A district court's order denying a defendant's request to represent himself is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Guerrina v. State, 134 Nev. 338, 341, 419 P.3d 705, 709 (2018); see also Lyons v. State, 106 Nev. 438, 445, 796 P.2d 210, 214 (1990), abrogated in part on other grounds by Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 341, 22 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2001). The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right to represent himself if he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do.
"Whether the movement of the victim is incidental to the associated offense and whether the risk of harm is substantially increased thereby are questions of fact to be determined by the trier of fact in all but the clearest cases." Guerrina v. State, 134 Nev. 338, 343, 419 P.3d 705, 710 (2018) (quoting Curtis D. v. State, 98 Nev. 272, 274, 646 P.2d 547, 548 (1982)). In Guerrina, the perpetrator "accosted" the victim in public and "forced her to accompany him into the secluded store, where he later demanded her personal wallet and cellphone."
A district court's order denying a defendant's request to represent himself is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Guerrina v. State, 134 Nev. 338, 341, 419 P.3d 705, 709 (2018); see also Lyons v. State, 106 Nev. 438, 445, 796 P.2d 210, 214 (1990), abrogated in part on other grounds by Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 341, 22 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2001).
Criminal defendants have "the right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Nevada Constitution." Guerrina v. State, 134 Nev. 338, 341, 419 P.3d 705, 709 (2018) (quoting Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 337, 22 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2001)). However, a district court can "deny a request for self-representation if the request is untimely, equivocal, or made solely for purposes of delay or if the defendant is disruptive." Id.
The State, in its supplemental authorities on appeal, points to Guerrina v. State, where the Nevada Supreme Court observed in dicta, paraphrasing subsection 1 of the coercion statute, that "felony coercion consists of the use or immediate threat of violence or injury against a person or property, with 'the intent to compel another to do or abstain from doing an act which the other person has a right to do or abstain from doing.'" 134 Nev. 338, 346, 419 P.3d 705, 712 (2018) (quoting NRS 207.190(1)). In Guerrina, however, the supreme court affirmed the defendant's felony coercion conviction because the defendant's immediate proximity to the victim, accompanied with a command to disconnect the phone, arose to "an immediate-albeit unspoken-threat of physical force" against the victim.
Coercion is felonious "[w]here physical force or the immediate threat of physical force is used" against the victim. NRS 207.190(2)(a); see also Guerrina v. State, 134 Nev. 338, 346, 419 P.3d 705, 712 (2018). "Whether the threat was 'immediate' depends on the 'viewpoint of a reasonable person facing the same threat.'"
See, e.g., Guerrina v. State, 419 P.3d 705, 708-11 (Nev. 2018) (the defendant, inter alia, accosted the victim outside a store and forced her to accompany him into the more secluded store, where he demanded her wallet and cell phone); Stewart v. State, 393 P.3d 685, 686-88 (Nev. 2017) (the defendant and his accomplice accosted the victim as she was entering her apartment, held her at gunpoint, forced her at gunpoint to allow them into the apartment, and made her lie face down on the floor in the back bedroom and guarded her at gunpoint while they ransacked her apartment); Gonzales v. State, 354 P.3d 654, 656-67 (Nev. App. 2015) (the accomplices forced the victim at gunpoint from an open garage visible to her neighbors into the house and thereafter moved her from room to room despite her not knowing where her husband had stored his weapons, when the robbery instead could have been accomplished simply by detaining her in the garage while they searched the house).
Typically, this court reviews the district court's decision to dismiss an information for an abuse of discretion, Cf. Guerrina, v. State, 134 Nev. 338, 347, 419 P.3d 705, 713 (2018) (stating that the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). When the motion asserts outrageous governmental conduct, however, courts review the district court's decision de novo.
Typically, this court reviews the district court's decision not to dismiss an information for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Guerrina v. State, 134 Nev. 338, 347, 419 P.3d 705, 713 (2018) (stating that the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). When the motion asserts outrageous governmental conduct, however, courts review the district court's decision de novo.
Further, noting that the investigating officer testified that he did not recall seeing anything noteworthy in the video, Guerrina has not shown prejudice as this court determined in adjudicating his direct appeal that his contention that such evidence was material was mere speculation. Guerrina v. State , 134 Nev. 338, 347, 419 P.3d 705, 713 (2018). The district court therefore did not err in denying this claim without an evidentiary hearing.