However, the court refused to apply the doctrine because the plaintiff had not alleged any conduct by the defendant which amounted to fraud or material misrepresentation. 362 F. Supp. 642, 646. In two other cases cited by defendant, National Importing Trading Co. v. E.A. Bear Co. (1927), 324 Ill. 346, 358, and Grundy County National Bank v.Westfall (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 845, it was noted that Illinois courts will not allow the Statute of Frauds to be used to accomplish a fraud. In National Importing the oral change in a written contract was induced by the party who sought to raise the defense of the Statute of Frauds to the oral charge.

In these counts the bank argues that because it detrimentally relied on Vermeil's promise to guarantee the $250,000 loan, Vermeil is estopped from raising the defense of the Statute of Frauds. Vermeil, on the other hand, argues that permitting the bank to sidestep the Statute of Frauds by claiming detrimental reliance and constructive fraud would emasculate the Statute of Frauds defense. • 10 In Illinois, courts will not permit a party who has perpetrated a fraud to raise the defense of the Statute of Frauds. ( Grundy County National Bank v. Westfall (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 845, 301 N.E.2d 28, 32.) Moreover, the court in Grundy County suggests that advancement of funds made in reliance on an oral contract of guarantee may constitute substantial performance sufficient to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. ( Grundy County, 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 301 N.E.2d 28; contra Brown Shinitsky Chartered v. Dentinger (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 517, 519-20, 455 N.E.2d 128, 129-30.) For purposes of this determination, we hold simply that before Vermeil can raise the Statute of Frauds defense, he must first succeed in his defense against the allegation that he committed constructive fraud upon the bank.

The plaintiff has not suggested that either party to the alleged contract had fully performed the terms of the agreement. All except one of the cases cited and discussed by the plaintiff, with regard to his contention that partial performance by parties to an oral agreement will take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds, involved equitable relief. The case that does not involve equitable relief, Grundy County National Bank v. Westfall (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 845, 301 N.E.2d 28, 32, was decided, not on the basis of the doctrine of part performance, but on the basis of the rule that "the courts will not permit the Statute of Frauds, the only purpose of which is to prevent fraud, to be used where the effect will be to accomplish a fraud, and if the facts are such that it would be a virtual fraud to permit the defendant to interpose the statute, a court will not listen to that defense." • 3 In his brief the plaintiff makes no assertion that the mortgage of February 21, 1979, served as a memorandum of the alleged oral agreement, and, therefore, we do not consider that question.

§ 2-201(3)(c). This provision may appear to narrow the statute of frauds still further, but if anything it curtails a traditional exception, and one applicable to Illinois' general statute: the exception for partial performance, on which see, for example, Payne v. Mill Race Inn, 152 Ill.App.3d 269, 277-78, 105 Ill.Dec. 324, 330-331, 504 N.E.2d 193, 199-200 (1987); Grundy County National Bank v. Westfall, 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 845, 301 N.E.2d 28, 32 (1973). The Uniform Commercial Code does not treat partial delivery by the party seeking to enforce an oral contract as a partial performance of the entire contract, allowing him to enforce the contract with respect to the undelivered goods.

Given this, estoppel is not before this court. SM R did cite one case, Grundy County Nat'l Bank v. Westfall, 13 Ill.App.3d 839, 301 N.E.2d 28 (3d Dist. 1973), that held that a party's substantial performance could take a contract outside the statute of frauds. The case, however, was not a UCC case and could not have told the district court how Illinois would treat nonstatutory exceptions to § 2-201.

Appellant's final contention is that the oral promise to renew employment after the first year is unenforceable under the Illinois Statute of Frauds. This argument has no merit given, under Illinois law, as elsewhere, the Statute of Frauds would not bar enforcement of the contract where there has been partial performance by the parties. Anastaplo v. Radford, 14 Ill.2d 526, 153 N.E.2d 37 (1958); Yorkville National Bank v. Schaefer, 71 Ill.App.3d 137, 27 Ill.Dec. 263, 388 N.E.2d 1312 (2d Dist. 1979); Grundy County National Bank v. Westfall, 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 301 N.E.2d 28 (3rd Dist. 1973). Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 59, § 1 (1981) states:

I note briefly that, again, the cases cited by plaintiff do not help him. Johnson does not touch upon the issue of reasonable reliance, and, in any case, there was no written employment contract governing the parties' relationship. Similarly, Grundy Cnty. Nat'l Bank v. Westfall, 301 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) does not discuss reasonable reliance; nor does that case involve a claim for fraud. Finally, Janda is also distinguishable in that there was no fraud claim at issue in that case, and to the extent that the court there analyzed aspects of the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim by analogizing to the reasonable reliance requirement of a fraud claim, Janda is inapposite for the reasons discussed above. IV.

Mr. Swint entered into the 1995 agreements in an effort to help Mr. Wright pay off his debt and in lieu of collecting the money owed. It would be inequitable to find Mr. Wright may now avoid the debt altogether. "It is well established in [Illinois] that the courts will not permit the Statute of Frauds, the only purpose of which is to prevent fraud, to be used where the effect will be to accomplish a fraud and if the facts are such that it would be virtual fraud to permit the defendant to interpose the statute, a court will not listen to the defense." Grundy County Nat'l Bank v. Westfall, 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 301 N.E.2d 28, 32 (1973); see also Fried v. Barad 175 Ill. App.3d 382, 530 N.E.2d 93, 97, 125 Ill. Dec. 175, 179 (1988) ("[The Statute of Frauds] was not intended to effectuate or perpetuate an inequity or a fraud."). Thus, due to policy reasons, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable in this case.

If, in fact, Mr. Swint entered into the 1995 agreements in an effort to help Mr. Wright to pay off his debt and in lieu of collecting the money owed, it would be inequitable to find Mr. Wright may now avoid the debt altogether. "It is well established in [Illinois] that the courts will not permit the Statute of Frauds, the only purpose of which is to prevent fraud, to be used where the effect will be to accomplish a fraud and if the facts are such that it would be virtual fraud to permit the defendant to interpose the statute, a court will not listen to the defense." Grundy County Nat'l Bank v. Westfall, 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 301 N.E.2d 28, 32 (3d Dist. 1973); see also Fried v. Barad, 175 Ill. App.3d 382, 530 N.E.2d 93, 97, 125 Ill.Dec. 175, 179 (1st Dist. 1988) ("[The Statute of Frauds] was not intended to effectuate or perpetuate an inequity or a fraud."). Thus, due to policy reasons, the Statute of Frauds may be inapplicable in this case.

We disagree. • 6 The purpose and function of the requirement of a writing or memorandum in certain transactions covered by the Statute of Frauds is to aid in the prevention of fraud. ( Grundy County National Bank v. Westfall (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 839, 301 N.E.2d 28, appealdenied (1973), 54 Ill.2d 597.) It was not intended to effectuate or perpetuate an inequity or a fraud. Shenk v. Continental Illinois National Bank Trust Co. (1948), 334 Ill. App. 373, 79 N.E.2d 757, appeal denied (1948), 400 Ill. 628.