Grosvenor v. Bowen

10 Citing cases

  1. Starrett v. Botsford

    64 R.I. 1 (R.I. 1939)   Cited 17 times
    In Starrett v. Botsford, 64 R.I. 1, which clearly rules this case, the court at page 6 used the following quotation from Harris v. McLaran, 30 Miss. 533, which it had previously quoted with approval in Kenyon, Petitioner, 17 R.I. 149, 163. "`The terms "lawful heirs," "right heirs," and "heirs" are synonymous; their significance is fixed by law; and when they are used in a deed or will without any superadded words or phrases, indicating a different meaning, they are always understood to be used according to their legal acceptation.'"

    These respondents concede that there is another line of cases "holding that 'heirs' in connection with a gift of a remainder interest means heirs determined as of the time of the decedent's death", but that such cases "are readily distinguishable from the present one." Those cases are Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549; Green v. Edwards, 31 R.I. 1; Roberts v. Wright, 48 R.I. 139; Kenyon, Petitioner, 17 R.I. 149; Oulton v. Kidder, 128 A. 674 (R.I.); Goodgeon v. Stuart, 50 R.I. 6, decided in 1929. On the other hand, the respondents, who urge that the word "heirs" in the present will should be construed in its ordinary legal sense, contend that the three last above-cited cases particularly resemble the instant cause.

  2. In re Norris

    46 R.I. 57 (R.I. 1924)   Cited 12 times

    It is well established in our decisions that a remainder, although vested in right, may be divested upon the happening of an event before the remainder vests in enjoyment. Of this nature are remainders which the court has held to be vested but liable to be divested by the exercise of a power of disposition given to the life tenant, ( Moore v. Dimond, 5 R.I. 121; Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549) or to be divested, wholly or in part, by the exercise of a power of sale given to a trustee for the benefit of the life tenant. Kenyon, Petitioner, 17 R.I. 149.

  3. Barker v. Ashley

    58 R.I. 243 (R.I. 1937)   Cited 9 times

    The fact that possession of the estate could not be taken till after the death of the first taker does not preclude the remainder from being held to be vested. Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549; Chafee v. Maker, 17 R.I. 739. We perceive no reason why the general rule should not be applied in the instant case.

  4. Patton v. Corley

    107 W. Va. 318 (W. Va. 1929)   Cited 7 times

    We find a number of cases presenting situations analogous to the case under consideration, holding in effect that the remainder vested, subject to be defeated on the happening of a certain contingency. Boatman v. Boatman, 198 Ill. 414; Vandewalker v. Rolins, 63 N.H. 460; Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549; Farnam v. Farnam, 53 Conn. 261. These cases, in so far as they are based on a construction of the instrument as showing an intent that the condition should not be a condition precedent, fully support our position here. Being of the opinion that the testator intended the "grandchildren" to take a vested remainder at his death, we reverse the decree of the lower court and remand the cause.

  5. Manning v. Board of Tax Commissioners

    46 R.I. 400 (R.I. 1925)   Cited 31 times
    In Manning v. Board of Tax Comm'rs, supra, this court at page 411 held that the right to inherit was "a proper subject for taxation within the broad power of the State in that regard."

    In accordance with former decisions of this court Mr. Chapin upon the death of Mrs. Hill by reason of the provisions of her will received a vested interest in said land subject to be divested upon the death of her son leaving a child or children surviving, and further subject to be divested in the event that the son left no surviving children, but in his will exercised the power of appointment conferred by the will of his mother. Moore v. Dimond, 5 R.I. 121, at 129; Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549. Under somewhat analagous provisions of a will it was held in Kenyon, Petitioner, 17 R.I. 149, that a devise of a remainder after an equitable life estate was vested at the testator's death although the trustees were empowered to use the whole or any part of the trust estate during the life of and for the benefit of the equitable life tenant.

  6. Langley v. Conlan

    212 Mass. 135 (Mass. 1912)   Cited 28 times
    In Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, the court said: "It is a general principle that where property is given for the benefit of certain persons in such a way that no one else has or can have a possible interest in it, they are in effect absolute owners and should have the control and disposition.

    It has been so held in other jurisdictions. In re Hancock, 2 Ch. 173. Foakes v. Jackson, 1 Ch. 807. Leggett v. Doremus, 10 C.E. Green, 122, 127. Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67, 79. Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549. This principle prevails notwithstanding the general rule that appointees by exercise of a power take, not through the person making the appointment, but through the donor of the power. Where the execution of the power is voluntary on the part of the donee, his conduct may be such as to prevent the exercise of the power.

  7. Melcher, Petitioner

    24 R.I. 575 (R.I. 1903)   Cited 7 times

    Rogers v. Rogers, 11 R.I. 38, was in similar terms. So also Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549. Spencer v. Greene, 17 R.I. 727, was an application of the well-settled rule that when futurity is not annexed to the substance of the gift, but only to the time of payment, the right vests immediately. In that case the uncertainty was the death of a nephew.

  8. Hamilton v. Robinson

    151 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941)   Cited 5 times
    In Hamilton v. Robinson, 236 Mo.App. 289, 151 S.W.2d 504 (1941), the testator created a trust for the benefit of his son for education and support until age twenty-one.

    He could not under the power given him in the will of his father, by his own will at his death, defeat a deed he might now make or that the sheriff might make for him. "It is contrary to the spirit of our law to hinder a person sui juris in the management of property that is altogether his own. [Dado v. Maguire, 71 Mo. App. 642; Underhill on Trusts (Am. Ed.), p. 370, art. 57, and notes; Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395; Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549.]" Under the doctrine announced in the foregoing cases, we would be compelled to sustain appellant's contention and reverse the judgment of the trial court in this case.

  9. Connolly v. Connolly

    122 App. Div. 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907)   Cited 2 times
    In Connolly v. Connolly (122 App. Div. 492, 495) it was held that the fact that the five children of the testator "were also beneficiaries of the trust created for their respective lives is no obstacle to their taking vested remainders, limited upon said trust estate," citing Doane v. Mercantile Trust Co. (160 N.Y. 494) and cases therein cited on page 499.

    Nor does the existence of an unexecuted power of appointment interfere with the vesting of the remainder. ( Doe v. Martin, 4 Durn. East, 39, 65; Smith v. Lord Camelford, 2 Ves. Jr. 698; Sandford v. Blake, 45 N.J. Eq. 247; Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549; Root v. Stuyvesant, 18 Wend. 257, 268.) Section 31 of the Real Property Law (Laws of 1896, chap. 547) provides: "The existence of an unexecuted power of appointment does not prevent the vesting of a future estate, limited in default of the execution of the power."

  10. Wilson v. Vogel

    87 N.J. Eq. 584 (Ch. Div. 1917)   Cited 3 times

    To the same effect is Smith v. Death, 56 Eng. Reprint, 937. In Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R. I. 549, 10 Atl. 589. there was a bill for specific performance, the question of title being raised under a will which gave property to A. for life, on his decease to such person as he might appoint by his will, and in default of such appointment to the heirs of testatrix; it was held that he might release his power to appoint to the tenants in remainder or to extinguish it by joining with the other complainants in a deed conveying the bargained lot to the defendant in fee simple and therein releasing the power to him. There is a full discussion of the law in this case.