Therein we held that a "small controlled trash fire on one's own property" did not constitute an "attractive nuisance" which would impose liability upon the landowner. It is contended by appellant that the later cases of Mann v. Kentucky Indiana Terminal Railroad Co., Ky., 290 S.W.2d 820; Kentucky Indiana Terminal Railroad Co. v. Mann, Ky., 312 S.W.2d 451; and Gross v. Bloom, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 326, wrought a "great change in the law" which in effect impaired the authority of Goss. We do not regard the last three cited cases as effecting any change in the law.

In Shannon v. Butler Homes, Inc., 102 Ariz. 312, 428 P.2d 990, the court held that where an infant social guest collided with a sliding glass door the jury could properly find that, in view of the plaintiff's tender years and the illusion of space created by an invisible door, a hidden peril existed giving rise to a duty to warn the infant of its existence. Recently, in Gross v. Bloom (Ky.), 411 S.W.2d 326, where an infant guest stepped into a linen closet in the bathroom of the host's home and fell through a clothes chute into the basement, the court held that evidence that children had been playing for about an hour and had made enough noise to notify the host that they were playing games and were hiding in places, including closets, created a jury question as to the host's negligence. In the instant case, evidence that appellant had knowledge that his children played with the electric window mechanism presented a question for the jury as to whether he should have foreseen the entry of children into his car.

First, did a condition exist which Mr. Hettinger realized, or should have realized, would involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to Laura? Second, would a child of Laura's age and experience reasonably be expected to understand and appreciate the risk of any dangerous conditions in the swimming pool? It is immaterial whether Laura was an invitee or merely a licensee. Gross v. Bloom, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 326, 20 A.L.R.3d 1123 (1967); Louisville Trust Company v. Nutting, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 484 (1968); Johnson v. Simpson County Seed Implement Co., Ky., 438 S.W.2d 340 (1969). In these three cases, the court adopted the rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, with respect to artificial conditions dangerous to trespassing children.

This rule has reference to the doctrine of attractive nuisance, 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 343 B, Comment a, p 223, and is intended to make that doctrine "equally applicable where the child is a licensee or an invitee". Id, comment b. The cases so hold. See, e.g., Courtell v McEachen, 51 Cal.2d 448, 457; 334 P.2d 870, 875 (1959), Kemline v Simonds, 231 Cal.App.2d 165; 41 Cal.Rptr. 653 (1964), Gross v Bloom, 411 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Ky, 1967), Peterson v Richfield Plaza, Inc, 252 Minn. 215, 221; 89 N.W.2d 712, 717 (1958). Secondly, we disagree with the trial judge's characterization of Darwin and Rodney's status as technical trespassers.

His duty in either event was to conduct his activities with reasonable care for the safety of the appellant. This view is in accord with our decisions in Rabe v. Chesapeake Ohio Railway Co., supra; Sage's Adm'r v. Creech Coal Co., supra; Louisville Nashville Railway Co. v. Page, supra, and Kentucky West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, supra. Cf. Gross v. Bloom, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 326 (1967). It also finds support in Prosser on Torts, Fourth Edition, Section 60, page 379 and in the Restatement, Torts, 2d, Section 341, Activities Dangerous to Licensees.

In our recent cases we have recognized that the label "attractive nuisance" does not necessarily solve the problem presented in cases of this sort and we have emphasized the considerations which underlie the doctrine in determining questions of liability. Kentucky Indiana Terminal Railroad Co. v. Mann, Ky., 312 S.W.2d 451; Gross v. Bloom, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 326; and Louisville Trust Company v. Nutting, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 484. In the latter case we thus stated the governing principle (page 485):