A party seeking modification of child support payments in a dissolution action has the burden of showing not only a change in circumstances, but also that such change is a material or substantial change, and not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the decree was entered. Graber v. Graber, 220 Neb. 816, 374 N.W.2d 8 (1985); Ohler v. Ohler, 220 Neb. 272, 369 N.W.2d 615 (1985); Grothendick v. Grothendick, 175 Neb. 726, 123 N.W.2d 646 (1963). The appellee alleges that the material changes in circumstances from the original decree entered in August 1981 to the time of his application for reduction of child support were that he was unable to financially support himself and pay $780 per month as child support based upon his income, that his living expenses have increased, and that his wife was presently employed.
See Crandall v. Luhnow, 137 Neb. 13, 288 N.W. 29. We find nothing to indicate that the trial court abused its discretion or acted unreasonably in disposing of the issue as it did. Grothendick v. Grothendick, 175 Neb. 726, 123 N.W.2d 646. No basis therefore exists for disturbing the action of the trial court under the evidence in the record. AFFIRMED.
We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling. Anderson v. Anderson, 461 So.2d 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Simon v. Simon, 435 So.2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Hale v. Hale, 12 Mass. App. 812, 429 N.E.2d 340 (1981), and cases cited; Grothendick v. Grothendick, 175 Neb. 726, 123 N.W.2d 646 (1963); cf. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); but cf. Costa v. Costa, 429 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). We endorse the extensive analysis of the present issue in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976), where the court, in discussing the difference in a child's relationships with the residential and the non-residential parent, pointed out: