Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-09-033WLW.
Submitted: October 6, 2000.
Decided: December 28, 2000.
On Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or Alternatively a New Trial as to Liability. Denied. On Plaintiff's Motion for Additur or Alternatively a New Trial as to Damages. Denied. On Defendant's Motion for Costs. Granted.
Kenneth J. Young, Young Malmberg, Dover, Delaware, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey A. Young, Young Young, Dover, Delaware, Attorneys for the Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court are three post-trial motions. Kailash and Sadhana Gaur ("Plaintiffs") renew their trial motion for judgment as a matter of law with regard to liability in the case and in the alternative request a new trial as to liability. Plaintiffs' second motion is for additur or in the alternative a new trial as to damages. Meriam Arocho ("Defendant") brings her own motion for costs.
1. Plaintiff Kailash Gaur was injured in a motor vehicle collision which occurred at the intersection of U.S. Route 113 and County Road 224 on October 4, 1996. Plaintiff Kailash Gaur was traveling Southbound on U.S. Route 113 in the right lane approaching the County Road 224 intersection. Meriam Arocho was traveling Westbound on County Road 224 approaching the same intersection. Defendant crossed over the two Northbound lanes of U.S. Route 113 and failed to properly yield at the yield sign in the median before crossing over the two Southbound lanes of U.S. Route 113.
2. Delaware State Police investigated the accident and charged the Defendant with Failure to Yield at a Yield Sign in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4164 (c). The Defendant pled guilty to the traffic ticket. At trial, the Defendant testified that she looked but did not see Plaintiffs vehicle as she proceeded through the median lane and into the Southbound lanes of Route 113. Plaintiff testified that he saw the Defendant's vehicle proceeding through the median area but thought she would stop before crossing into his lanes of travel. The Defendant testified that she proceeded through the intersection around 20mph and Plaintiff testified that he was traveling at 50mph on southbound Route 113. The collision occurred in the far right part of the right-hand lane of the two Southbound lanes. Defendant's vehicle was damaged on the rear, passenger side and Plaintiffs vehicle was damaged on the front, driver side portion. The contested issues at trial concerned the visibility of the plaintiff and defendant to each other, the reactions of the drivers given their respective speeds, the point of impact in the road and the location of the damage to each vehicle.
I. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or Alternatively a New Trial.
The speed limit along that section of Route 113 is 55mph.
Defendant strenuously argued that the location of the body damage to the two vehicles was likely the result of Plaintiff having turned into the Defendant.
3. Plaintiffs' first set of motions concern liability. At the close of evidence, Plaintiffs brought a motion for judgment as a matter of law as to liability. The Court denied this motion and Plaintiffs now renew it and alternatively request a new trial. Superior Court Civil Rule 50(b) details the procedure for renewing a motion for judgement as a matter of law after trial. Rule 50(b) also states that a motion for a new trial may be requested in the alternative with a motion for judgement as a matter of law. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate under Superior Court Civil Rule 50(a) when "during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party." Plaintiff is asking this Court to find that "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis" existed for the jury to decide negligence in this case. The Court's responsibility in this motion is to determine "whether under any reasonable view of the evidence, the jury could have justifiably found for the nonmoving party." On the other hand, in deciding a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) the court must determine if "the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached that result."
Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, Del. Supr., 759 A.2d 582, 587 (2000), quoting from Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, Del. Supr., 706 A.2d 526, 530 (1998).
Storey v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 465 (1979). "Thus, on weight of the evidence motions, we hold that a trial judge is only permitted to set aside a jury verdict when in his judgement it is at least against the great weight of evidence. In other words, barring exceptional circumstances, a trial judge should not set aside a jury verdict on such ground unless, on a review of all the evidence, the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached the result." Id.
4. In the immediate case, the jury had ample support in deciding that the Plaintiff was 20% negligent, even though the Defendant pled guilty to a traffic violation. Plaintiff testified that he saw the Defendant and thought she would stop. In addition, the relative speeds of the two vehicles and the location of the body damage to each vehicle also called into question the nature of the accident. It was appropriate for the jury to weigh the evidence and testimony of the witnesses at trial and apportion negligence accordingly. This Court finds that there was sufficient legal evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict and that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. Plaintiffs' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or alternatively a new trial as "to liability are therefore denied.
II. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motion for Additur or Alternatively a New Trial as to Damages.
