Guevara v. Keen

Full title: Marcela Guevara, appellant, v. Javed Keen, et al., respondents.

Court: SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Date published: Jun 24, 2015

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 5442 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

Opinion

2014-10182

06-24-2015

Marcela Guevara, appellant, v. Javed Keen, et al., respondents.

Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky, New York, N.Y. (Mitchell Dranow of counsel), for appellant. Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel), for respondents.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P.

CHERYL E. CHAMBERS

JEFFREY A. COHEN

ROBERT J. MILLER

HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ. (Index No. 23185/11)

Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky, New York, N.Y. (Mitchell Dranow of counsel), for appellant.

Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel), for respondents.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Weiss, J.), dated July 28, 2014, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine and to her left knee did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see generally Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614). The defendants submitted further evidence that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

MASTRO, J.P., CHAMBERS, COHEN, MILLER and LASALLE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court