Opinion
No. CV-08-5007824
November 12, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (NO. 106)
This action, filed by the plaintiffs, Lamarre Guerrier (plaintiff) and his wife, Nancy Guerrier (co-plaintiff), stems from the plaintiff's employment as a minister with the defendant, the Southern New England Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc. In the complaint, which was served on June 24, 2008, the plaintiff alleges that on October 1, 2000 he was hired by the defendant as a pastor at the Shekinah Haitian Church in Norwich, Connecticut. He further alleges that on October 29, 2003, the defendant removed him as pastor of the church and informed him that there were no other pastor openings available. The plaintiff claims that there were in fact other pastor openings available and that his termination was related to his request for an increase in pay and medical benefits as well as his request for a reimbursement of church funds, which were purportedly borrowed improperly by another church member. According to the plaintiff, he could only be fired for just cause, which did not exist at the time of his removal. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant did not fulfill its promise to place him in another parish, which resulted in the plaintiff's effective termination.
The plaintiffs' complaint consists of eight counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) wrongful termination/breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) breach of express and/or implied contract; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5) reckless violation of the plaintiff's rights; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) false light: and (8) loss of consortium. The eighth count is the only count raised by the co-plaintiff, who claims that she has been denied the consortium of her husband due to the defendant's misconduct.
Presently before the court is the defendant's motion to dismiss, filed on January 21, 2009, which is directed at the entire complaint. The defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that the claims related to the plaintiff's alleged termination as pastor are barred by the first amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 3, of the constitution of Connecticut, which protect the free exercise of religion. On April 23, 2009, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss disputing that these constitutional amendments deprive the court of jurisdiction. The defendant responded by filing a reply brief on May 22, 2009.
Along with the motion to dismiss, the court also heard argument on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Because the motion to dismiss is granted as to all counts, this court does not need to reach the summary judgment motion.
DISCUSSION
"Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) May v. Coffey, 291 Conn. 106, 113, 967 A.2d 495 (2009). "[I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).
The defendant's central argument is that this court is barred from adjudicating the plaintiffs' complaint because it would interfere with the defendant's free exercise of religion. Specifically, the defendant claims that according to the "ministerial exception" under the first amendment, courts have no jurisdiction over a religious organization's actions regarding the employment of its ministers. In the defendant's view, the ministerial exception applies because the entire complaint is related to or derivates from the plaintiff's alleged termination as a minister.
The plaintiffs object, arguing that the defendant's alleged wrongdoings are not covered by the "ministerial exception." In their memorandum in opposition, the plaintiffs state that the ministerial exception is inapplicable where the alleged improprieties have "no relation to the church's decisions regarding the employment of its clergy." The plaintiffs claim that the alleged motives for termination — deprivation of income and benefits and concern over improper financial dealings — do not implicate church doctrine, teaching or administration. Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that their tort claims do not implicate the ministerial exception. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that because the court has jurisdiction over the claims of the plaintiff, it also has jurisdiction over the derivative claim of the co-plaintiff for loss of consortium.
"The first amendment to the United States constitution protects religious institutions from governmental interference with their free exercise of religion." Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 98 Conn.App. 646, 648, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51, cert. denied. 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144, 76 U.S.L.W. 3162 (2007). "The Free Exercise Clause protects not only the individual's right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires, but also a religious institution's right to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2008).
"Accordingly, many courts have recognized a ministerial exception to judicial authority to adjudicate employment disputes between religious institutions and their religious leaders." Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 648. "The ministerial exception prevents courts or government agencies from exercising jurisdiction over a religious institution's actions regarding the employment of its ministers." Id., 654-55.
"[T]he ministerial exception is jurisdictional rather than evidentiary. Religious institutions need not rely on proof of affirmative defenses in employment discrimination suits but may categorically resist the judicial intrusion implicit in inquiry into their employment practices and relationships." Id., 653.
In 2004, the Connecticut Appellate Court in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 646, formally recognized the ministerial exception in the context of an employment discrimination claim by a Catholic priest against the Archdiocese of Norwich on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin and alienage pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-60. The Rweyemamu court upheld the decision of the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the ministerial exception. The Rweyemamu court limited the scope of its holding "only to the employment of ministers and clergy broadly defined" as opposed to nonministerial staff. Id., 655.
Although Rweyemamu only applied the ministerial exception in the context of § 46a-60, at least one Connecticut Superior Court has applied the exception to common-law tort and contract claims. The court in Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 03 0824616 (July 29, 2008, McWeeny, J.) [ 46 Conn. L. Rptr. 18], did not narrowly interpret Rweyemamu to apply to only employment discrimination claims, noting that the United States Supreme Court in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) applied the ministerial exception to overturn a decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois holding that a bishop's removal was arbitrary. Other jurisdictions have also applied the ministerial exception outside of employment discrimination claims. "Just as there is a ministerial exception to Title VII, there must also be a ministerial exception to any state law cause[s] of action . . ." Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007).