5. Plaintiffs second motion relates to the amount of damages awarded by the jury. Mr. Gaur suffered a non-displaced fracture of the left navicular bone, a non-displaced fracture of the radial styloid bone and other contusions and abrasions. The permanency and extent of the injuries was heavily contested at trial. The jury returned from deliberations with a $4,000 verdict which was then reduced by 20% (to $3,200) for the plaintiffs comparative negligence. Plaintiffs are seeking additur or a new trial as to damages under Superior Court Civil Rule 59(a) and (d).
6. Under Delaware law, jury verdicts are given great deference. The standard for reviewing the damages awarded by a jury verdict is whether the jury's verdict is disproportionate or shock's the court's conscience. In Young v. Frase, the court stated that "in the absence of special circumstances, the validity of damages determined by the jury should likewise be presumed." The Supreme Court in Young went on to state that the issue is not whether the Court itself would have awarded higher damages, "the issue is whether the Court's conscience is shocked by the award." The jury evaluated the testimony and evidence at trial and awarded what they determined to be appropriate damages in this case. While the $4,000 award is not high, it does not "shock the court's conscience" and will not be altered. Plaintiffs' motion for additur or in the alternative a new trial as to damages is therefore denied.
Young v. Frase, Del. Supr., 702 A.2d 1234, 1236-1237 (1997).
Id.
Id. at 1236.
Plaintiff argues the inadequacy of the $4,000 verdict because the Defendant's filed an Offer of Judgement in the amount of $15,000 before trial. This was not part of the evidence before the jury and has no bearing on this case other than establishing what Defendant felt the case might be worth.
III. Defendant's Motion for Costs.
7. The Defendant's post-trial motion is a Motion for Costs. Superior Court Civil Rule 68, Offer of Judgment, states that:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. . . . If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.
The purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlements by shifting part of the risk of proceeding with the lawsuit to the claimant. For the Plaintiff to prevail completely, he must not only win but win an award amount greater than the Offer of Judgment or pay some of the opposition's costs.
Bejger v. Shreeve, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95C-06-104, Cooch, J. (May 7, 1997), Order at 2.
8. Rule 68 contains three requirements for reimbursement of costs: (1) a filed Offer of Judgment at least 10 days before trial, (2) costs that occur after the date of that filing, and (3) a trial verdict below the amount of the offer. While these are straightforward, factually specific requirements, exactly what constitutes a reimbursable cost is not defined in Rule 68. Through the common law, costs under Rule 68 has been interpreted to mean those costs that would be appropriate under Rule 54. Defendant has asked the Court to award the cost of her expert's deposition and the cost of the transcript. Under Rule 54(h), "[flees for expert witnesses testifying on deposition shall be taxed as costs pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 8906 only where the deposition is introduced into evidence." The Court must perform a simple evaluation of the number of days between the time of the offer and the start of the trial and calculate the difference between the jury's verdict and the Offer of Judgment. Next, the Court determines what costs are appropriate in its discretion under Rule 54 and any applicable statutes, in this case 10 Del. C. § 8906.
Bejger at 2, citing to Parsons v. Black, Del. Super., C.A. No. 89C-JA-102, Toliver, J. (June 5, 1990), Letter Op. at 2, which states that "Rule 68 does not define "costs." However, 10 Del. C. § 5101 and § 8906, as well as Superior Court Civil Rule 54 indicate that "costs" shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless otherwise specified by statute, rule or direction of the Court. And while they do not specifically define that term, they do provide some guidance."
9. In the case sub judice, the Defendant filed an Offer of Judgment for $15,000 on February 15, 2000, well before the trial in September, 2000. The deposition of Dr. John E. Spieker was taken on February 18, 2000. Dr. Spieker charged $1,100 for a deposition that was scheduled to last one hour with an additional fifteen minute conference. A transcript of the deposition was ordered at a cost of $260 bringing the total cost for the deposition and transcript to $1,360. The transcript was then read into evidence at trial. The jury returned with a verdict of $4,000 which was reduced by 20% to $3,200 for comparative fault. Dr. Spieker's deposition expenses occurred after the Offer of Judgment and are recoverable by the Defendant as the jury verdict was less than the offer. The Court therefore feels bound by Rule 68 to tax the deposition costs of $1,360 to the Plaintiffs. Defendant's Motion for Costs is granted.
See Bradshaw v. Trover, Del. Super., C.A. No. 97C-01-028, Vaughn, J. (Oct. 27, 1999), Order at 3-4 (discussing what a reasonable range of fees based on the "1995 study compiled by the Medical Society of Delaware's Medico-Legal Affairs Committee" and factoring in increase in these figures over time).
IT IS SO ORDERED.