Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-34697
Margulies, J.
Plaintiff sued four governmental agencies alleging negligence in the handling of her detention after she was raped in 1975, while she was a minor. Plaintiff did not file her lawsuit until 2005, 30 years after the events in question. She argues that the discovery rule postponed accrual of her cause of action because she was told, at some point, that the state hospital at which she was detained had been closed. The trial court found her claims barred by the statute of limitations and by her failure to file timely notices of claim. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on December 27, 2005, in Alameda County Superior Court. Joined as defendants were the police department of the City of Alameda, Juvenile Hall, Highland Hospital, a county hospital, and Napa State Hospital, a state facility. The complaint alleges that in 1975, plaintiff, then a minor, was raped repeatedly and beaten by another teen. She was taken to the Alameda Police Department, where she was given no medical assistance and no attempt was made to investigate the rape. She was then sent to Juvenile Hall, again without investigation of her complaint of rape. The complaint further alleges that plaintiff, against her will, was subsequently taken to Highland Hospital and then to Napa State Hospital. She was confined at Napa State Hospital, where she was physically and verbally abused.
Although plaintiff, acting pro se, named these entities as defendants, the true defendants appearing in the litigation were the City of Alameda (for the police department), the County of Alameda (for Juvenile Hall), Alameda County Medical Center (for Highland Hospital), and the State of California (for Napa State Hospital).
The complaint alleges that plaintiff did not discover her causes of action until July 28, 2005. On that date, the San Francisco Chronicle published a story reporting that the United States Department of Justice had accused the state of attempting to impede an investigation of mistreatment of inmates at Napa State Hospital. Plaintiff alleged that “[a] few years ago” she was told during a meeting with a counselor at a mental health clinic that the state hospital had closed. It was not until she saw the newspaper article that she realized the facility remained open.
The State of California, appearing for Napa State Hospital, successfully moved to transfer the action to the County of Napa. Once the action had been transferred, each defendant filed a demurrer, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and by plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). Plaintiff filed no opposition to the four demurrers, and they were granted without leave to amend.
All further statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise indicated.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her action. She contends that, under the discovery rule, accrual of the statute of limitations and the notice requirements of the Tort Claims Act was tolled until 2005.
“On appeal, we review the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend de novo, exercising our independent judgment as to whether a cause of action has been stated as a matter of law. [Citations.] We assume the truth of properly pleaded allegations in the complaint and give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and with all its parts in their context. [Citations.] . . . [¶] We apply the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court’s denial of leave to amend. [Citations.] When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. [Citation.] The appellant bears the burden of proving the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer or abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. [Citations.]” (V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 499, 506–507.)
Because each of the defendants is a public entity, plaintiff was required to file a formal claim for damages before bringing suit for negligence. (§§ 905, 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240.) A claim related to personal injury must be filed “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) For these purposes, “the accrual of a cause of action” occurs on the same date the cause of action accrues under the applicable statute of limitations. (§ 901.)
If plaintiff failed to file within the requisite six-month period, she was required to apply for leave to file a late claim, first with the defendants (§ 911.4, subd. (a)) and, failing that, the superior court (§ 946.6). Before the trial court could grant such relief, however, plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the section 911.4 application had been filed with the defendants “within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action.” (§§ 911.4, subd. (b), 946.6, subd. (c).) Failure to meet the one-year time limit deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to grant relief under section 946.6. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1314.)
The statute of limitations normally accrues when a wrongful act is done or a wrongful result occurs. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (Norgart).) The discovery rule, an exception to this general rule, can delay accrual of a cause of action until after a plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. (Norgart, at p. 397.) For these purposes, a plaintiff “discovers” a cause of action when he or she at least suspects, or has reason to suspect, a factual basis for the cause of action—for example, the suspicion that the injury was caused by “wrongdoing.” Once suspicion or a basis for suspicion exists, a plaintiff is deemed to have discovered the cause of action, even if he or she lacks actual knowledge that a wrong occurred. (Ibid.; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110–1111.) Upon such discovery, the plaintiff must make an effort to learn the facts necessary to support a cause of action. (Norgart, at p. 398.)
