See id. "Where there are disputed questions of material fact as to whether a plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations, these questions are to be decided by a jury." Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982). I.
Generally, medical-malpractice actions in Minnesota accrue when "the physician's treatment for a particular condition ceases"; this is known as the termination-of-treatment rule. Doyle v. Kuch, 611 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. App. 2000) (quoting Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982)). There is an exception, however, "where there is a single act of allegedly negligent conduct.
ANALYSIS A motion for summary judgment may be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 1982). On appeal, this court must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.
In the present case the district court properly applied the Minnesota case law interpreting Minn.Stat.Ann. § 541.07. Moreover, the principles relied on by the district court were recently reaffirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Grondahl v. Bulluck, Minn., 318 N.W.2d 240 (1982). In Grondahl, the court stated:
Medical malpractice actions ordinarily accrue upon the termination of treatment by the physician for the particular condition for which the physician's assistance was sought. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1982);Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories Division of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 1971); Schmit v. Esser, 236 N.W. 622, 624 (Minn.
A jury should decide fact questions regarding whether a statute of limitations bars a claim. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982). The statute of limitations provides that an individual must commence an action against a physician or surgeon for medical malpractice within two years of the date on which the cause of action accrued.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.03; Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 1982). The district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Vieths v. Thorp Finance Co., 305 Minn. 522, 525, 232 N.W.2d 776, 778 (1975) (per curiam), and on appeal this court must view the evidence most favorable to the one against whom the motion was granted.
Where there are disputed questions of material fact as to when treatment ceased and whether the action is barred by the statute of limitations, those questions are for the jury. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 359, 236 N.W. 622, 625 (1931). On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the issue is whether a jury could reasonably have concluded that treatment did not cease more than two years before the commencement of the action.
Under Minnesota law, an action for medical malpractice accrues when the physician's treatment of the particular condition ceases. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1982), quoting Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Minn. 1982). In a disputed case, the courts will consider three factors in determining when treatment ceases:
To ameliorate this problem, we fashioned the "termination of treatment rule," under which a cause of action for medical malpractice will not accrue until the plaintiff ceases treatment with the defendant physician. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Schmitt v. Esser, 178 Minn. 182, 186, 226 N.W. 196, 197 (1929). This rule is intended to extend the statute of limitations by assuming that the negligent conduct of the physician occurred on the last day of treatment unless the plaintiff's injury was caused by a discrete, identifiable act.