Opinion
No. 4-522 / 04-0107
Filed February 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica L. Ackley, Judge.
Dena Grutz appeals the district court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank National Association in an employment discrimination action. AFFIRMED.
Michael Coyle, Michael Shubatt, Danita Grant of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant.
Brendan Quann and Davin Curtiss of O'Connor Thomas, P.C., Dubuque, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Forty-five-year-old Dena Grutz worked for U.S. Bank for approximately twelve years. The bank terminated her employment. The stated reason was her lack of "dedication/commitment and team spirit."
Through a series of mergers, the bank ultimately became known as U.S. Bank.
Grutz sued U.S. Bank, alleging age discrimination in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) as well as other claims not at issue on appeal. The bank moved for summary judgment which the district court granted, reasoning "[t]he record as reviewed . . . does not suggest age was a factor in Plaintiff Grutz's termination." Grutz appealed.
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
Iowa Code § 216.6 (2001).
I. Scope and Standards of Review
Our review of the district court's summary judgment ruling is for errors of law. Estate of Harris v. Papa John's Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2004). Summary judgment is proper when the record shows "no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) (2002)).
II. Analysis
The ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1998). The ICRA states that "[i]t shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any . . . [p]erson to . . . discharge any employee . . . because of the age . . . of such . . . employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation." Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (2001).
This provision prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of age when the person is over the age of forty. Chambers v. Metropolitan Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 848, 855 (8th Cir. 2003).
The district court analyzed these claims using a framework prescribed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677-79 (1973). Neither party takes issue with the court's decision to apply this framework.
The continued viability of this framework has been called into question since the recent United States Supreme Court opinion, Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2003). See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed Motives" Case, 52 Drake L. Rev. 71 (2003); but see Christopher R. Hedican, Jason M. Hedican, Mark P.A. Hudson, McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 Drake L. Rev. 383 (2001). In Desert Palace, the Court examined a 1991 amendment to the Federal Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(m) (stating unlawful employment practice is established "when the complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice"). The Court held that, given the plain language of the amendment, "direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases." Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02, 123 S. Ct. at 2155, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 96. There is no analogous amendment to the ADEA, leaving open the question of whether "because of" within the meaning of the ADEA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate only that age was a motivating factor in the employment decision. See Donald J. Spero, Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa — Does McDonnell Douglas Survive?, 78 Fla. Bar J. 53, 58 (Nov. 2004) (citing opinions that have declined to apply Desert Palace in ADEA context).
In McDonnell Douglas, the United States Supreme Court stated that a complainant carries the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment action. Id. The complainant then must "be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer's] stated reason for [the employment action] was in fact pretext." Id. The Court later clarified that "although the McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, `[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407, 416 (1993) (citation omitted).
The Iowa Supreme Court has recognized this framework in age discrimination cases under the ICRA. Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa 1989). The parties do not dispute that Grutz established a prima facie case of age discrimination. They focus instead on the last two stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Because they have structured their arguments in just fashion, we will as well. Cf. Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Iowa 1990) (stating on review of jury verdict in discrimination case that "[a]lthough the three-stage order of proof and the presumptions described in McDonnell Douglas are useful to the court in structuring proof while the trial is in progress, once the jury finds discrimination, and the resulting judgment is being evaluated on appeal, these presumptions fade away and the appellate court should simply study the record to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and judgment").
A.U.S. Bank's Proffered Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
The district court cited the following facts concerning U.S. Bank's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for termination. A fifty-six-year old coworker of Grutz, Sharon Peters, was fired because her drawer did not balance. Grutz, angered by this action, "mounted a `noisy campaign challenging management's decisions.'" Grutz "confronted at least two managers making statements that at best are considered to be very disrespectful and show a lack of commitment as a team player." As a result, the district court found,
Without an appropriate level of commitment to participating in the employment expectations, the Defendant's management team made the decision that Plaintiff's open display of disrespect toward two higher-ranking employees showed an inability to respect the decision of the banks' management team, therefore requiring the termination of Plaintiff.
