Opinion
04-21-00353-CV
08-24-2022
Amar C. GUEYE, Appellant v. Luz TORRES, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-CV-02073 Honorable J. Frank Davis, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Appellant Amar C. Gueye appeals the county court's judgment awarding appellee Luz Torres possession of property located at 1015 Torreon #1, San Antonio, Texas. We affirm the county court's judgment.
Background
Torres is a property manager who initiated an eviction proceeding against Gueye in a Bexar County Justice of the Peace Court. In her petition, Torres asserted Gueye did not have any right to live in the property located at 1015 Torreon #1 because Gueye did not have a lease to the property and did not pay rent. Torres further asserted she gave Gueye notice to vacate the premises in thirty days, and Gueye acknowledged receiving the notice in a text message. However, Gueye did not vacate. The justice court ultimately entered a default judgment awarding possession of the premises to Torres.
Gueye appealed the judgment to the county court at law, and the county court scheduled a virtual hearing to hear the case de novo. Gueye did not attend the hearing. Afterward, the county court entered a judgment awarding Torres possession of the property. Gueye now appeals.
Analysis
A tenant who loses an eviction proceeding in justice court can appeal the eviction judgment to a county court. Tex.R.Civ.P. 510.9, 510.10(c). The county court must "docket the appeal, schedule a hearing . . . notify the parties and the surety of the hearing time and date, and hear the contest de novo." Tex. Prop. Code § 24.00512(f). A trial de novo "is a new trial in which the entire case is presented as if there had been no previous trial." Furrer v. Furrer, No. 09-18-00360-CV, 2019 WL 5075864, at *2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Oct. 10, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 510.10(c)). The only issue to be determined is the right to immediate possession, and to prevail, a party must "present sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession." Lenz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
In this case, Gueye did not present any evidence establishing his right to immediate possession. He did not file an answer, and he did not appear at the hearing. Instead, he mailed a document to the county court, referring to his federal lawsuit against "slum landlords Isaha Hernandez and Luz Torres, who subjected him to two burglaries, daily assaults and batteries by [another] tenant." Other than referencing his federal lawsuit, Gueye's document did not address the right to actual possession.
Torres, however, addressed her right of actual possession to the disputed property. Her petition for eviction was before the county court, and at the virtual hearing, she testified she was the property manager of the property and her client had bought the property. She testified when her client purchased the property, Gueye was living at the property without a lease and he never paid rent. She explained she asked him to leave and sent him a notice to vacate the premises, but Gueye refused. Thus, the evidence and pleadings before the county court showed Gueye had no lease to live at the property, had received notice to vacate the premises, and did not vacate. Accordingly, we conclude because Gueye did not explain why he was entitled to immediate possession, the county court properly entered a judgment of eviction against Gueye.
To the extent Gueye argues the justice court did not have jurisdiction over the original eviction proceeding, Gueye is incorrect. "[A] justice court in the precinct in which the real property is located has jurisdiction in eviction suits." Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004. Here, the property at issue is located in Bexar County precinct 2, and therefore, the original eviction proceeding was properly adjudicated in Bexar County Justice of the Peace Court-Precinct 2. To the extent Gueye complains about not having a jury trial, there is nothing in the record showing he filed a written demand for a jury trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.6(b). Accordingly, we overrule Gueye's arguments on appeal.
Conclusion
After reviewing the record, we conclude the county court did not err in awarding possession of the disputed premises to Torres, and we affirm the county court's judgment.