Opinion
Civil No. 01cv1401 PCL.
September 26, 2005
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Danny Montana Guerra ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against correctional officials D. Paramo, C. Ostendorf, and A. Dymond ("Defendants") in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his United States Constitution Eighth Amendment rights; failing to prevent cruel and unusual punishment by refusing his request to be housed outside of the prison's general population.
Now before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying documents filed June 1, 2005. (Doc. Nos. 200, 201) Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion In Opposition to Defendants' Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion, and supporting documents on July 7, 2005. (Doc. Nos. 218-220) Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on July 29, 2005. (Doc. No. 226)
BACKGROUND
According to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Plaintiff was transferred from the California Correctional Insitution ("CCI") to California State Prison Calipatria ("CSP-CAL") in June of 1999. (FAC at 3) At CCI Plaintiff was held in Protective Custody but, much to his dismay, at CSP-CAL he was assigned to the general population. (Id. at 3-4) Plaintiff, after receiving threats from his fellow inmates at CSP-CAL, wrote Defendants and petitioned for Protective Custody Status. (Id. at 4) Accordingly, on July 7, 1999, a CSP-CAL Classification Hearing was held before Defendants to consider Plaintiff's request to be removed from the general population; it was denied. (Id. at 3-4) Undeterred, Plaintiff wrote Defendants asking them to reconsider their position, but to no avail. Defendants, in a series of documents to Plaintiff labeled "Request for Interview Response," wrote that while Plaintiff's claims had merit they required further investigation. (Id. at 4-5) Finally, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was attacked on August 5, 2000, and was severely injured. (Id. at 6)
DISCUSSION
1. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence, which the moving party "believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth." SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue for trial.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The nonmoving party "must point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact" that could convince a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). However, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, he must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. More than a "metaphysical doubt" is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
2. Application
To determine if the moving party, Defendants, have carried their burden for a successful summary judgment motion it is necessary to identify the elements of Plaintiff's claim. In this case, an Eighth Amendment violation will be found if: (1) the deprivation alleged is objectively and sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Specifically, for cases involving the failure to prevent harm, Plaintiff must show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that Defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to that risk. Id.
Here, Defendants argue that they lacked the requisite mental state; that they were not deliberately indifferent. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. at 6-7) Plaintiff, for his part, has pointed to documents containing Defendants Ostendorf and Dymond's signatures. (Compl. at 4-5) In these documents the Defendants are alleged to say Plaintiff's claims about his need for Protective Custody have merit but need further investigating. Regardless of their admissibility for the truth of the matter asserted, they are certainly admissible as evidence of Defendants' mental states. Defendants respond in their summary judgment motion that these documents are forged; however, this argument only benefits Plaintiff, demonstrating that a material fact is in question. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. at 4) The Court does not weigh evidence on summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. As Plaintiff is the nonmoving party, the documents are taken as genuine. Id. at 255. Additionally, Plaintiff gains reasonable inferences from the evidence, in this case, that Defendants knew Plaintiff could be at risk. Id. Accordingly, for the purposes of summary judgment, Plaintiff has enough evidence to establish there is a material question of fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
Defendants in their Motion invite the Court to weigh the admissible evidence and declare Plaintiff's evidence to be forgeries on summary judgment. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. at 4) They cite the case of Guthrie v. Brown, an unpublished District Court case, as authority for such a bold move. However, the documents in Guthrie were obvious forgeries: the signatures were markedly different and the names misspelled. The defendants in Guthrie did not have to resort to a handwriting expert as do Defendants. More to the point, for all but the most flagrant offenses, summary judgment is not a vehicle to weed out possibly fraudulent documents. The Court will leave it to the jury to decide how much weight should be given to Plaintiff's evidence.
