"`Thus the plaintiff must, at a minimum, show that the defendant was negligent either in the materials he used in treating the floor or in the application of them.'" Gross v. Frank's Warehouse Foods, 192 Ga. App. 539, 540 ( 385 S.E.2d 688). Nonetheless, where defendant moves for summary judgment the burden is cast upon defendant to pierce the plaintiff's allegations before any burden is placed on plaintiff to present evidence in support thereof.

Although the floor was shiny, the fact that Mrs. Goodman fell does not prove that the floor's condition constituted an unreasonable hazard. See Gross v. Frank's Warehouse Foods, 192 Ga.App. 539, 541, 385 S.E.2d 688 (1989); Flagstar Enterprises, supra, 267 Ga.App. at 858, 600 S.E.2d 834. Since Mrs. Goodman has failed to present admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a hazardous condition, her and her husband's causes of action must fail, and Wings and Things was entitled to summary judgment. See Gross, supra, 192 Ga.App. at 541, 385 S.E.2d 688 (summary judgment properly granted to defendant where plaintiff claimed that overwaxed floor caused her to slip and fall where she perceived the floor to be shiny, but offered no evidence showing that defendant negligently waxed the floor); see also Pinckney, supra, 288 Ga.App. at 893, 655 S.E.2d 650 (summary judgment properly granted to defendant because plaintiff “assumed” that slime caused her to fall).

Id. This, with respect to either the existence of a dangerous condition or negligence on the part of Young, she failed to do. Gross v. Frank's Warehouse Foods, 192 Ga. App. 539, 540 ( 385 S.E.2d 688) (1989). Sudduth has also failed to present admissible evidence showing that Young had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged hazard.

Such a lack of information has been fatal to an injured person's claims in many slip and fall cases, since identification of what has caused a slip is often the only means of establishing the fault or breach of duty of a proprietor, as well as the cause of the fall and resulting injuries. See Hospital Auth. of Ben Hill County v. Bostic, 198 Ga. App. 500 ( 402 S.E.2d 103); Gross v. Frank's Warehouse Foods, 192 Ga. App. 539, 541 ( 385 S.E.2d 688). This case is different in that the defect at issue here is not the cause of the slip, but the absence of a handrail intended to prevent a fall and injury resulting from any slip by a person on the ramp. The absence of the handrail is foreseeably a contributing cause of the fall of any person who slips while on the ramp.

Proof of nothing more than the occurrence of plaintiff's fall is insufficient to establish defendant's negligence. Gross v. Frank's Warehouse Foods, 192 Ga. App. 539 ( 385 S.E.2d 688). Judgment affirmed. Sognier, C. J., and Andrews, J., concur.

In response to appellee's piercing evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, appellant "had to set forth specific facts and present her case in full in order to show there was a genuine issue for trial. [Cit.] This she failed to do." Gross v. Frank's Warehouse Foods, 192 Ga. App. 539, 540 ( 385 S.E.2d 688) (1989). Appellant's own testimony reveals that she was unaware of the cause of her fall. Estelle Mann's affidavit concludes the floor was unduly slippery, however, that assertion is not supported by any probative evidence, as appellee correctly contends, of defects in the tile or its coating or evidence of the "quality of material used or the methods which [appellee] used in ... maintaining its floor."

Important as well is that plaintiff had equal or superior knowledge of the floor's condition and the absence of mats, since he traversed it three times before he fell. Controlling are such as Veazey v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 191 Ga. App. 601 ( 382 S.E.2d 411) (1989); Gross v. Frank's Warehouse Foods, 192 Ga. App. 539 ( 385 S.E.2d 688) (1989); Dyer v. Joe Rigatoni's of Atlanta, 191 Ga. App. 473 ( 382 S.E.2d 193) (1989); Rossano v. American Legion Post, 189 Ga. App. 610 ( 376 S.E.2d 698) (1988); Winn-Dixie of Greenville v. Ramey, 186 Ga. App. 257 ( 366 S.E.2d 785) (1988); Rush v. Food Giant, 183 Ga. App. 388 ( 358 S.E.2d 919) (1987); Alterman Foods v. Ligon, supra. There is no merit in plaintiff's contention that the statement of the store manger was an admission sufficient to carry the question of fault to a jury.