensation. Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129 ( 252 S.E.2d 612) (1979); Guhl v. M. E. M. Corp., 242 Ga. 354 ( 249 S.E.2d 42) (1978). This standard must be scrupulously honored by this court in order that the integrity of local zoning ordinances be maintained.

  2. Gwinnett County v. Davis

    492 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1997)   Cited 25 times

    Whether the facts which we must accept are sufficient to authorize the conclusion that the existing R-100 classification of the Davises' property is unconstitutional is, however, a question of law for this court and no deference is owed to the trial court in that regard. Moon v. Cobb County, supra; Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129, 130 (1), fn. 1 ( 252 S.E.2d 612) (1979). Resolution of this legal question requires a balancing of the Davises' right to the unfettered use of their property against the public's health, safety, morality and general welfare.

  3. DeKalb County v. Bremby

    252 Ga. 510 (Ga. 1984)   Cited 6 times

    Others challenge the constitutionality of the existing zoning and these, if denied, present questions of law for the courts. Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129, 130 ( 252 S.E.2d 612) (1979); Guhl v. Davis, 242 Ga. 356, 358 ( 249 S.E.2d 43) (1978). However, as we made clear in Guhl v. Davis, supra at p. 358, the trial court may, if the court elects to do so, empanel a jury to resolve factual disputes by special interrogatories, from which the trial court can decide the ultimate constitutional issues.

  4. Hubert Realty Co. v. Board of Comm

    264 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    Our function on appellate review in a zoning case is, "once a constitutional issue is presented, [to] consider all the facts and circumstances in reaching [our] own decision on the merits of the ordinance's constitutionality." Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129, 130 n. 1 ( 252 S.E.2d 612) (1979). "The function of the trial court in a zoning appeal is to determine if the present zoning is constitutional, not to scrutinize any other proposed uses."

  5. City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Champion

    244 Ga. 620 (Ga. 1979)   Cited 26 times
    In City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Champion, 244 Ga. 620 (261 S.E.2d 343) (1979), we held that the findings of the trial court and special master in regard to necessity must be affirmed if there is evidence to support them.

    It is not an "any evidence" test as the majority implies. Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129 fn. 1 ( 252 S.E.2d 612) (1979). The Court of Appeals has reviewed the evidence and has determined as a matter of law that MARTA acted beyond its authority in condemning airspace it did not need to accomplish its public purpose.

  6. Village Centers v. City of Atlanta

    257 S.E.2d 894 (Ga. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    JORDAN, Justice. This is an appeal from a rezoning case which raises issues similar to those considered and decided in Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 ( 219 S.E.2d 399) (1975) and its progeny, Guhl v. M. E. M. Corp., 242 Ga. 354 ( 249 S.E.2d 42) (1978); Guhl v. Davis, 242 Ga. 356 ( 249 S.E.2d 43) (1978); Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129 ( 252 S.E.2d 612) (1979). The factual situation involved in this case began when the appellant property owners sought to have a tract of approximately nine (9) acres located on Roswell Road just south of the intersection of Roswell Road and Wieuca Road in the City of Atlanta, Georgia, rezoned from a low density commercial classification (R-4) to a high density commercial classification (C-1) for the development of a shopping center.

  7. DeAlb County v. Flynn

    243 Ga. 679 (Ga. 1979)   Cited 15 times

    In Guhl v. Davis, 242 Ga. 356 ( 249 S.E.2d 43) (1978) we reiterated that Barrett v. Hamby involves a balancing test. See also Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129 ( 252 S.E.2d 612) (1979); Guhl v. M. E. M. Corp., 242 Ga. 354, 355 ( 249 S.E.2d 42) (1978). Flynn adequately showed the loss to him occasioned by the R-85 and RA8 zoning.

  8. Bd. of Zoning, Etc. v. Fulton Federal

    177 Ga. App. 219 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    However, this is not to say that the judiciary cannot review the reasonableness of zoning classifications, and issues involving constitutionality of legislative enactments, including zoning ordinances, which are questions of law for a court. Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129, 130 ( 252 S.E.2d 612). In the instant case, the superior court, as a matter of law, interpreted the meaning of the word "open" in the ordinance variance.

  9. Clark v. State

    277 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 2 times
    Finding that a violation of a county ordinance was only a crime because it was specifically codified as one under the Official Code of Georgia

    Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (Code Ann. ยง 2-111). Nothing to the contrary was held in Guhl v. Pinkard, 243 Ga. 129, 131 ( 252 S.E.2d 612); Turner v. State, 233 Ga. 538 ( 212 S.E.2d 370); or Poole v. Stewart, 228 Ga. 548 ( 186 S.E.2d 864), which were cited by the trial court below. Guhl, supra, involved a civil case.