Although "conservatism is in order" when relying on the practice of other jurisdictions to predict how the highest court of another state might rule, Lexington Ins. Co., 165 F.3d at 1093, we have some confidence that the Maryland courts would prefer the majority rule. In Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 297 A;2d 257 (1972), the Maryland Court of Appeals, in an effort to define "advertising" for the purposes of a Maryland statute prohibiting false advertising in real estate transactions, observed that advertising has been defined as: Any form of public announcement intended to aid directly or indirectly in the sale of a commodity, . . . [and] the act or practice of calling public attention to one's product, service, need, etc., esp. by paid announcements in newspapers and magazines, over radio or television, on billboards, etc. . . .
In the course of its opinion, the court held: In making our determination of the meaning of "convicted of a crime", we are strongly persuaded by the view of the Commission. Not only is the general rule that courts are not permitted to substitute their judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken, Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n., 267 Md. 259, 265 [ 297 A.2d 257] (1972), and see Code, art. 41, § 252(d), but the authority of the Commission to construe its own Rules is compatible with the full power the General Assembly bestowed upon it to control horse racing. Further, it is patent that the interpretation adopted by the Commission is not only consistent with, but essential to, its function and duty to see that horse racing is conducted fairly, decently and cleanly.
Even though the lyrics may vary at times, their substance is always in harmony. See, in addition to Bernstein 221 Md. at 224-225 and 230, 156 A.2d 657 and Dashiell 327 Md. at 137-138, 607 A.2d 1249, State Board v. Ruth, 223 Md. 428, 436-437, 165 A.2d 145 (1960); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 484, 204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849, 86 S.Ct. 95, 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965); Nuger v. Insurance Comm'r, 238 Md. 55, 61, 207 A.2d 619 (1965); Melfa v. Commissioner, 240 Md. 744, 746, 215 A.2d 755; cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001, 86 S.Ct. 1922, 16 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1966); Eger v. Stone, 253 Md. 533, 542, 253 A.2d 372 (1969); Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 268, 297 A.2d 257 (1972); Zeitschel v. Board of Education, 274 Md. 69, 79, 332 A.2d 906 (1975); Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 224-226, 334 A.2d 514 (1975); Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 511-513, 390 A.2d 1119 (1978); Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Services, 283 Md. 677, 683, 393 A.2d 181 (1978); Annapolis v. Annap. Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 394-396, 396 A.2d 1080 (1979); Courtney v. Board of Trustees, 285 Md. 356, 361-363, 402 A.2d 885 (1979); Md. State Dep't of Personnel v. Sealing, 298 Md. 524, 535-536, 471 A.2d 693 (1984); United Steelworkers v. Beth. Steel, 298 Md. 665, 679, 472 A.2d 62 (1984); Balto. Lutheran High Sch. v. Emp. Sec. Adm., 302 Md. 649, 660-661, 490 A.2d 701 (1985); Board of Educ., Mont. Co. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 35-36, 491 A.2d 1186 (1985); State Election Bd. v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 58-59, 548 A.2d 819 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644, 104 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989); Board of County Comm'rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 218, 550 A.2d 664 (1988); Cauc
In a number of our cases boards and agencies have appeared before us as appellees notwithstanding the fact that under the doctrine enunciated in Zoning Appeals Board v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938), and its progeny the agency might have no right to appear as an appellant. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Bd. of Appeals, 270 Md. 301, 310 A.2d 796 (1973); Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758 (1973); Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 297 A.2d 257 (1972); Jacobson v. Md. Racing Comm'n, 261 Md. 180, 274 A.2d 102 (1971); Amerley Community Ass'n v. Board, 229 Md. 261, 182 A.2d 811 (1962). In Schauder v. Brager, 303 Md. 140, 147, 492 A.2d 630, 634 (1985), we said, "It is intended that claimants be protected under Art. 101."
. . . [ Id. at 113.] Chief Judge Murphy observed for the Court in Zeitschel v. Board of Education, 274 Md. 69, 82, 332 A.2d 906 (1975), "[A] court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of the administrative agency from which an appeal is taken, Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 297 A.2d 257 (1972). . . . [T]his is especially true in matters involving public education, Bernstein v. Board of Education, 245 Md. 464, 226 A.2d 243 (1967).
We agree with the decision of the lower court which concluded, in effect, that there was no substantial evidence before the State Board on the record considered as a whole to support its determination that the County Board's action in terminating Miss Zeitschel's contract was unlawful or unreasonable. We are, of course, mindful of the principle that a court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of the administrative agency from which an appeal is taken, Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 297 A.2d 257 (1972), and that this is especially true in matters involving public education, Bernstein v. Board of Education, 245 Md. 464, 226 A.2d 243 (1967). We are also mindful of the admonition set forth in Insurance Comm'r v. Nat'l Bureau, 248 Md. 292, 236 A.2d 282 (1967), that in reviewing decisions of administrative agencies, the court's appraisal or evaluation must be of the agency's fact-finding results and not an independent original estimate of or decision on the evidence, and that the required process requires restrained and disciplined judicial judgment so as not to interfere with the agency's factual conclusion where supported by evidence.
We preface our discussion of the issues presented for decision here by recognizing that when the courts of this State consider appeals from determinations made by administrative agencies they "are not permitted to substitute their judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken." Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 297 A.2d 257 (1972). See Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm., 221 Md. 221, 230, 156 A.2d 657, 662 (1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 419, 80 S.Ct. 1257, 4 L.Ed.2d 1515 (1960).
The Commission found as a fact from the evidence adduced at the hearing that it was the latter reason which precipitated Easton's action in terminating Gutwein's employment. Being supported by substantial evidence, the Commission's finding should have been accepted by the circuit court. See Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 297 A.2d 257 (1972); Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm., 221 Md. 221, 156 A.2d 657 (1959); Article 41, § 255. (2)
The lower court stated that although Maryland law requires that claims must be only potentially covered by the policy, Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975), it found that the customary and normal usage of "advertising activity" did not include sales or solicitation as alleged by Peoples in the underlying case. Second, the lower court relied on Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 297 A.2d 257 (1972), for the proposition that advertising must be in the form of a public announcement ( i.e., calling public attention to one's product, service, need, etc.). The lower court held that there was no public announcement alleged in Peoples' complaints, but only private solicitations which, according to the court, are not encompassed by the term "advertising."
The agency's expertise in setting attorney's fees in workmen's compensation cases is not to be undermined. See Resetar v. State Bd. of Education, 284 Md. 537, 554, 399 A.2d 225, 238-39, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838, 100 S.Ct. 74, 62 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979); Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 265, 297 A.2d 257, 260 (1972); Mayor of Baltimore v. Bowen, 54 Md. App. 375, 386, 458 A.2d 1242, 1249 (1983). We conclude that Judge Hinkel properly declined to grant Barnes a de novo trial on the question of the amount of counsel fee to be awarded.