"[W]here the intention in granting an easement is to afford only a right of ingress and egress, it is the right of passage, and not any right in a physical passageway itself, that is granted to the easement holder" (Lewis v Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443, 449; see Panday v Allen, 187 A.D.3d 775, 778). Here, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that the intent of the parties was to include a right of ingress in the easement, as the words "entrance to" are crossed out in the definition of "Access Use" in the grant of easement (see Lewis v Young, 92 N.Y.2d at 449; Grosbard v Abbey on Willow Lane, LLC, 192 A.D.3d 773, 775). The plaintiff also failed to establish, prima facie, that the defendants were interfering with the plaintiff's rights under the grant of easement (see Panday v Allen, 187 A.D.3d at 778).

0 [2012] ; Sedor v. Wolicki, 206 A.D.2d 854, 855, 616 N.Y.S.2d 124 [1994] ), terms which courts will generally interpret to mean an interest or right in an estate that is not conveyed to the grantee (see Somerset R.R. Corp. v. Owasco Riv. Ry., 69 N.Y.2d 1023, 1026, 517 N.Y.S.2d 911, 511 N.E.2d 54 [1987] ; Corning v. Lehigh Val. R.R. Co., 14 A.D.2d 156, 163–164, 217 N.Y.S.2d 874 [1961] ; see alsoCity Club of Auburn v. McGeer , 198 N.Y. 609, 609–612, 92 N.E. 105 [1910] ; Las–Daub Realty Corp. v. Fain, 214 App.Div. 8, 13, 210 N.Y.S. 623 [1925] ). Initially, it is clear that the 1954 EADA–Bourgeois deed creates only a right-of-way easement across the land now constituting the subject parcels, and, "[a]s a rule, where the intention in granting an easement is to afford only a right of ingress and egress, it is the right of passage, and not any right in a physical passageway itself, that is granted to the easement holder" ( Lewis v. Young, 92 N.Y.2d at 449, 682 N.Y.S.2d 657, 705 N.E.2d 649 ; seeGrosbard v. Abbey on Willow Lane, LLC, 192 A.D.3d 773, 775–776, 144 N.Y.S.3d 92 [2021] ; Panday v. Allen, 187 A.D.3d 775, 778, 133 N.Y.S.3d 303 [2020] ). Under these circumstances, accepting plaintiff's position – that the land described in terms of Bourgeois’ easement was never in fact conveyed to the Parkers during a period of development on Crow Point – would "lead[ ] to the rather illogical result" of leaving Joachim with title to a right-of-way granted to another "but none of the surrounding property" ( Carter v. Heitzman, 198 A.D.2d 649, 650, 603 N.Y.S.2d 614 [1993], lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 751, 611 N.Y.S.2d 133, 633 N.E.2d 488 [1994] ; compare Somerset R.R. Corp. v. Owasco Riv. Ry., 69 N.Y.2d at 1024–1026, 517 N.Y.S.2d 911, 511 N.E.2d 54).

; Rivera v Bruzzese, 93 A.D.3d 1124, 1125-1126 [2012]; Sedor v Wolicki, 206 A.D.2d 854, 855 [1994]), terms which courts will generally interpret to mean an interest or right in an estate that is not conveyed to the grantee (see Somerset R.R. Corp. v Owasco Riv. Ry., 69 N.Y.2d 1023, 1026 [1987]; Corning v Lehigh Val. R. R. Co., 14 A.D.2d 156, 163-164 [1961]; see also City Club of Auburn v McGeer, 198 NY 609, 609-612 [1910]; Las-Daub Realty Corp. v Fain, 214 A.D. 8, 13 [1925]). Initially, it is clear that the 1954 EADA-Bourgeois deed creates only a right-of-way easement across the land now constituting the subject parcels, and, "[a]s a rule, where the intention in granting an easement is to afford only a right of ingress and egress, it is the right of passage, and not any right in a physical passageway itself, that is granted to the easement holder" (Lewis v Young, 92 N.Y.2d at 449; see Grosbard v Abbey on Willow Lane, LLC, 192 A.D.3d 773, 775-776 [2021]; Panday v Allen, 187 A.D.3d 775, 778 [2020]). Under these circumstances, accepting plaintiff's position - that the land described in terms of Bourgeois' easement was never in fact conveyed to the Parkers during a period of development on Crow Point - would "lead[] to the rather illogical result" of leaving Joachim with title to a right-of-way granted to another "but none of the surrounding property" (Carter v Heitzman, 198 A.D.2d 649, 650 [1993],