Plaintiff claims that her lawsuit is subject to the three-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, governing negligence claims against a health care provider. We assume without deciding that this is the applicable statute of limitations, although it appears some of her claims are more appropriately subject to the two-year general negligence statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)
Regarding the latter requirement, the Supreme Court summarized the law as follows: “[I]n order to employ the discovery rule to delay accrual of a cause of action, a potential plaintiff who suspects that an injury has been wrongfully caused must conduct a reasonable investigation of all potential causes of that injury. If such an investigation would have disclosed a factual basis for a cause of action, the statute of limitations begins to run on that cause of action when the investigation would have brought such information to light. In order to adequately allege facts supporting a theory of delayed discovery, the plaintiff must plead that, despite diligent investigation of the circumstances of the injury, he or she could not have reasonably discovered facts supporting the cause of action within the applicable statute of limitations period.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808–809 (Fox).)
Plaintiff contends that she was excused from filing her lawsuit at the time the events occurred because she was a minor and that her causes of action did not accrue until 2005, when she learned from the newspaper that Napa State Hospital remained open.
Plaintiff is correct that a person ordinarily is excused from bringing suit during the time of his or her minority under Code of Civil Procedure section 352, subdivision (a), which tolls the statute of limitations during the time a person is under the age of majority. Subdivision (b) of section 352, however, makes subdivision (a) inapplicable to tort claims against a government entity. (See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1270.) Absent the discovery rule, plaintiff’s claims therefore accrued when the events in question occurred, rather than when she reached the age of majority.
Code of Civil Procedure section 352 reads as follows: “(a) If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 335) is, at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of majority or insane, the time of the disability is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. [¶] (b) This section does not apply to an action against a public entity or public employee upon a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) or Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3, or Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 950) of Part 4, of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code. This subdivision shall not apply to any claim presented to a public entity prior to January 1, 1971.”
Plaintiff’s only excuse for not filing earlier is that, at some unspecified point in time “[a] few years ago,” she was told that Napa State Hospital was closed. This allegation is inadequate to toll the running of the statute of limitations for three distinct reasons. First, in order for her excuse to toll the notice requirement of the Tort Claims Act, plaintiff would have to have been told about the closing sometime during the three years after her causes of action accrued in 1975. Under no rule of liberal pleading can “[a] few years ago” be construed to reach back nearly 30 years. The statute of limitations and the time for filing notice of claim with the various public entities therefore expired before plaintiff was told of the closing.
Second, even if plaintiff had been told before 1979 that Napa State Hospital was closed, that information would not have tolled her claims under the discovery rule. As to her claims against the nonstate public entities, the County of Alameda, Alameda County Medical Center, and the City of Alameda, the information is simply irrelevant, since the claims plaintiff alleges against those defendants are independent of her claims against the state. Believing that the state could not be sued would not excuse filing against the other defendants. Further, the closing of Napa State Hospital would not insulate the state from a timely-filed claim with respect to the operation of the hospital. Even if the hospital had closed, the state remained available for service of process. Therefore, the mere belief that the hospital had been closed would not interfere with the filing and prosecution of a tort claim against the state with respect to the hospital.
Third, plaintiff has not alleged that she was diligent in confirming the information regarding closing of the hospital. A plaintiff is “required to conduct a reasonable investigation” with respect to the existence of a cause of action. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808.) Plaintiff alleges only that she was told during a counseling session at an unnamed mental health clinic by an unnamed person that the state hospital had closed. There is no allegation that the person who informed plaintiff was a person in a position to have firsthand knowledge of the closing, or was otherwise in a position to impart authoritative information. Nor is there any allegation that plaintiff followed up this information by attempting to investigate the closing. In short, plaintiff’s alleged reliance on an unnamed informant does not demonstrate the diligence necessary to invoke the discovery rule.
As plaintiff’s claims are alleged in the complaint, they accrued at some point in 1975. Her lawsuit was therefore untimely under both the Tort Claims Act and the applicable statutes of limitations. Because plaintiff has not suggested a way in which her complaint could have been amended to bring it within the statute of limitations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her action without leave to amend.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P.J., Swager, J.