The applicability of the ministerial exception depends on both the nature of the claim and the nature of the employment relationship. "The salience of th[e] concern depends upon the claim asserted by the plaintiff . . . [W]hatever their `emblemata,' some claims may inexorably entangle [courts] in doctrinal disputes." (Citations omitted.) Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. Conn. 2008). Nevertheless, the ministerial exception "plainly does not create for religious institutions a charmed existence free from liability for their torts and upon their valid contracts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Friedlander v. Port Jewish Center, 588 F.Sup.2d 428, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). "[A] plaintiff alleging particular wrongs by the church that are wholly non-religious in character is surely not forbidden his day in court. The minister struck on the head by a falling gargoyle as he is about to enter the church may have an actionable claim." Rweyemamu v. Cote, supra, 520 F.3d 208. While there is no generally accepted test, courts focus on whether the "cause of action . . . would otherwise impinge on the church's prerogative to choose its ministers or to exercise its religious beliefs in the context of employing its ministers." Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[A]ny inquiry into the Church's reasons for asserting that Minker was not suited for a particular pastorship would constitute an excessive entanglement in its affairs"); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 92 L.Ed.2d 739, 106 S.Ct. 3333 (1986).
In terms of the nature of the employment relationship, "[t]he more `pervasively religious' the relationship between an employee and his employer, the more salient the free exercise concern becomes." Rweyemamu v. Cote, supra, 520 F.3d 208. When the employment relationship is a minister in charge of a parish, the free exercise concern is high. "The commission and the courts have determined that such [relationships] are the `lifeblood' of the church, and any government [interference] between a church and its ministers would violate the first amendment to the constitution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 651 (quoting the underlying decision of the commission on human rights and opportunities, which was upheld). "The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern. Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of church administration and government, so are the functions which accompany such a selection. It is unavoidably true that these include the determination of a minister's salary, his place of assignment, and the duty he is to perform in the furtherance of the religious mission of the church." McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
Given the high concern accorded to the employment of ministers, courts have dismissed common-law tort and contract claims that implicate those matters. In Thibodeau, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 03 0824616, the court applied the ministerial exception in the context of a minister alleging, inter alia, that the defendant church denied him employment by withdrawing its recognition of his ordination. The Thibodeau court dismissed the entire complaint, which consisted of the following contract and tort claims: breach of a promissory estoppel of an implied contract, defamation, deceit and fraud, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Friedlander v. Port Jewish Center, supra, 588 F.Sup.2d 428, the federal district court dismissed counts of breach of an employment contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing related to the termination of a rabbi. See also, e.g., Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986) (dismissing claims of breach of contract, fraud/collusion/arbitrary action, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Ogle v. Church of God, 153 F. Appx. 371 (6th Cir. 2005) (dismissing claims of breach of implied contract, tortious interference with business relationships, invasion of privacy, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and loss of consortium); Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens Vestry of Grace Church in New York, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Docket No. 01CV7871 (March 15, 2004) (dismissing claims of breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, wrongful discharge, wrongful denial of employment benefits and defamation).
In the present action, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was employed as a "minister" as contemplated by the ministerial exception. The issue is whether the plaintiffs' common-law claims require an impermissible inquiry into the defendant's employment of ministers. This court finds that every count of the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed.
Counts one through three of the complaint are contract-based causes of action. Count one is a breach of contract claim alleging that the plaintiff was terminated as pastor due to his request for medical benefits and increased wages and his inquiries regarding improper financial activities by a church member. He also alleges that he was misled into believing that he would be placed at another parish, which never occurred despite the existence of nearby openings. Count two substantially incorporates the allegations in count one and is pleaded as a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Count two further alleges that defendant terminated him: (1) for false reasons and with no proper investigation; (2) to improperly gain from his efforts as pastor; (3) to shelter favored members of the church from being exposed for improper borrowing; and (4) to deny the plaintiff income and benefits. Count three also incorporates most of the allegations in count one and is styled as a "breach of express/implied contract" because he was terminated without "just cause."
Counts four through seven are mainly tort claims, all of which substantially incorporate and are predicated on the allegations in count one. Counts four and six sound in negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively, both on the basis of the allegations in count one. Count five, to the extent that it can be characterized as a cause of action, states that the allegations in count one constitute "a reckless, wanton, and willful violation of the plaintiff's rights" without any specification of what rights have been violated. Count seven pleads an action in false light, claiming that "[t]he defendant's conduct in dismissing and terminating plaintiff from his employment position as a pastoral employee for wrongful, false and inadequate reasons, has nevertheless placed plaintiff and his character in a false light such that his reputation has been damaged . . ."
