We have noted "that the interests at stake in a guardianship proceeding are constitutionally protected interests." Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶¶ 9-10, 715 A.2d 919, 921-22. See also Matter of Howes, 471 A.2d 689, 691 (Me. 1984) (holding that a guardianship affects fundamental rights of the ward).
SeeU.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6–A. Brant argues that awarding temporary parental rights and responsibilities concerning his son to Judy would violate his constitutionally protected interests. Those interests include Brant's fundamental liberty interest in the custody and control of his child, protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), and his interest in fair proceedings pursuant to the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, see Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶ 9, 715 A.2d 919. [¶ 19] “We review questions of law, including alleged constitutional violations ... de novo.”
18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-304(b). See Guardianship of Hughes, 715 A.2d 919, 922 (Me. 1998) (concluding that a preponderance of the evidence standard in guardianship proceedings satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process). Since the beginning of this case, the State of Maine has taken the position that a probate judge has the power to specifically reserve or deny the right to vote to any ward.
[¶ 11] We review a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(d) by examining the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine "whether any reasonable view of the evidence, including all justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom, can sustain the verdict." Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶ 20, 715 A.2d 919, 924. The burden is on the moving party to show that the adverse judgment is clearly and manifestly wrong.
Section 3863 outlines the first step of that extraordinary process, a process that has the potential to deprive a person of his right to control where he is, what he does, and how he is treated. See Guardianship of Hughes , 1998 ME 186, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 919 (explaining that involuntary commitment involves "a complete deprivation of a person's liberty to the extent the person could lawfully be restrained by force from leaving the facility" (emphasis omitted)); Doe v. Graham , 2009 ME 88, ¶ 23, 977 A.2d 391 ("We have previously recognized that both the private and governmental interests associated with involuntary commitment due to mental illness are substantial." (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶16] "In a procedural due process challenge, we must first determine whether the governmental action has resulted in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property." Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶ 9, 715 A.2d 919. Here, Doe has a property interest in his existing license, see Munjoy Sporting & Athletic Club v. Dow , 2000 ME 141, ¶ 11, 755 A.2d 531, but he does not claim to have been deprived of that license.
In recognition of that, the Probate Code prescribes a series of procedural steps that operate to safeguard those fundamental liberty interests. See 18-A M.R.S. § 5-303 ; Guardianship of Hughes , 1998 ME 186, ¶¶ 9, 13-14, 715 A.2d 919. [¶15] For a guardianship to be established, "[t]he incapacitated person or any person interested in his welfare may petition for a finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian."
[¶ 17] "In a procedural due process challenge, we must first determine whether the governmental action has resulted in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property." Guardianship of Hughes , 1998 ME 186, ¶ 9, 715 A.2d 919. If a deprivation has occurred, we must next determine what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment.
[¶13] The Probate Court ensured that the necessary procedures were followed in the course of this guardianship proceeding: (1) the court appointed counsel for McIntosh, see id. § 5-303(b); (2) the court appointed a visitor, who made the requisite investigation, filed a report, and was present and testified at the hearing, see id. §§ 5-303(b), (c), 5-308; (3) McIntosh was given an opportunity for an independent evaluation, see id. § 5-303(b); (4) all interested persons were provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard, see id. §§ 1-401, 5-309; and (5) the hearing on the petition was recorded in a manner that allowed subsequent preparation of a transcript. See Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 6 n.2, --- A.3d ---; Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶¶ 8-15, 715 A.2d 919 (outlining the fundamental liberty interests implicated in adult guardianship proceedings and procedural safeguards in place). [¶14] In proceedings in which fundamental liberty interests are implicated, due process requires that there be an adequate record of the trial court decision, including any transcript of the proceedings, to permit fair consideration of the issues on appeal. See State v. King, 2015 ME 41, ¶ 4, 114 A.3d 664; State v. Milliken, 2010 ME 1, ¶¶ 12-13, 985 A.2d 1152. An adequate, retrievable record of a trial court proceeding may also be essential for consideration of issues raised post-judgment or in a subsequent proceeding in the trial court, as can occur in guardianship proceedings.
The requirement of clear and convincing evidence is based primarily on concerns arising from the finality of the decision to terminate parental rights. In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258, ¶ 12, 721 A.2d 629 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, and In re Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶ 13, 715 A.2d 919 ). The Maine Legislature appropriately adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard in the statute governing the termination of parental rights.