Gross v. Loft, Inc.

8 Citing cases

  1. Quinn v. Swift Co.

    20 F. Supp. 234 (M.D. Pa. 1937)   Cited 6 times

    and three federal courts apply the doctrine of the presumption of negligence; that two state courts and one federal do not; and that in Massachusetts, Georgia, New York, and Tennessee there are cases on both sides of the question. The cases applying the doctrine are: Bellingrath v. Anderson (1919) 203 Ala. 62, 82 So. 22; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Barksdale (1920) 17 Ala. App. 606, 88 So. 36; Whistle Bottling Co. v. Searson (1922) 207 Ala. 387, 92 So. 657; Franklin v. Argyro (1924) 211 Ala. 506, 100 So. 811; Collins Baking Co. v. Savage (1933) 227 Ala. 408, 150 So. 336; Reichert Mill. Co. v. George (1934) 230 Ala. 3, 162 So. 393; Eisenbeiss v. Payne (1933) 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 162; Heinemann v. Barfield (1918) 136 Ark. 456, 207 S.W. 58; Drury v. Armour Co. (1919) 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McBride (1929) 180 Ark. 193, 20 S.W.2d 862; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Bennett (1931) 184 Ark. 329, 42 S.W.2d 213; Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co. (Cal.App. 1935) 49 P.2d 877; Gross v. Loft, Inc. (1936) 121 Conn. 394,185 A. 80; Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co. (1905) 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1178, 110 Am.St.Rep. 157; Martin v. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1916) 18 Ga. App. 226, 89 S.E. 495; Bradfield v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1920) 24 Ga. App. 657, 101 S.E. 776; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp (1930) 41 Ga. App. 705, 154 S.E. 385; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dean (1931) 43 Ga. App. 682, 160 S.E. 105; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sinyard (1932) 45 Ga. App. 272, 164 S.E. 231; Coleman v. Dublin Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1933) 47 Ga. App. 369, 170 S.E. 549; Gainesville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Stewart (1935) 51 Ga. App. 102, 179 S.E. 734; Rost v. Kee C. Dairy Co. (1920) 216 Ill. App.? 497; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co. (1920) 189 Iowa, 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649; Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas (1930) 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701; Liggett Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin (1932) 246 Ky. 65, 54 S.W.2d 612; Kroger Grocery Co. v. Schneider (1933) 249 Ky. 261, 60

  2. Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc.

    324 Conn. 362 (Conn. 2016)   Cited 58 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Concluding same for product liability statute

    A primary justification for imposing strict liability has been that, as between the injured consumer and the manufacturer who has derived the economic benefits from the sale of the product, the latter is better able to insure against the risk and can pass that cost along to all consumers. See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. , 241 Conn. 199, 209, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997). See, e.g., Corneliuson v. Arthur Drug Stores, Inc., 153 Conn. 134, 214 A.2d 676 (1965) (implied warranty); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961) (breach of warranties and negligence); Crotty v. Shartenberg's–New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960) (implied warranty); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316, 130 A.2d 793 (1957) (negligence); Gross v. Loft, Inc., 121 Conn. 394, 185 A. 80 (1936) (warranty and negligence); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 A. 385 (1932) (negligence); Wolcho v. Rosenbluth, 81 Conn. 358, 71 A. 566 (1908) (negligence). "The elements of a strict liability action that this court derived from § 402A [of the Restatement [Second] ) required the plaintiff to prove: (1) the defendant was engaged in the business of selling the product; (2) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user; (3) the defect caused the injury for which compensation was sought; (4) the defect existed at the time of the sale; and (5) the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in condition."

  3. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Rees

    381 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1963)   Cited 2 times

    In Collins Baking Co. v. Savage, 227 Ala. 408, 150 So. 336, there was no question that plaintiff ate wire contained in the bread, The question resolved in that case was that the bread, when eaten, was in the same condition, insofar as it contained wire, as when purchased. In Gross v. Loft, Inc., 121 Conn. 394, 185 Atl. 80, there was proof that the chocolate bar eaten contained a pin. Nothing was left to surmise; the pin struck in plaintiff's tongue.

  4. Sapiente v. Waltuch

    127 Conn. 224 (Conn. 1940)   Cited 26 times
    In Sapiente the plaintiff sought damages for injuries, and in Burkhardt the plaintiff sought damages for death, caused by a breach of warranty in the sale of food.

    The claim of contributory negligence was not pressed in argument and is without merit. Gross v. Loft, Inc., 121 Conn. 394, 396, 185 A. 80. The plaintiff vomited repeatedly, was made nervous and apprehensive, was treated eight times by a doctor and had to put her baby on a bottle.

  5. Bagre v. Daggett Chocolate Co.

    126 Conn. 659 (Conn. 1940)   Cited 5 times

    Its contention amounts to this, that having established the care and supervision used in the manufacture and handling of its products, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur loses all probative force and all its potency to set up any presumptions or inferences of negligence, and, to all intents and purposes, drops out of the case; and that the plaintiff must then bear the burden of proving negligence in the usual manner without benefit of any such presumptions or inferences. The cases of Gross v. Loft, Inc., 121 Conn. 394, 185 A. 80, and Jump v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 117 Conn. 110, 167 A. 90, are relied upon in support of this proposition. In the former case where it appeared that the plaintiff was injured by eating a chocolate bar purchased of the defendant containing a pin within it, and the defendant offered no evidence of the process or care used in manufacturing it, we held that the doctrine was applicable justifying the trial court's inference of negligence upon the part of the defendant.

  6. Tupay v. Murdock

    1998 Ct. Sup. 7900 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998)

    "To deny to [an Administrator] in such a situation as the one before us the right to prosecute an action in the ordinary courts because of the pendency of the probate proceedings would be to deprive him of rights and advantages in the enforcement of his claim which the law intends that he should have, and, at least where he has not instituted the probate proceedings, their pendency cannot be permitted to deprive him of the right to bring an ordinary court action." Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 121 Conn. 394. The motion to dismiss on the basis of the prior pending action doctrine is denied. B. CONCLUSION

  7. Levine v. Wilson Co.

    16 Conn. Supp. 404 (Conn. C.P. 1950)

    To recover judgment against Wilson and Company, a finding of negligence is required. Proof of a specific act or omission of negligence was not offered. The plaintiff, however, invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on this phase of the case, citing Gross v. Loft, Inc., 121 Conn. 394; Bagre v. Daggett Chocolate Co., 126 Conn. 659, and Jump v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 117 Conn. 110. So also she makes reference to Burkhardt v. Armour Co., 115 Conn. 249, 264, which is not concerned with the application of the doctrine. The short answer on this phase of the case is that the court cannot find negligence on the part of Wilson and Company, inferentially or otherwise, for the presence of the offending dead fly in one of the slices of bacon.

  8. Nagy v. Continental Baking Co.

    12 Conn. Supp. 406 (Conn. C.P. 1944)

    The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies and an inference of negligence is drawn on the physical facts present, coupled with the declarations contained in the defendant's letter to the plaintiff. Gross vs. Loft, Inc., 121 Conn. 394; Bagre vs. Daggett Chocolate Co., 126 id. 659. Likewise a right of the plaintiff has been invaded for which compensation is due. There can be no doubt but that the presence and discovery of the oil constituted a proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical upset.