She was occupied at least in part with the care of the children, and there was nothing which she saw or could be required to see that was not visible to her husband, who was doing the driving. Defendant contends the court erred in refusing an instruction based on a theory of joint enterprise by the plaintiff and her husband. It is contended that the jury could find them to be acting as each other's agent or engaged in a joint enterprise in taking their son to the doctor, and that if it was so found then any negligence of the driver would be imputed to the plaintiff as well. Reliance is placed on Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co. 366 Ill. 330. We cannot accept the argument.

The automobiles driven by the defendants collided, and photographs in evidence show the left front of each car to be damaged. [1, 2] Citing Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 366 Ill. 330, 8 N.E.2d 934, defendant, Edgar Robbins, contends that the evidence shows plaintiff to have been engaged with him in a joint enterprise, and therefore, she cannot recover from him on a negligence theory. Absent evidence of a business enterprise, the rule enunciated in Grubb v. Illinois Terminal does not apply, Smith v. Bishop, 32 Ill.2d 380, 205 N.E.2d 461. As to defendant's contention that plaintiff was a guest, the testimony shows that plaintiff paid defendant $20, which defendant testified, was to pay her part of the expenses for gasoline and meals.

" The leading case on joint enterprises is Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co. (1937), 366 Ill. 330, 8 N.E.2d 934. The Grubb case involved a railroad-crossing accident in which plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in a car negligently driven by one of her sisters. The court found a joint enterprise based upon evidence that the sisters contributed to the payment of the expenses of the trip which was for the purpose of getting material to decorate their home.

"To define a joint enterprise there must be evidence of a common business purpose in which the occupants are mutually interested in the trip itself as part of such purpose and where each is responsible for the manner in which the car was operated. Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co. (1937), 336 Ill. 330, 339 ( 8 N.E.2d 934); Smith v. Bishop (1965), 32 Ill.2d 380, 385 ( 205 N.E.2d 461). Here the original complaint was sufficient to show that there was no mutual interest in the purpose of the automobile ride, and that the purpose was not a business purpose to the boys." (Emphasis by the Court.)

In our opinion, this statement clearly shows a divergence of interests. The district court in its memorandum opinion states that in Illinois there is no requirement that profits be shared in order to establish a joint venture, citing Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 366 Ill. 330, 8 N.E.2d 934 (1937). The fact situation and legal concept involved in that case are in apposite from those in the instant case.

But historical applications of the rule also show it does not require the level of formality that the term “business” might suggest. See Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 8 N.E.2d 934, 93839 (Ill. 1937) (finding sufficient evidence to support joint enterprise application where sisters agreed to travel together in a car to purchase materials to decorate their home); Matesevac v. Will Cty., 416 N.E.2d 807, 811 (Ill.App.Ct. 1981) (finding joint enterprise issue properly was submitted to the jury where evidence showed the purpose of the trip was to view a farmhouse for rent)

However, in Yokel, the court merely analyzed whether plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the plaintiffs and defendant had been a part of joint enterprise that created a fiduciary duty between them. 809 N.E.2d at 723, 726 ("Joint venture partners stand in a fiduciary relationship with each other as a matter of law."). And Plaintiffs' reliance on Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 8 N.E.2d 934, 366 Ill. 330 (1937), also does not support their argument that there is an independent joint enterprise claim under Illinois law. In Grubb, the court analyzed whether a third party driver's contributory negligence could be imputed to her passenger, the plaintiff, when the two engaged in a "joint enterprise" driving trip.

When asked if the sign was working, plaintiff said he looked at it, and "as far as [he] observed, it was not operating". The St. Louis Court of Appeals held that under the law of Illinois plaintiff's failure to look after entering a zone of unobstructed vision constituted contributory negligence unless his failure to look was excused by non-operation of the "blinker-light". The opinion then considered the case of Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 366 Ill. 330, 8 N.E.2d 934, 937 (decided in 1937), which involved the alleged non-operation of "flasher lights in the daytime". In that case the Supreme Court of Illinois stated: "We believe the sound rule to be that although the fact that a signal system is not operating is an indication to the traveler that it is safe to cross, nevertheless he is not thereby released of the duty of using reasonable care for his own safety.

s action must be determined under and according to the law of Illinois. Cox v. Term. Railroad Assn., 55 S.W.2d 685, 331 Mo. 910, 43 S.W.2d 571; Newlin v. Railroad Co., 222 Mo. 391, 121 S.W. 125; Caine, Admr., v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 209 Ala. 181, 95 So. 876, 32 A.L.R. 793. (2) Appellant's instructions in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence should have been given, for the following reasons: (a) Respondent had the burden of proof to show her intestate was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and she wholly failed to sustain that burden. Greenstreet v. A., T. S.F. Ry. Co., 234 Ill. App. 399; Opp v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 128 N.E. 580; Morgan v. R.B. J. Rd. Co., 251 Ill. App. 127; Dee v. Peru, 343 Ill. 36, 174 N.E. 901; Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1; Schopp v. Muller Dairies, 25 F. Supp. 50; Schlander v. Chicago So. Traction Co., 253 Ill. 154, 97 N.E. 233; Dambacher v. I.C. Ry. Co., 288 Ill. App. 457, 6 N.E.2d 227; Goodman v. C. E.I. Ry. Co., 248 Ill. App. 128; Grubb v. Ill. Term. Co., 366 Ill. 330, 8 N.E.2d 938; Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 Ill. 259, 88 N.E. 651; Ridgway, Admr., v. I.C. Ry. Co., 24 N.E.2d 759; Petro v. Kines, 299 Ill. 236; Ingle v. Maloney, 234 Ill. App. 151; Anderson v. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co., 243 Ill. App. 337; Burns v. C.A. Ry. Co., 234 Ill. App. 439. (b) The burden of proof to show that the deceased, Wolf, was exercising ordinary care was one of substantive law and goes to appellee's right to recover.

• 1 Generally, an automobile passenger is not liable for the negligent acts of the driver unless the passenger owns the automobile or a special relationship exists between them. ( Martino v. Leiva (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 1006, 1007, 479 N.E.2d 955; Fugate v. Galvin (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 573, 574, 575, 406 N.E.2d 19.) The special relationship of a joint venture ( Campanella v. Zajic (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 886, 887, 379 N.E.2d 866; Bridgewater v. Wagoner (1960), 28 Ill. App.2d 201, 208, 170 N.E.2d 785) endows the association with the characteristics of a partnership ( Prassas v. Nicholas W. Prassas Co. (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 311, 315, 418 N.E.2d 904), making each venturer an agent of the other. • 2 Citing Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co. (1937), 366 Ill. 330, 339, 8 N.E.2d 934, plaintiffs suggest they need only show that Walker and Matts were engaged in a business enterprise, in which they shared a mutual interest, to establish a joint venture. (See also Smith v. Bishop (1965), 32 Ill.2d 380, 385, 205 N.E.2d 461; Galliher v. Holloway (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 628, 633, 474 N.E.2d 797; Fugate v. Galvin, 84 Ill. App.3d at 576; Campanella v. Zajic, 62 Ill. App.3d at 887; Babington v. Bogdanovic (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 593, 598-99, 600, 288 N.E.2d 40.) Plaintiffs correctly portray the nature of a joint venture, but neglect other elements necessary to establish the relationship, namely: a community of interest in the business purpose; an expectation of profit and a concomitant duty to share all profits and losses; a shared proprietary interest in the subject matter of the venture; and the right of each venturer to direct and control the conduct of each other member of the enterprise.