Grondahl v. Bulluck

156 Citing cases

  1. Ciardelli v. Rindal

    582 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1998)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that plaintiff's physician-patient relationship ended when plaintiff failed to return for recommended follow-up care

    See id. "Where there are disputed questions of material fact as to whether a plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations, these questions are to be decided by a jury." Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982). I.

  2. Fitzgerald v. Silverman

    A17-1224 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2018)

    Generally, medical-malpractice actions in Minnesota accrue when "the physician's treatment for a particular condition ceases"; this is known as the termination-of-treatment rule. Doyle v. Kuch, 611 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. App. 2000) (quoting Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982)). There is an exception, however, "where there is a single act of allegedly negligent conduct.

  3. Offerdahl v. U. of M. Hospitals Clinics

    411 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    Advising use of and undertaking to insert IUD constitute "isolated incident," or single act, for purposes of statute of limitations

    ANALYSIS A motion for summary judgment may be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, this court must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.

  4. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic

    691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982)   Cited 113 times
    In Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411-412 (8th Cir. 1982), and Fitz v. Dolyak, supra, 712 F.2d at 333, we rejected similar due process arguments, and most courts have rejected the due process claims asserted here. See, e.g., Adair v. Koppers Co., 541 F. Supp. 1120, 1128 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., supra, 655 P.2d at 826-827; Carter v. Hartenstein, supra, 455 S.W.2d at 920; Klein v. Catalano, supra, 437 N.E.2d at 522; Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., supra, 382 A.2d at 720-721.

    In the present case the district court properly applied the Minnesota case law interpreting Minn.Stat.Ann. § 541.07. Moreover, the principles relied on by the district court were recently reaffirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Grondahl v. Bulluck, Minn., 318 N.W.2d 240 (1982). In Grondahl, the court stated:

  5. DeRogatis v. Mayo Clinic

    Civil No. 4-83-645 (D. Minn. Jun. 1, 1987)

    Medical malpractice actions ordinarily accrue upon the termination of treatment by the physician for the particular condition for which the physician's assistance was sought. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1982);Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories Division of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 1971); Schmit v. Esser, 236 N.W. 622, 624 (Minn.

  6. Bliss v. Stevens

    544 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 1 times
    Declining to consider existence of agency relationship when party failed to raise issue before district court

    A jury should decide fact questions regarding whether a statute of limitations bars a claim. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982). The statute of limitations provides that an individual must commence an action against a physician or surgeon for medical malpractice within two years of the date on which the cause of action accrued.

  7. Peterson v. Fortier

    406 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    Holding dismissal of claim against surgeon improper because disputed issues of fact existed over whether, under joint enterprise theory, surgeon's treatment did not terminate until family doctor's treatment of ailment terminated

    A motion for summary judgment may be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.03; Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 1982). The district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Vieths v. Thorp Finance Co., 305 Minn. 522, 525, 232 N.W.2d 776, 778 (1975) (per curiam), and on appeal this court must view the evidence most favorable to the one against whom the motion was granted.

  8. Krause v. Farber

    379 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 20 times
    Applying two-year statute of limitations to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

    Where there are disputed questions of material fact as to when treatment ceased and whether the action is barred by the statute of limitations, those questions are for the jury. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 359, 236 N.W. 622, 625 (1931). On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the issue is whether a jury could reasonably have concluded that treatment did not cease more than two years before the commencement of the action.

  9. Wehrman v. United States

    648 F. Supp. 386 (D. Minn. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    Under Minnesota law, an action for medical malpractice accrues when the physician's treatment of the particular condition ceases. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1982), quoting Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Minn. 1982). In a disputed case, the courts will consider three factors in determining when treatment ceases:

  10. Molloy v. Meier

    679 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 2004)   Cited 52 times
    Holding that "a physician's duty regarding genetic testing and diagnosis extends beyond the patient to biological parents who foreseeably may be harmed by a breach of that duty"

    To ameliorate this problem, we fashioned the "termination of treatment rule," under which a cause of action for medical malpractice will not accrue until the plaintiff ceases treatment with the defendant physician. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Schmitt v. Esser, 178 Minn. 182, 186, 226 N.W. 196, 197 (1929). This rule is intended to extend the statute of limitations by assuming that the negligent conduct of the physician occurred on the last day of treatment unless the plaintiff's injury was caused by a discrete, identifiable act.