'" [7] We specifically noted in Guardianship of Cookingham, 45 Cal.2d 367, 374 [ 289 P.2d 16], that "both sections contemplate that the services and expenditures be completed before theclaim for compensation. (§ 904 [`services rendered up to that time']; § 1556 [`reasonable expenses incurr ed in the execution of his trust'].)

" (165 Cal. at pp. 216-217.) In Guardianship of Cookingham (1955) 45 Cal.2d 367 [ 289 P.2d 16], the court upheld the guardian's right to reimbursement for expenses incurred in unsuccessfully resisting the ward's petition for restoration to capacity. The court said, "The guardian could not assume merely from his ward's discharge and subsequent petition for restoration that he was capable of taking care of himself. [Citation.] To discourage the guardian's inquiry as to the ward's status, in effect, would allow the petition for restoration to be considered without the presentation of all of the facts.

In analogous situations the broad policy of encouraging persons acting in good faith in the interests of an incompetent has been followed, and compensation has been generally allowed for professional services. ( Estate of Doyle, 126 Cal.App. 646 [ 14 P.2d 920] and Stone v. Conkle, 31 Cal.App.2d 348 [ 88 P.2d 197] (services to an incompetent seeking restoration to capacity); Guardianship of Cookingham, 45 Cal.2d 367 [ 289 P.2d 16] (expenses of guardian in unsuccessfully opposing the ward's petition for restoration to capacity).) Appellant relies on Guardianship of Boxley, 115 Cal.App.2d 483 [ 252 P.2d 348], a decision which vacated an award of fees to attorneys hired by a ward to bring about the removal of his guardian.

In such case he could, subject to certain statutory limitations, properly manage the entire community fund in his capacity as husband regardless of whether he was also the guardian of his incompetent wife, and he could do so without the approval of or the requirement that he account to the court having jurisdiction of the guardianship matter. [9] Contentions by the present guardian that the contract for contingent fees is void in its entirety for lack of court approval, that a guardian cannot authorize the payment of attorney fees without court approval (see Guardianship of Cookingham, 45 Cal.2d 367, 374 [ 289 P.2d 16]), and that a guardian cannot delegate his powers to distribute a guardianship fund (see Gaver v. Early, 191 Cal. 123 [ 215 P. 394]) have application only as against a guardian and not as against a husband who apart from guardianship proceedings has been authorized to exercise management and control over a community fund. [8b] However, the husband's power of control over the community fund has been limited.

The common law impliedly allows a guardian or conservator to oppose the ward or protected person's motion to terminate the relationship by holding that a guardian or conservator could be paid out of the ward's or protected person's funds for, reasonably and in good faith, opposing the motion to terminate. See In re Guardianskip of Cookingham, 45 Cal.2d 367, 289 P.2d 16, 19 (1955); Conservatorship of LefkovMz, 50 Cal. App.4th 1310, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 299, 302 (1996); Woodruff v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 233 Ga. 135, 210 S.E.2d 321, 325 (1974); Palmer v. Palmer, 38 N.H. 418, 420 (N.H. 1859); In re Lamer, 39 Misc. 377, 380-81, 79 N.Y.S. 836, 837-38 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1902); American Nat'l Bank v. Bradford, 28 Tenn.App. 239, 188 S.W.2d 971, 980 (1945), superseded in part on other grounds by Tenn. R. Evid. 201, as stated in Counts v. Bryan, 182 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2005). In this regard, we discern no principled difference between a guardian and a conservator.

The cases are inapposite, though, because they all involve expenditures, not appraisals. (See Guardianship of Vucinich (1935) 3 Cal.2d 235 [ 44 P.2d 567] [guardian failed to provide receipts in support of his claim for child support reimbursement]; Guardianship of Cookingham (1955) 45 Cal.2d 367 [ 289 P.2d 16] [objection to guardian's failure to obtain court approval for costs associated with defending the guardianship]; In re Moore (1891) 88 Cal. 1 [ 25 P. 915] [objection to guardian having exceeded amount approved by court for home repairs]; Estate of Barreiro (1932) 125 Cal.App. 752 [ 14 P.2d 786] [executor had duty to justify fees paid to foreign attorney].) II

While a good-faith belief that the trustee's opposition will further the purpose of the trust is insufficient unless the belief is reasonable, the converse is also true: in the absence of good faith, an otherwise reasonable expenditure will not be reimbursed. For instance, in Guardianship of Cookingham (1955) 45 Cal.2d 367 [ 289 P.2d 16], the issue was whether a guardian should be compensated for expenses incurred in unsuccessfully opposing a petition to terminate the guardianship. The former ward contended that compensation should be denied because the guardian did not obtain approval from the court in advance of incurring the expense.

In providing a new procedure for obtaining fees of attorneys for guardians whereby such fees may be fixed by the court and allowed to the attorneys, the Legislature was undoubtedly aware of the numerous decisions holding that a similar procedure for obtaining fees of attorneys for executors and administrators altered the former rule with respect to the personal laibility of the executor or administrator for attorney's fees, and must have intended the 1951 statutory changes to have a like effect upon the personal liability of guardians for such fees. Guardianship of Cookingham (1955) 45 Cal.2d 367 [ 289 P.2d 16] does not require a different conclusion since it was not an action by an attorney against a guardian for fees, but involved the propriety of a credit claimed by a guardian in her final account for attorney fees incurred by the guardian under express contract. The judgment is affirmed.

[2] Certain expenditures are said to be improper because court approval therefor was not first obtained; the items consist of a piano, three violins and a horse — all apparently purchased for Victoria. Cited by appellant is Guardianship of Cookingham, 45 Cal.2d 367 [ 289 P.2d 16], but that case does not support the contention presently advanced. Thus, quoting from Estate of Clanton, 171 Cal. 381 [ 153 P. 459], it is declared in Cookingham (p. 372): "`Under our liberal system, if the expenditures of the guardian have been just and equitable, they will be allowed regardless of the obtaining or failure to secure orders of the court authorizing them.'"

(Cf. Guardianship of Cookingham (1955) 45 Cal.2d 367, 375-376 [ 289 P.2d 16]; and see as to effect of the judge's opinings Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 740, 749-751 [ 47 P.2d 273]; and Bailey v. Fosca Oil Co. (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 289, 293-295 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 474].) Furthermore, the criteria for the exercise of such authority, if it does in fact exist, are interrelated with the questions which are posed in resolving the question of the existence of such power.