Guare v. State

10 Citing cases

  1. In re Ops. of the Justices

    171 N.H. 128 (N.H. 2018)   Cited 2 times
    Discussing in detail the 2018 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6-a

    Significantly, however, in subsequently addressing the merits of the appeal in Guare, we did not find it necessary to rely upon any factual findings made by the trial court in that case. See Guare v. State of N.H., 167 N.H. 658, 117 A.3d 731 (2015). To the contrary, the appeal was based upon the trial court's summary judgment rulingβ€”in which the trial court was not permitted to resolve factual disputesβ€”in favor of the parties who challenged the legality of the voter registration form at issue.

  2. N.H. Democratic Party v. Sec'y of State

    174 N.H. 312 (N.H. 2021)   Cited 3 times
    Explaining that under New Hampshire law, courts are to β€œpresume that the legislature intended that the invalid part shall not produce entire invalidity if the valid part may be reasonably saved” and consider β€œwhether the unconstitutional provisions of the statute are so integral and essential in the general structure of the act that they may not be rejected without the result of an entire collapse and destruction of the statute”

    The trial court also rejected the State's argument that, because the plaintiffs failed to show that SB 3 places any burden on the vast majority of New Hampshire voters, SB 3 could not be deemed facially unconstitutional even assuming it might discourage some voters from attempting to register. The court found the State's argument inconsistent with Guare v. State of New Hampshire, 167 N.H. 658, 117 A.3d 731 (2015), reasoning that "[a]t no point did the Court in Guare indicate that the plaintiffs were required to establish that the challenged law placed a substantial burden on the vast majority of voters in the State." Because the State's arguments relied on a "faulty legal premise" and because it "faile[d] to advance any argument regarding the appropriate constitutional test to apply to [the plaintiffs’] claims and how those tests are met," the trial court determined that the State failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs’ claim must fail.

  3. Libertarian Party of New Hampshire v. Gardner

    843 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2016)   Cited 13 times
    Relying on "statements of the state's interest first identified in litigation briefs"

    United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996). They observe that some courts applying Anderson have compared the middle range of its sliding scale to "intermediate scrutiny," seeGuare v. State, 167 N.H. 658, 117 A.3d 731, 740 (2015), and therefore urge us to ignore the state's asserted interest in ensuring a minimal level of support for parties appearing on the ballot. The problem for LPNH is that the burden here caused solely by the start date itself (as opposed to the three-percent-within-seven-months requirement), for the reasons already stated, is minimal, placing it at the easier-to-justify end of Anderson's sliding scale.

  4. Libertarian Party v. Sununu

    2020 DNH 133 (D.N.H. 2020)

    "[S]ome courts applying Anderson have compared the middle range of its sliding scale to 'intermediate scrutiny.'" Gardner III, 843 F.3d at 31 (citing Guare v. State, 167 N.H. 658 (2015)). In a case concerning the signature requirements for Michigan's congressional primary ballot, a trial court in the Sixth Circuit very recently described this test for "[r]egulations falling somewhere in betweenβ€”i.e., regulations that impose a more-than-minimal but less-than-severe burden" as requiring "a 'flexible' analysis, weighing the burden on the plaintiffs against the [s]tate's asserted interest and chosen means of pursuing it.'"Esshaki v. Whitmer, 2:20-cv-10831-TGB, 2020 WL 1910154, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 20, 2020) ("Esshaki I") (quoting Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

  5. Casey v. NH Sec'y of State

    2019 DNH 199 (D.N.H. 2019)

    The basic difference between a "resident" and a person who merely has a New Hampshire "domicile," is that a "resident" has manifested an intent to remain in New Hampshire for the indefinite future, while a person who merely has a New Hampshire "domicile" has not manifested that same intent.Guare v. State, 167 N.H. 658, 662 (2015). As HB 1264 removed this "basic difference," it arguably rendered those who have a New Hampshire domicile "residents."

  6. League of Women Voters of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire Sec'y of State

    2017 DNH 174 (D.N.H. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    Significantly, the defendants never argue here that federal jurisdiction lies over the New Hampshire constitutional claims pleaded in the Amended Complaint, arguing only that "it is not clear that federal question jurisdiction no longer remains in this case." In support of that less-than-forceful contention, they point to what they characterize as a federal question: "whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision to apply a bright-line intermediate scrutiny test in State v. Guare, 167 N.H. 658, 665 (2015), is preempted under the United States Supreme Court's decisions . . . requir[ing] courts to test the burden of restriction against the strength of the State's interest in the restriction in a nuanced, case-by-case basis." They argue that this court may, on the basis of this question, retain jurisdiction over these actions under Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).

  7. Libertarian Party of N.H. v. Gardner

    126 F. Supp. 3d 194 (D.N.H. 2015)   Cited 5 times

    The parties disagree about which level of scrutiny should control in light of this conclusion. Citing the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Guare v. New Hampshire, 117 A.3d 731 (N.H.2015), LPNH argues that even if strict scrutiny does not apply, intermediate scrutiny is nonetheless appropriate. The State argues otherwise, citing the First Circuit's decision in Barr v. Galvin, 626 F.3d 99 (1st Cir.2010), to contend that rational-basis review should control.

  8. Mont. Democratic Party v. Jacobsen

    410 Mont. 114 (Mont. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    The Supreme Court has reaffirmed, and other jurisdictions have adopted, the Anderson-Burdick standard. See generally Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd. , 553 U.S. 181, 189-91, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615-16, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008) ; Obama for Am. v. Husted , 697 F.3d 423, 429-31 (6th Cir. 2012) ; Guarev. State , 167 N.H. 658, 663, 667-68, 117 A.3d 731, 736, 739-740 (2015) ; Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker , 2014 WI 98, ΒΆΒΆ 26-29, 40, 357 Wis.2d 469, 851 N.W.2d 262, 270, 272 (all describing and applying balancing or intermediate level of scrutiny to election statutes). While there is potential value in the Anderson-Burdick standard, I would decline in a preliminary injunction appeal to reach or adopt this test, because the "very purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo."

  9. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Pate

    950 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2020)   Cited 5 times
    Providing background facts

    It is important to note, however, that most cases fall between the two polar extremes. Obama for Am. v. Husted , 697 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2012) ; see alsoGuare v. State , 167 N.H. 658, 117 A.3d 731, 736 (2015). Further, even restrictions that may appear to impose only "slight" burdens must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests "sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation."

  10. Lynn v. Wentworth by the Sea Master Ass'n

    169 N.H. 77 (N.H. 2016)   Cited 2 times
    Addressing question of law in the interest of judicial economy instead of remanding to the trial court

    "In reviewing the trial court's rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Guare v. State of N.H., 167 N.H. 658, 661, 117 A.3d 731 (2015). "If our review of that evidence discloses no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then we will affirm the grant of summary judgment."