Opinion
No. 04-04-00211-CV
Delivered and Filed: April 27, 2005.
Appeal from the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2003-CI-11278, Honorable Rebecca Simmons, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J.A. Guajardo a/k/a Joseph A. Guajardo a/k/a Joseph Alfonso Guajardo a/k/a Joe Guajardo ("Guajardo") appeals the summary judgment rendered in favor of Linebarger Goggan Blair Sampson, L.L.P. and Mary Belan Doggett. On appeal, Guajardo contends summary judgment was improper on four grounds: (1) Appellant's suit was not barred under the doctrine of official immunity; (2) Appellant's suit was not barred under doctrine of attorney immunity; (3) Appellees were proper parties to a suit to quiet title and request for declaratory judgment; and (4) Appellant's claims based upon oral agreement with Appellees were not barred as a matter of law. We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Guajardo's claims arise out of events that occurred within the course of delinquent property tax collection litigation between the Taxing Authorities ( i.e., (1) the State of Texas, County of Bexar; (2) the City of San Antonio; (3) the South San Antonio Independent School District; and (4) the Bexar County Education District) and Guajardo. In the delinquent property tax litigation, the law firm of Linebarger Goggan Blair Sampson, L.L.P. ("LGBS"), serving as litigation counsel for the Taxing Authorities, filed three separate lawsuits against Guajardo to collect allegedly delinquent ad valorem taxes on three Bexar County properties owned by Guajardo. Guajardo subsequently filed suit against Appellees, as attorneys and independent contractors for Taxing Authorities, alleging that Appellees were liable to Guajardo for representing the Taxing Authorities in frivolous lawsuits brought to collect delinquent taxes for which they either knew or should have known he was not liable.
In their second motion for summary judgment, Appellees LGBS and Mary Belan Doggett asserted that they were entitled to summary judgment on multiple grounds: (1) Guajardo's suit was barred by the doctrine of official immunity; (2) Guajardo's suit was barred by attorney immunity for conduct in the course of representing their clients; (3) Appellees were improper parties to a suit to quiet title; and (4) Guajardo's claims were based upon an unenforceable oral agreement. On February 4, 2004, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of LGBS and Mary Belan Doggett. Guajardo appeals from this summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a summary judgment de novo. Reynoso v. Huff, 21 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Accordingly, we will uphold a summary judgment only if the summary judgment record establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a ground set forth in the motion. Amer. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnel, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997); TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). In deciding whether the summary judgment record establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, we view as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant and indulge every reasonable inference, and resolve all doubts in its favor. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). When, as in the instant case, the trial court enters a general summary judgment order, the summary judgment must be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989).
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
In his first issue, Guajardo contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees because his suit was not barred under the doctrine of official immunity. We disagree. Here, Appellees LGBS and Mary Belan Doggett presented competent summary judgment evidence that they acted in good faith and within the scope of their duties performing a governmental function, i.e., the collection of property taxes. In response, Guajardo failed to produce evidence that no reasonably prudent official in the Appellees' position could have believed that the facts were such that they would justify the official's actions. As a result, Appellees established the defense of official immunity, and Guajardo's suit against Appellees is barred as a matter of law.
Government officers and employees who are sued in their individual capacities are entitled to immunity from suit arising from the performance of (1) discretionary duties (2) in good faith, and so long as they were (3) acting within the scope of their authority. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). This immunity is referred to as "official immunity." Id. The purpose of this immunity is to ensure that the government is administrated effectively and that people are encouraged to enter governmental service and zealously discharge their duties. See Baker v. Story, 621, S.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
While the Appellees are not themselves government officers or employees, "[i]t is generally recognized that official immunity extends to private parties under contract to perform governmental functions." See Puthoff v. Ancrum, 934 S.W.2d 164, 169 n. 7 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (granting official immunity to independent contractor medical examiner); see also City of Houston v. First City, 827 S.W.2d 462, 481 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (granting official immunity to litigation firm engaged in tax collection efforts); Bates v. McLaughlin, No. 04-98-00933-CV, 1999 WL 816149, at * 4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Oct. 13, 1999) (not designated for publication) (granting official immunity to independent contractor psychologist); but cf. Gonzalez v. Heard, Goggan, Blair Williams, 923 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (denying sovereign immunity to litigation firm engaged in tax collection efforts where firm failed to establish agency relationship to government entity). Here, LGBS and Doggett were under contract to perform duties, i.e., the collection of property taxes, that otherwise would have to be performed by a government official who would be entitled to immunity. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 101.055(1) (Vernon 1997) (providing that there is no waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act for any claim arising "in connection with the assessment or collection of taxes by a governmental unit"); see also Williams v. O'Leary, 55 F.3d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1995). Therefore, this clearly falls within the class of cases in which official immunity may be raised by a private defendant. Nevertheless, having concluded that official immunity extends to the Appellees, we must determine whether the Appellees conclusively proved each element of their defense. See Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8-9 (Tex. 1994) (holding that defendant has summary judgment burden to conclusively establish each element); Harless v. Niles, 100 S.W.3d 390, 396 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
Guajardo's argument that independent contractors are never entitled to the protections of official immunity is apparently derived from the Thirteenth Court's decision in Gonzalez. In Gonzalez, the court reversed the summary judgment of the trial court where it held that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the litigation firm was acting as independent contractors or agents/employees of the government entity. Gonzalez, 923 S.W.2d at 766. We do not find Gonzalez controlling. The Gonzalez decision was based upon an appeal from a summary judgment where "the sole ground asserted . . . [was] that the [defendant's] actions are protected by sovereign immunity," not the ground of official immunity which the Appellees argue here. See id. at 765 (emphasis added) (reasoning that "summary judgment could not have been based upon sovereign immunity of an individual or law firm" because "sovereignty has not resided in a person in Texas since independence from the Spanish monarchy in 1821").