All of the plaintiff's contract and tort claims must be dismissed because they inevitably require the defendant to justify why it chose to terminate and fail to reappoint the plaintiff as a minister. The three contract claims essentially allege that the plaintiff did not terminate the plaintiff's employment for proper reasons. The four tort claims essentially allege that because the plaintiff was terminated improperly, he was harmed. These counts cannot be adjudicated without delving into the reasons why the plaintiff was terminated as a minister. Consistent with Thibodeau and the numerous other courts which have dismissed common-law contract and tort claims on the basis of the ministerial exception, the plaintiffs' action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Count eight of the complaint, which is a derivative claim by the co-plaintiff for loss of consortium, necessarily must be dismissed because it is premised on the existence of the other counts of the complaint.
The plaintiffs' central argument that the alleged motives for the plaintiff's termination have no relation to church doctrine, teaching or administration is flawed. For the purposes of the ministerial exception, it matters only that the allegations require an inquiry into the church's reasons for the termination. Though the plaintiff does not allege that he was terminated for reasons of religious doctrine, for example, the defendant may be required to assert reasons of religious doctrine as a defense. As our Appellate Court held, religious institutions may "categorically resist" this inquiry into their employment decisions as matter of jurisdiction: they do not need to set forth evidence or plead affirmative defenses. Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 653.
Because of this flaw, the cases cited by the plaintiffs are readily distinguishable. The plaintiffs rely principally on Bollard v. Calfornia Province of the Society of Jesus, supra, 196 F.3d 940 and Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004). Bollard, however, did not involve a minister claiming that he was hired or fired improperly. Bollard held that a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) by a trainee Jesuit priest, who voluntarily left the order as a result of the harassment, was not dismissible under the ministerial exception. Significantly, the Bollard court reasoned, inter alia, that "this is not a case about the Jesuit order's choice of representative, a decision to which we would simply defer without further inquiry. Bollard does not complain that the Jesuits refused to ordain him or engaged in any other adverse personnel action." (Emphasis added.) Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, supra, 196 F.3d 947; see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, supra, 375 F.3d 950, 955-59 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining Bollard).
The plaintiffs attempt to construe Elvig in their favor by characterizing the decision as one where sexual harassment and retaliation claims survived a motion to dismiss. The problem with this characterization is that the plaintiffs ignore the other claims that were dismissed in Elvig precisely because they involved an inquiry into ministerial employment decisions.
The plaintiff in Elvig was an associate pastor of the Calvin Presbyterian Church (CPC), who claimed, inter alia, that she was sexually harassed by the pastor, Will Ackles. She alleged that she reported the harassment to the CPC, who did not act, and she suffered retaliation by the pastor in the form of verbal abuse and intimidation as well as being relieved of certain duties and by the church, who allegedly suspended her, terminated her, and blocked her from working at other parishes. Id., 953-54, 961. The plaintiff filed Title VII claims against both Ackles and the CPC on the grounds of sexual harassment, hostile work environment and retaliation.
The Elvig court held that only two claims should have survived a motion to dismiss. The first was a Title VII claim alleging that the CPC was vicariously liable for the sexual harassment itself. Id., 962. The second was a Title VII retaliation claim that alleged harassment in the form of verbal abuse. Id., 965. For each claim, the court held that no employment decision was implicated, and no religious doctrine was offered to justify the practice. Id., 962-65.
Where the claims did implicate an employment decision, the Elvig court dismissed them summarily. These claims included the remainder of the plaintiff's Title VII sexual harassment claims, which alleged that she was removed from certain duties, that she was suspended, that she was terminated, and that the CPC prevented her from securing another church placement. Id., 961. The court also dismissed her Title VII retaliation claims based on the same allegations. Id., 965. The court stated: "[T]o the extent Elvig's claims necessarily involve an inquiry into the [CPC's] decision to terminate her ministry, those claims cannot proceed in civil court and were properly dismissed." Id., 958. Given that all of the counts of the complaint in the present case involve an inquiry into the defendant's employment decisions, neither Bollard nor Elvig is precedent for holding that the ministerial exception is inapplicable.
The lone Connecticut case cited by the plaintiffs, Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5002874 (March 11, 2009, Aurigemma, J.) ( 47 Conn. L. Rptr. 360) is also distinguishable because the plaintiff in Dayner did not hold a position equivalent to a minister and therefore was not entitled to the same level of protection afforded by the ministerial exception. She was the principal of a Catholic school who was allegedly terminated for failing to support an educational administrator who had purportedly made sexual remarks to a student. The Dayner plaintiff alleged counts of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, wrongful termination, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with business expectancies. The court denied the motion to dismiss as to all counts, relying on a series of cases involving employees of religious institutions who were not serving in a ministerial capacity. Unlike Dayner, the plaintiff here is a minister who was leading a parish and is therefore entitled to heightened protection under the ministerial exception.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted as to all counts of the complaint.