Next, Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence showing that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. at 8-9) Naturally, Plaintiff points to his stabbing as proof that he was in grave danger. (Compl. at 6) Defendants, again, take issue with the quality of Plaintiff's evidence, they call the stab wounds either self-inflicted or de minimis, and again they make Plaintiff's case for him: if both sides disagree to the cause of Plaintiff's injury, the injury must then be a material fact still at issue. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. at 8-9) Moreover, it does not follow that a superficial wound is necessarily de minimis. The harm protected by the Eighth amendment is a substantial risk of serious harm, such as the knife of a killer at Plaintiff's throat — even if it leaves only a scratch. Plaintiff's evidence, which benefits from the presumptions and inferences given to the nonmoving party of a summary judgment motion, is adequate to show there is a material question of fact as to whether he faced a substantial risk of serious harm.
Defendants' strongest argument in favor of summary judgment, instead of contesting evidence it alleges a failing in the evidence, is that Plaintiff never identified any known enemies. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. in Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n at 2-3) Defendants cite a pair of Eighth Circuit cases for the proposition that "an inmate's failure to identify specific enemies is fatal to a claim of deliberate indifference."Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892, 893 (8th Cir. 1994); Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1996). Although well-known, it is worth noting the Eighth Circuit cases are not binding on this Court. Moreover, Plaintiff did identify the threat he faced: at the very least, Plaintiff identified the gangs he believed to be after him. (Compl. at 3-4) Requiring more of Plaintiff, such as providing the specific names of his would-be assassins — who, for obvious reasons, would likely go to great lengths to remain unknown — seems unduly burdensome. To the extent the Eighth Circuit requires such particularity, which they seemingly do not, the Court declines to follow their precedent.
Although not fatal on summary judgment, Plaintiff's alleged lack of specificity will be relevant at trial. As Defendants point out in their summary judgment motion, "even where prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety, they will not be found liable if they responded reasonably to the risk — even if the harm was not averted."Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. at 7) At trial, the jury could easily find the threat to Plaintiff was too vague and Defendants acted reasonably by returning him to general population. Of course, a reasonable jury could also find the threat was specific enough that more should have been done for Plaintiff; and that is why summary judgment has been denied.
3. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue they are immune from Plaintiff's claims as they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. at 10-12) Qualified immunity applies to government officials performing discretionary functions, protecting them from section 1983 law suits, "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Court must determine whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id. This task consists of two separate determinations: (1) Has the plaintiff stated a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right?; and (2) If so, was that right clearly established, i.e., "were the contours of the right . . . sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates that right"? Siegart v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
Defendants argue in the alternative that: (1) the Plaintiff has failed to show a clearly established right, he has only alleged a vague Eighth Amendment violation; and (2) even if Plaintiff has met his burden in demonstrating a clearly established right, he can not prove by admissible evidence that Defendants violated the aforementioned right. The Court disagrees. The law is clear, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from attacks by other prisoners. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. A prison official may not be deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. See id. at 828. Plaintiff has shown that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety. Accordingly, qualified immunity is not appropriate. 4. Punitive Damages
Finally, Defendants request that the Court deny Plaintiff punitive damages. (Defs.' Mem. of P. A. at 12) Defendants argue Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to meet the high burden required for punitive damages. More specifically, Defendants claim Plaintiff has failed to even allege facts that would show Defendants' conduct was motivated by evil motive or intent, or "involv[ed] reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others," as required. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56(1983).
Once again, despite Defendants insistence to the contrary, Plaintiff has established sufficient evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's safety. Similarly, the Court is satisfied the evidence is also sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants conduct involved reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff's rights. As such, the Court refuses Defendants' invitation to rule out punitive damages
CONCLUSION
The Court is mindful that summary judgment is no longer a disfavored procedural shortcut as it was once considered.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. Far from reluctant, the Court is eager to grant summary judgment where appropriate. While the Defendants succeed in highlighting the weaknesses in Plaintiff's case, they do so by contesting the quality of his evidence. Summary judgment is not the forum to bicker over what material facts may or may not show — in fact, that is the opposite of what the moving party should be trying to demonstrate. The proper forum is a courtroom, before a jury, where this case is destined: motion DENIED.