Moreover, in Gonzalez, the court based its decision on the insufficiency of the law firm's summary judgment evidence. Id. In contrast, here, Appellees LGBS and Mary Belan Doggett presented extensive summary judgment evidence supporting their claim of official immunity. Appellees filed a verified and complete copy of its contract with the Taxing Authorities in their motion for summary judgment. According to this contract, Bexar County agreed to employ Appellees LGBS to enforce by suit or otherwise the collection of all delinquent ad valorem taxes on behalf of Bexar County. Appellees also attached an affidavit from the Tax Assessor-Collector for Bexar County stating that: (1) the Taxing Authorities have engaged LGBS to file suit to collect delinquent taxes as agents for the Taxing Authorities, and (2) "[a]s a result [of this contract with LGBS], part of my overall responsibilities include oversight, direction and control of LGBS." In response, Guajardo has failed to contradict Appellees' evidence or create an issue of material fact regarding the nature or relevancy of Appellees' duties under the contract. Accordingly, we hold that the Appellees established by sufficient summary judgment evidence that, at all times relevant to the matters of this suit, they served as the agents of the Taxing Authorities.
Guajardo does not contest the first two elements of Appellees' defense. Therefore, we address only whether the Appellees established as a matter of law that they acted in good faith. See Antu v. Eddy, 914 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ). The test for whether a government official or employee acted in good faith is one of "objective legal reasonableness." Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. Under this test, to be entitled to summary judgment, Appellees must prove that a reasonably prudent official, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that their acts were justified. Id. Should the Appellees satisfy this threshold burden of proof, Guajardo must then produce evidence establishing that no reasonable person in the official's position could have believed the facts were such that they would justify the official's actions in order to avoid summary judgment. Knowles v. City of Granbury, 953 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
Here, Appellees LGBS and Mary Belan Doggett established with competent summary judgment evidence that they acted in objective good faith when they filed suit against Guajardo regarding allegedly delinquent property taxes. Appellees' motion for summary judgment details that, pursuant to a written agreement, LGBS was authorized to collect delinquent taxes on behalf of the Taxing Authorities as their attorneys. In conjunction with these contractual duties and obligations, Mary Belan Doggett attested in her affidavit that LGBS filed suits and sought to enforce judgments against Bexar County property owners indicated in the Tax Authorities' records to be delinquent in their payment of taxes. In their motion for summary judgment, Appellees also attached the affidavits of Linda Warren and Sylvia S. Romo, Tax Assessor/Collector for Bexar County, showing the current and delinquent tax rolls for the named tax units for the properties. Here, the Taxing Authorities' records showed that there were delinquent property taxes which remained unpaid on three properties owned by Guajardo (the Medina Base Road property, the 3222 West Commerce property, and the 110B Old Pearsall Road property). Based upon this information, Doggett states that the Appellees could have reasonably believed they were entitled to file suit against Guajardo to enforce the payment of the allegedly delinquent taxes. Appellees further produced evidence that they conducted their tax collection efforts in a manner consistent with the Tax Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In response, Guajardo has failed to prove that no reasonably prudent official in the Appellees' position could have believed that the facts were such that they would justify the official's actions. Instead, Guajardo's effort to bear his evidentiary burden is essentially comprised of his own belief that he had affirmative defenses which Appellees should have recognized prior to filing suit against him on behalf of the Taxing Authorities. Specifically, Guajardo contends that Appellees either knew or should have known that he was not liable to the Taxing Authorities for the allegedly delinquent amounts because: (1) Appellees' suits were barred by limitations under sections 33.54(a)(1) and 34.05(d) of the Texas Property Code; and (2) the allegedly delinquent amounts accrued during the periods prior to his purchasing the properties at tax resales. Therefore, Guajardo alleges that the Appellees' decision to file suit against him was unreasonable and probably motivated by proprietary gain. In addition, Guajardo alleges that he was never served with notice in one of the suits where default judgment was rendered against him. However, these assertions fail to negate facts relied upon by Appellees with competent summary judgment evidence, and more appropriately constitute arguments on the merits that should have been raised in defense of the applicable property suits.
In his brief, Guajardo states, "[t]he Appellees as independent contractors in their zest to collect a fifteen percent (15%) commission from Appellant on tax revenue during ths post-judgment pre-purchase period conveniently ignored clear Texas law in filing three lawsuits and obtaining two default judgments against Appellant."
This assertion is not supported by the record.
Indeed, Guajardo does not present evidence that there were no delinquent taxes regarding his properties. Rather, he suggests that he was not liable for the disputed amounts, and Appellees "as a collection agency engaged in tax collection knew or should have known the Texas law which barred such actions." Nevertheless, the standard of good faith as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or even a measure of an official's motivation. See Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tex. 2004). Therefore, while Guajardo may contest the merits of the Appellees' decision to file suit against him, the decision was made in good faith if a reasonably prudent person could have believed that the facts justified their actions. Id. Here, Appellees established that a reasonably prudent person could have believed that he was justified to file suit and seek judgment against Guajardo where tax records established that delinquent taxes were owed on his properties and Guajardo was the property owner of record. Accordingly, we hold that the Appellees established as a matter of law their defense of official immunity, and we overrule Guajardo's issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Because the summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the theories advanced are meritorious, we need not reach the other issues on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.