Guerdon Ind. v. Fidelity C. Co.

72 Citing cases

  1. Acgic v. Marzonie

    447 Mich. 624 (Mich. 1994)   Cited 31 times
    In Marzonie, this Court finally formed a majority on this issue holding that "accidents" are evaluated from the standpoint of the insured, not the injured person.

    See DiCicco, supra at 665. In Guerdon Industries v Fidelity Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich. 12, 18; 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963), this Court considered the term accident in a liability policy. Therein, this Court quoted 10 Couch, Insurance (2d ed), § 41:6, p 27, now at 10 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 41:8, pp 11-12:

  2. Group Ins Co v. Czopek

    440 Mich. 590 (Mich. 1992)   Cited 107 times
    Stating that “the exclusions to the general liability in a policy of insurance are to be strictly construed against the insurer”

    anything that begins to be, that happens, or that is a result which is not anticipated and is unforeseen and unexpected by the person injured or affected thereby — that is, takes place without the insured's foresight or expectation and without design or intentional causation on his part. In other words, an accident is an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected. [ Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity Casualty Coof New York, 371 Mich. 12, 18-19; 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963).]

  3. Polkow v. Citizens Ins Co.

    438 Mich. 174 (Mich. 1991)   Cited 62 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Polkow there was a question of fact as to whether groundwater contamination resulted from ongoing regular business activity or whether it resulted from a sudden and accidental discharge such that the sudden and accidental exception would apply.

    Post, p 185. In addition, the dissent, citing Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich. 12; 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963), correctly states, "any doubt pertaining to application of the duty to defend is to be resolved in favor of the insured." Post, p 185.

  4. Allstate Ins v. Freeman

    432 Mich. 656 (Mich. 1989)   Cited 184 times
    Holding "the word ‘a’ or ‘an’ in front of the word ‘insured’ ... unambiguously means ‘any insured’ "

    The court must resolve any doubt pertaining to the duty to defend in favor of the insured. Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich. 12, 18-19; 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963); Illinois Employers Ins of Wausau v Dragovich, 139 Mich. App. 502; 362 N.W.2d 767 (1984). However, it is equally clear that an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify does not depend solely upon the terminology used in a plaintiff's pleadings.

  5. Space Conditioning v. Ins. Co., of No. Amer.

    294 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mich. 1968)   Cited 21 times

    The plaintiff brought this action, alleging that the defendant breached its duty under the contract by refusing to defend the suit brought against Warren Webster, and by refusing to contribute to, indemnify, or otherwise reimburse Warren Webster for the expenses incurred in the defense of the suit and in the payment of the judgment rendered against it. The facts are stipulated and the Court has before it motions for summary judgment submitted by both parties. The insurer's duty to defend under an insurance contract is measured by the allegations in the pleadings of the person who is suing the insured, Guerdon Industries, Inc. v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 371 Mich. 12, 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963); American States Insurance Co. v. Stachowski, 249 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Mich. 1965); 29A Am.Jur., Insurance, § 1452, and is not dependent on the insurer's ultimate liability to pay. Guerdon Industries v. Fidelity, supra; City Poultry Egg Co. v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 297 Mich. 509, 298 N.W. 114 (1941); St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Huitt, 336 F.2d 37, 44 (6th Cir. 1964).

  6. Estate of Filek v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.

    No. 16-2517 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2017)

    Likewise, in Michigan, "[a]n 'accident,' within the meaning of policies of accident insurance, . . . is an undersigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected." Guerdon Indus., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 123 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Mich. 1963) (quoting Couch on Insurance (2d ed. 1962), § 41:6, p. 26)). Thus, the language of the policy here, like in Air France and Bliss, states that Defendants will cover bodily injuries that are the result of unanticipated or unusual events, not bodily injuries that are themselves unanticipated or unusual. Reliance on these cases, therefore, was not unfounded.

  7. Gelman Sciences, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.

    456 Mich. 305 (Mich. 1998)   Cited 42 times
    Finding "no support for the manifestation trigger in the relevant policy language"

    Gelman contends that Michigan courts have generally interpreted the coverage of accident-based policies consistent with that of occurrence policies. Guerdon Industries, Inc. v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of New York, 371 Mich. 12, 18-19; 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963). We agree that analysis of the trigger issue, which hinges on the timing of the property damage, should be identical whether that property damage is denoted as an "accident" or as an "occurrence" under the specific policy at issue.

  8. Frankenmuth Mut v. Continental

    450 Mich. 429 (Mich. 1995)   Cited 20 times
    Concerning the identification of the primary insurance policy, “the next inquiry should be whether the terms of the polices at issue cover the same loss, the same risk, and the same subject matter.”

    The duty to defend is triggered whenever the facts set forth in the pleadings would require coverage, or an "unpleaded fact or set of facts [known by the insurer to be true] would bring the claim within the coverage of the policy."Guerdon Industries v Fidelity Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich. 12, 18; 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963).Id.

  9. People v. Keskimaki

    446 Mich. 240 (Mich. 1994)   Cited 10 times
    In People v. Keskimaki, 446 Mich. 240, 248-249; 521 N.W.2d 241 (1994), the Court indicated that the purpose of the accident exception is to facilitate a drunken driver's safety by eliminating any potential delay in securing prompt medical attention.

    [A]n "undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected." [ Tope, supra at 99, quoting Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich. 12, 18-19; 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963).] Applying this to the case at bar, the Court of Appeals concluded that a car parked alongside the highway with its engine running, its lights on, and its driver slumped over the passenger seat, unable to be easily aroused, when considered in its entirety, constituted

  10. Frankenmuth Ins v. Piccard

    440 Mich. 539 (Mich. 1992)   Cited 26 times
    In Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. v. Piccard, 440 Mich. 539, 548-49, 489 N.W.2d 422 (1992), the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the same argument Century raises here, i.e., that intentional acts cannot be considered "accidents" even though they cause unexpected and unintentional harm.

    Under this definition, an "accident" is evaluated from the standpoint of the injured person, rather than the insured. Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich. 12, 1819; 123 N.W.2d 143 (1963). This conclusion is in accord with the language of the contract and the majority rule that