Section 8-1-7 of the Code provides that "[n]o contract shall be made by the corporate authorities * * * unless an appropriation has been previously made concerning that contract" and that a contract not supported by a prior appropriation is "null and void as to the municipality." It is apparent DCS would be barred from recovery under its lease-purchase agreement if townships were governed by the Municipal Code. (See Chicago Patrolmen's Association v. City of Chicago (1974), 56 Ill.2d 503, 309 N.E.2d 3, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 839, 42 L.Ed.2d 66, 95 S.Ct. 68; Koudelka v. Village of Woodridge (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 884, 413 N.E.2d 1381; Guerine v. City of Northlake (1971), 1 Ill. App.3d 603, 274 N.E.2d 625; Collins v. Village of Glen Ellyn (1959), 21 Ill. App.2d 373, 158 N.E.2d 89; Beling v. City of East Moline (1957), 14 Ill. App.2d 263, 144 N.E.2d 865, appeal denied (1958), 12 Ill.2d 635.) However, townships are not included as municipalities subject to the proscriptions of the Illinois Municipal Code (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par.

Our interpretation of Iowa Code section 331.756(6) is supported by the fact that at common law, public officials were not entitled to mandatory reimbursement of fees resulting from criminal prosecutions absent express statutory authorization. Hall v. Thompson, 283 Ark. 26, 669 S.W.2d 905, 906-07 (1984); Guerine v. City of Northlake, 1 Ill.App.3d 603, 274 N.E.2d 625, 626 (1971); Zimmer v. Town of Brookhaven, 247 A.D.2d 109, 678 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 (1998). It is improbable that the legislature intended to significantly rework the common law through the language in the statute.

Although a legislative body may have broad discretion in determining what constitutes a public purpose ( People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 Ill.2d 347, 355 (1972)), that discretion is not unlimited and courts will intervene when public property is devoted to a purely private use ( City of Elmhurst ex rel. Mastrino, 272 Ill. App.3d at 173). An unsuccessful criminal defense involving the holder of a public office, but not arising out of the lawful exercise of the duties of that office, is purely private litigation (see Guerine v. City of Northlake, 1 Ill. App.3d 603 (1971)), and as such, absorbing the costs of such litigation cannot be considered a proper public purpose ( City of Elmhurst ex rel. Mastrino, 272 Ill. App.3d at 173). Moreover, even a home rule unit, such as Danville, may only exercise powers and perform functions pertaining to its government and affairs.

Other jurisdictions have also held that attorney's fees are not recoverable by public officials or employers who are Successful in getting the charges dismissed. Chapman v. City of New York, 168 N.Y. 80, 61 N.E. 108 (1901); Schieffelin v. Henry, 123 Misc. 792, 206 N.Y.S. 172 (1924); Guerine v. City of Northlake, 1 Ill. App.3d 603, 274 N.E.2d 625 (1971); Holtzendorff v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles, 250 Cal.App.2d 596, 58 Cal.Rptr. 886 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968). In Chapman, supra, the court stated:

Frequently the reported cases make a distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, and in general the cases appear to disfavor indemnification in criminal proceedings. E.g. Guerine v. Northlake, 1 Ill. App.3d 603, 274 N.E.2d 625 (1971). Criminal law presents greater obstacles to frivolous prosecutions than does civil law, and, obviously, there is a reluctance on the part of the prosecuting authorities to bring actions against other government officers for alleged crimes arising out of the performance of official duties.

There is no ongoing obligation between the village and Ancel Glink, or, for that matter, any other attorney the board might eventually choose to utilize under the ordinance. ¶ 27 As for its argument concerning the lack of a budget appropriation, plaintiff argues that where there is no appropriation in the municipal budget for a contract, the contract is void (citing Guerine v. City of Northlake , 1 Ill.App.3d 603, 606-07, 274 N.E.2d 625 (1971) ). But plaintiff is not trying to invalidate any particular contract.

Ancel Glink, or, for that matter, any other attorney the board might eventually choose to utilize under the ordinance.¶ 28 As for its argument concerning the lack of a budget appropriation, plaintiff argues that where there is no appropriation in the municipal budget for a contract, the contract is void (citing Guerine v. City of Northlake, 1 Ill. App. 3d 603, 606-07 (1971)). But plaintiff is not trying to invalidate any particular contract.

A number of courts have agreed that a municipality cannot reimburse an official for legal fees arising out of criminal charges for official misconduct, absent statutory or contractual authority. Zimmer v. Town of Brookhaven, 678 N.Y.S.2d 377, 247 A.D.2d 109 (1998) ("It has been held that in the absence of a statute authorizing it, there is no obligation on the part of a public employer to reimburse an employee for [criminal defense] expenses."); Hall v. Thompson, 669 S.W.2d 905, 283 Ark. 26 (1984) ("Other jurisdictions have also held that [in the absence of a statute] attorney's fees are not recoverable by public officials or employers who are successful in getting charges dismissed."); Guerine v. City of Northlake, 274 N.E.2d 625, 627-28, 1 Ill. App.3d 603, 607 (1971) (In the absence of statute imposing duty upon City to defend policemen charged with criminal offenses, defendants' attorney could not recover his fees from City.); Schieffelin v. Henry, 206 N.Y.S. at 174, 123 Misc. at 794 ("It is not the duty of the public to defend or aid in the defense of one charged with official misconduct.")

In that regard, it has been held that assurances by city officials, including the mayor, cannot bind the municipality in the absence of approval by a majority vote of the city council. Guerine v. City of Northlake (1971), 1 Ill. App.3d 603, 606-07; Greene v. City of Danville (1953), 350 Ill. App. 440, 444. However, it has also been held that section 8-1-7 is not violated in situations where payment under a contract is to be made from a special fund or a special assessment and not from a city's general corporate funds.

The requirement of a full prior appropriation imposed upon municipalities by section 8-1-7 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24, par. 8-1-7) has uniformly been considered as a condition precedent to the expenditure of city funds and therefore to the validity of the contract in issue. See Guerine v. City of Northlake (1971), 1 Ill. App.3d 603, 274 N.E.2d 625; Collins v. Village of Glen Ellyn (1959), 21 Ill. App.2d 373, 158 N.E.2d 89; Greene v. City of Danville (1953), 350 Ill. App. 440, 113 N.E.2d 348, appeal denied (1953), 415 Ill. 631; Deyo v. Commissioner of Highways (1930), 256 Ill. App. 3, appeal denied (1930), 256 Ill. App. xxxix; DeKam v. City of Streator (1925), 316 Ill. 123, 146 N.E. 550. • 2 In the instant case, there is no allegation by plaintiff that funding for the contract in question was to be out of a special assessment collected for that purpose.