We review the BJA's decision to deny claims under the Benefits Act to determine “ ‘(1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements and provisions of implementing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the government officials involved; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the decision denying the claim.’ ” Id. (quoting Amber–Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed.Cir.2007)); see also Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2007); Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508, 511 (Fed.Cir.1995). Here, we must decide whether the BJA complied with the Benefits Act and its own regulations in determining that the decedents did not qualify as “public safety officers” because they were formally employed by a private company that had an independent contractual relationship with the government.

We review the BJA's decision to deny claims under the Benefits Act to determine "'(1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements and provisions of implementing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the government officials involved; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the decision denying the claim.'" Id. (quoting Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508, 511 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Here, we must decide whether the BJA complied with the Benefits Act and its own regulations in determining that the decedents did not qualify as "public safety officers" because they were formally employed by a private company that had an independent contractual relationship with the government.

"The Supreme Court has held that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference by the courts." Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); see also Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The BJA's "interpretation of its own rule or regulation is entitled to 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'"

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 284, 126 S.Ct. 904, 163 L.Ed.2d 748 (2006) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778). We also acknowledge that this court has previously found that the Bureau's interpretations of the PSOBA have the force of law and are thus entitled to deference under the rubric of Chevron. Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007). II.

Christine Wells GROFF and Michael Wells, petitioners, v. UNITED STATES.Case below, 493 F.3d 1343. Motion of Associated Air Tanker Pilots and Aerial Firefighters, and California Fire Pilots Association for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.

Additionally, the decisions were not made by the head of the EPA but instead by a mid-level Agency official. See Aplt. Supp. Br. at 7–8; see also, e.g. , Groff v. United States , 493 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (one factor in the court's conclusion that it should provide Chevron deference to the agency action was that the adjudication at issue was "formal and culminate[d] in a formal written decision by the head of the agency, not a nonbinding disposition by a low-level agency official").Next, the decisions hold no precedential value for third parties.

And in Groff v. United States , we held that the Bureau of Justice Assistance's (BJA) legal interpretations announced through adjudication were entitled to Chevron deference. 493 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In Groff , the statute allowed the BJA to establish "rules, regulations, and procedures" to administer a benefits program for public safety officers.

Additionally, the decisions were not made by the head of the EPA but instead by a mid-level Agency official. See Aplt. Supp. Br. at 7-8; see also, e.g., Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (one factor in the court's conclusion that it should provide Chevron deference to the agency action was that the adjudication at issue was "formal and culminate[d] in a formal written decision by the head of the agency, not a nonbinding disposition by a low-level agency official").Next, the decisions hold no precedential value for third parties.

Additionally, the decisions were not made by the head of the EPA but instead by a mid-level Agency official. See Aplt. Supp. Br. at 7–8; see also, e.g. , Groff v. United States , 493 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (one factor in the court's conclusion that it should provide Chevron deference to the agency action was that the adjudication at issue was "formal and culminate[d] in a formal written decision by the head of the agency, not a nonbinding disposition by a low-level agency official").Next, the decisions hold no precedential value for third parties.

See NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 129–130, 92 S.Ct. 360, 30 L.Ed.2d 312 (1971) ("It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)); Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2007) (because "Congress did not [ ] define" the relevant term, the statute is silent as to its meaning). Accordingly, the effective date provision does not speak to what action or conduct by the claimant constitutes an informal claim.