Grutz contends that the bank's stated ground for termination "cannot reasonably be found to be legitimate or credible." She urges that she merely followed U.S. Bank's "open communication policy" in voicing her concerns about Peters' termination. She also notes that she recommitted to her job when asked to do so. In light of these seemingly contrary facts, Grutz contends that, "whether [U.S. Bank's stated reason for her termination] is legitimate or not is an issue of fact the jury must decide." We disagree.
Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, an employer's burden is one of production rather than persuasion. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105, 117 (2000). This burden " precedes the credibility-assessment stage" and is met "[b]y producing evidence (whether ultimately persuasive or not) of nondiscriminatory reasons." St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S. Ct. at 2748, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 417 (1993) U.S. Bank satisfied this burden of production.
Included among the bank's attachments to its motion for summary judgment were supervisors' statements regarding the termination. One supervisor stated that Grutz's job performance was unsatisfactory "[b]ecause of her attitude." Another stated, "I could not believe her verbal recommitment to this job and the Branch where she worked when she had made it very clear to me that she had no respect for the management of that office, including myself." She continued, "I need and expect dedication/commitment and team spirit from all of the staff at our Branch in order to grow our business to the highest level possible." Also included among the attachments were notes prepared by Grutz. Grutz recalled telling her supervisor, "I wish you well as you continue to manage our branch. You'll have a tough road ahead, having lost our respect." On this record, the district court did not err in concluding that U.S. Bank met its burden of producing evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Grutz's termination.
B. Pretext
To survive summary judgment, an employee "must `prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.'" Kohrt v. Mid American Energy Co., 364 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Hitt v. Harsco Corp. 356 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2004)). "The showing of pretext necessary to survive summary judgment `requires more than merely discrediting [the employer's] proffered reason for the adverse employment decision. [The employee] must also prove that the proffered reason was a pretext for age discrimination.'" Id. at 898 (citing Spencer v. Stuart Hall Co., 173 F.3d 1124, 1128 (8th Cir. 1999)). "[T]he plaintiff's age must have `actually played a role in [the employer's decision making] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141, 120 S. Ct. at 2105, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 116 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338, 347 (1993)).
In a Title VII case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that Desert Palace does not mandate a modification of this element of the McDonnell-Douglas framework at the summary judgment phase. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
Grutz argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether U.S. Bank's stated reason for her discharge was mere pretext for age discrimination. She notes that, after expressing discontent with Peters's termination, she was treated differently than two employees in their twenties who expressed similar discontent.
The summary judgment record reveals a significant difference between Grutz's attitude and the attitudes of the younger employees. The younger employees showed remorse for challenging the Peters termination decision and recommitted to the bank without reservation or confrontation. Grutz, in contrast, told her direct supervisor she had lost respect for her and told another supervisory employee, "What kind of a woman are you to do such an injustice?" These statements bolster rather than undermine U.S. Bank's stated reason for terminating Grutz.
Testifying by deposition, their supervisor stated both employees "understood the bank's position." Although they were upset about Peters's termination, "they also understood that I needed them to get beyond this, recommit and do what the bank needed them to do."
Her supervisor testified, "I didn't understand how I could get 100 percent recommitment from her and then have her turn around and say she had no respect for me. As a team it doesn't get done that way."
Grutz also points to evidence of other employment decisions within the bank which, in her view, showed a general animus toward older workers. While certain older employees were discharged, the record does not establish that the terminations were based on age. Like Grutz, one employee displayed a confrontational attitude toward her superiors after being asked to recommit to the bank. Another resigned after her position was eliminated due to merger reorganizations. Finally, Peters, the employee whose termination precipitated the events leading to Grutz's discharge, received multiple warnings for errors.
Grutz's final piece of evidence to support her age discrimination claims is a supervisor's comment to a vice president of the bank that, "We generally only hire 20 to 24 year olds for the teller positions." While facially compelling, this evidence lacks a nexus with Grutz's termination decision. The person who made the comment was not Grutz's supervisor and, indeed, had no workplace connection with Grutz. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to age discrimination. See Hammer v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding summary judgment appropriate where evidence suggested decision-maker may have "harbored discriminatory feelings toward older employees in general," but did not suggest decision-maker discriminated against plaintiff personally).
The district court correctly concluded no genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank and Grutz failed to satisfy her burden of proving age discrimination.